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Summary
The Impact of the Haitian Revolution on the Hispanic Caribbean, c.1791-1830
This thesis examines how the slave uprising in the French Caribbean sugar colony of 
Saint-Domingue (1791-1804) had dramatic and long-lasting repercussions on the 
neighbouring Spanish possessions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. Events 
in Saint-Domingue took place during a period of profound change in the Spanish 
colonies. Reforms implemented during the reign of Carlos III (1759-1788) had begun 
to shift the imperial economic focus from the extraction of precious metals in Spain’s 
American colonies towards the potential of intensive agriculture, especially sugar. The 
process was accelerated by France’s loss of Saint-Domingue in 1804, which presented 
the Spanish islands under Carlos IV (1788-1808) with the opportunity to have a much 
larger share of the sugar trade – a chance which Cuba and Puerto Rico were quick to 
seize. At the same time, Napoleon Bonaparte’s overthrow of the Spanish monarchy, 
the war against France (1808-1814), and the writing of a Spanish constitution (1812) 
precipitated the unravelling of most of Spain’s empire, bar the Philippines and the 
sugar islands in the Caribbean. The thesis focuses on how relations between Madrid 
and the Caribbean islands were significantly altered in the wake of peninsular 
upheaval. At the same time, this work also considers the islands’ reconfigured 
relationship with new republic of Haiti, formed by the freed slaves of Saint-
Domingue. Drawing from correspondence between the crown and the island 
authorities, as well as between colonial officials, this thesis also examines the culture 
of fear that permeated the Spanish possessions. Initially, this fear reflected anxieties 
about Saint-Domingue-style slave rebellions, but as mainland Spanish colonies 
became independent – and Santo Domingo fell under Haitian control in 1822 – this 
fear took on a new dimension and became a vital tie between Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
Madrid, contributing to the continuation of colonial rule until the Spanish-American 
War of 1898.
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Introduction: Rebellion, Rupture, and Reconfiguration in the Caribbean 
‘With those two words “liberty and equality” these people will do much 
damage...’
– Report to Santo Domingo Governor Joaquín García, 5 November 17901
In 1791 the French Revolution’s arrival in the Caribbean ignited a massive slave 
rebellion in France’s most valuable colony, Saint-Domingue. The uprising not only 
uprooted France’s colonial order, but caused deep concern on the neighbouring slave-
holding Spanish islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo, echoing the 
anxiety on the peninsula about the events of 1789. The quote that begins this chapter 
was taken from a commander’s report to the captain-general and governor of Santo 
Domingo. The Eastern side of the island, which was a Spanish colony, had received a 
steady stream of news and rumours about Saint-Domingue, which occupied the 
Western third of the island. Commander Vicente’s remark in many ways embodied the 
Spanish worldview about the French during this period – hostility, suspicion, and 
doubt. The fight to keep republican ideas North of the Pyrenees had been under way 
in Europe for some time. Now it appeared that the same struggle was about to come to 
the Caribbean’s shores. The island initially named Hispaniola was divided between 
Spanish and French, and the two sides would take divergent paths in their responses 
to the events of 1791. And the responses of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo 
would themselves become an important factor in setting out the different trajectory 
the islands would take compared with Spain’s other territories in the Americas.
 However, it was not the dismissal of ‘liberty and equality’ by Spanish 
governors that was the genesis of this thesis, but rather the 1808 battle cry of ‘¡Viva 
1
1 Commander Vicente to Joaquin García, 5 November 1790, Archivo General de Indias, Seville 
(hereafter)AGI, Santo Domingo, legajo 954
‘Con estas dos palabras Libertad é Igualidad esas gente harán mucho daño ...’; see chapter 2.
Fernando VII!’ in Santo Domingo. It was here I became aware of the many 
contradictions of the colonial Hispanic Caribbean that had been obscured by a wider 
historical interest in the march to independence – there has been less scrutiny of the 
ties that bound each island to an increasingly weak Spain, yet these ties persisted 
throughout the fraught decades of the early nineteenth century. While researching a 
master’s dissertation I became interested in the mostly forgotten battle by Juan 
Sánchez Ramírez and his band of loyalists in Santo Domingo. They defeated 
Napoleon’s troops in 1808-09 in order to regain their place as Spain’s colony at a time 
when other Spanish American colonies were beginning to consider very different 
political possibilities (this is detailed in Chapter 3). The contrary nature of these 
events at such a critical juncture for the American colonies became the starting point 
of unravelling a much larger series of events, stretching back to the Bourbon reforms 
of the 1760s and going into the nineteenth century to intersect with the loss of most of 
Spain’s empire and the rise of the former slave colony turned republic of Haiti.2 So in 
finding Sánchez Ramírez, I also encountered Toussaint L’Ouverture. And in tracing 
the relationship between France, Spain, and the Caribbean during the age of Atlantic 
reconfigurations, it became clear that the continuities during this period were as 
numerous as the ruptures. 
 Part of my aim was simple: to put Sánchez Ramírez and L’Ouverture in the 
same story and to explain the impact of the reconfiguration of the French Caribbean 
on the Hispanic Caribbean world. The reason I focus on Spain and its islands is 
because of how uncomfortably they sat with the rest of Europe and the West Indies. 
Of course there were similarities – the British, French, Dutch, and Danish also had 
slave colonies in the Caribbean. But the changes that swept through the region in the 
nineteenth century – not least the abolition of the slave trade – were virtually ignored 
by the Spanish islands. Likewise, the threat unleashed by the French Revolution was 
2
2 I will use Saint-Domingue when referring to events that took place on the French colony until 1804, 
when it declared itself the republic of Haiti.
stifled in Spain, and it would not be until the crisis of 1808 that a form of liberalism 
began to emerge on the peninsula. Part of the story of Caribbean continuity was also 
to do with the economic shift towards Cuba and Puerto Rico as much as it was to do 
with their loyalist mindset, the genesis of which I examine over the course of this 
thesis. The uniqueness of these islands lies not only in these contradictions, but in the 
consistency in which such contradictory ideas and practices endured.
 Another aim of this thesis is to paint a trans-colonial picture of the Caribbean 
and bring together the three islands. A cursory glance gives the impression that their 
stories do not fit – Cuba and to a lesser extent Puerto Rico became rich on sugar and 
coffee and remained colonies until 1898, while Santo Domingo fell under French and 
later Haitian rule, becoming independent in 1844. The three islands have not been put 
together in this context, yet their collective experiences provide a more complete 
picture of the complications of this period, something that I put in the context of 
Spain’s own struggles and the story of Haitian independence. This thesis, then, brings 
together these many elements – from the Enlightenment thought of eighteenth-century  
Europe, to the impact of French republicanism in Spain and beyond, to the Caribbean 
loyalty to the crown in the age of Latin American independence. But there is one 
more important factor that arose during this period, and it is the one that provides a 
route through the historical density of this period – fear.
Fear, Haiti, and historiography
The commonplace observation that ‘fear of slave rebellions’ kept Cuba and Puerto 
Rico (though not Santo Domingo) in the imperial fold during and after the age of 
Latin American independence movements would appear fairly straightforward.3 By 
the early 1800s the two islands had seen substantial prosperity during a ‘second 
3
3 Santo Domingo’s bumpy road to independence in 1844 is detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.
slavery’ of sugar riches.4 These islands could not afford to eschew a long-standing 
relationship with Spain, unlike their more populated cousins in Central and South 
America, which were economically and demographically different. Santo Domingo, 
not as prosperous, felt the need to seek the crown’s protection from the incursions of 
the French. The criollo – i.e. Caribbean-born Spaniards – elites across the islands 
wanted to draw on Spain’s resources in keeping public ‘order’ in a society containing 
rising numbers of people of colour and that would later face the rising threat of 
republicanism. They feared the combination of a small number of whites and the 
prospect of independence, which many felt could ignite a race war, like they had seen 
in the neighbouring French colony of Saint-Domingue. What started out as a battle for 
equality by mulattos (people classified as mixed European and African parentage) in 
that colony, sparked complete upheaval, one of the results of which was a slave 
rebellion that lasted for 13 years and ended with the establishment of the republic of 
Haiti. 
 Yet I sensed this ‘fear’ in the Spanish colonies was far more multifaceted and 
multidimensional than had been depicted, so I set out to excavate it and give it some 
shape by tracing the fear from the period of the Saint-Domingue slave rebellion in 
1791, through the turbulent decades that followed, until the 1830s. My aim was to 
unpick it; to understand the contours of this fear; to examine its source – in this case 
the overthrow of a slave-owning regime – within the context of the continuity of the 
Spanish colonies. There seemed to be key flashpoints of anxiety: the slave rebellion in 
what would become Haiti; the arrival of refugee planters and the stories, information, 
and sugar production technology they brought with them to the Spanish islands; the 
question of free people of colour; Napoleon’s invasion of Spain; and the subsequent 
independence movements in Latin America. In this stream of events, my aim was to 
4
4 For more on the idea of Cuban ‘second slavery’ see Dale Tomich, ‘The Wealth of Empire : Francisco 
Arango y Parreño, Political Economy, and the Second Slavery in Cuba’, in  Christopher Schmidt-
Nowara and John M Nieto-Phillips (eds) Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and 
Legends, (Albuquerque, 2005), pp.54-85.
discern how the nature of fear changed, and, if so, how it was manipulated by the 
Spanish colonial authorities. The question, remained, however – how to measure and 
quantify fear. 
 Fear was a symbiotic part of the colonial relationship, but that did not make it 
static. For Caribbean criollos in the first half of the eighteenth century, their more 
immediate threats and worries concerned possibilities such as an attack by Spain’s 
long-standing enemy, Britain, or the loss of goods or money due to piracy. The 
stability of the Spanish crown, the Catholic Church, and the functioning of the 
colonial order were not the concerns of the day. What both France and Saint-
Domingue brought to the Spanish world by the end of the century was a new and 
complicated set of anxieties. The execution of the monarch and the Terror in 
revolutionary France petrified the Spanish crown. Likewise, the example set by the 
former slaves of Saint-Domingue was terrifying for plantation owners around the 
Caribbean. These fears were later compounded by Spanish America’s embodiment of 
the larger reconfigurations in the European and colonial world, and these would come 
in the form of the Spanish constitution of 1812 and the later independence 
movements. At the same time, social and intellectual changes across Europe and the 
Caribbean were also a cause for unrest – the rise and growth of print culture and a 
public sphere, as well as the increase in port traffic and commerce, offered more 
avenues for the exchange of ideas and information. Although the Spanish inquisition 
tried to keep ‘contagious’ ideas out of Spain and its territories, it was an impossible 
mission – new intellectual forces had been unleashed in Europe and the Caribbean. 
 Timing and context also had every part in shaping fear, as well as giving me 
the impetus to undertake research into these particular islands at this particular 
moment: the period 1791-1830 was the time of reconfiguration of Spanish 
imperialism. Although it seemed Spain’s empire was effectively over by the 1820s, it 
was not. Indeed, the Caribbean colonies would have a starring role in the empire that 
5
remained. Certainly, by the 1820s, Spain had lost the majority of its holdings, from 
New Spain to Rio de la Plata, and was left only with two of its Caribbean islands, the 
Philippines and some small holdings in Africa. Gone were the days of Potosí silver, 
but they were being replaced by those of Caribbean sugar. This economic turn 
underpinned a new fear because the crown, the colonial authorities, and the planters 
knew exactly what could be lost – they had watched the example of Saint-Domingue. 
As slave imports rose, so did their anxiety. Plantation agriculture in the Spanish 
Caribbean had taken off as Saint-Domingue’s was falling, a point not lost on planters. 
In addition, the crown, long accustomed to the metal wealth of the Americas, had 
become interested in the economic potential of agriculture by the late 1700s. This 
interest would later turn into a dependency when the metal-rich territories of Mexico 
and Peru declared their independence. So in this context, a slave rebellion could not 
only ruin a planter’s fortune, it could destroy an entire colonial economic system. 
 However, this story is not merely about the Caribbean or Spain – it is global. 
The ‘entanglement’ of Britain, France, and Spain in the region would see shifting 
power balances throughout the nineteenth century, with the Caribbean mirroring the 
dramatic changes occurring on the European continent.5 By 1814, Spain was on the 
periphery of Europe, its liberal reforms outlined in the 1812 constitution scuppered by  
the Bourbon restoration, which would spark cycles of civil war that would last until 
the 20th century.6 France and Britain, on the other hand, went on to expand their 
imperial reaches. But while British scholars have long debated the meaning of first 
and second empires through ideas like Bayly’s ‘imperial meridian’7 or Robinson and 
6
5 Eliga Gould, ‘Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish 
Periphery’, The American Historical Review 112, No 3, 2007, pp.764-786.
6 See for instance, Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1975 (Oxford, 1982).
7 CA Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London, 1989).
Gallagher’s ‘imperialism of free trade’,8 Spain, it would seem, would have to be 
resigned to what Josep María Fradera has called ‘colonias para después de un 
imperio’ – colonies after an empire – a poetic coda on more than 300 years of imperial 
rule.9 Yet it was still an empire, and one in the throes of a sugar revolution in the 
Caribbean. More broadly, the years 1791-1830 mark a very specific and fraught time 
for Spain and its American colonies, as well as being a period of drastic economic 
change through the growing agricultural wealth of the Caribbean. Thus the ‘fear of 
slave rebellions’, as such, cannot be divorced from the larger geo-political and 
economic changes that Spain and its colonies underwent during the early decades of 
the nineteenth century. 
 So while this thesis has at its core the concrete objective of examining the 
Spanish Caribbean during this tumultuous time, I also wanted to undertake the less 
clear-cut task of trying to understand the anxiety of the period. Deciding how to 
approach this was not straightforward – whose fear, after all, am I examining? In the 
end, I decided to focus on colonial administrators. The reason is that they were the 
link between the crown and the public, and they were at the frontline of anxiety. They 
had to not only follow royal orders, which often were useless or unenforceable, they 
also had to work with the planters to prevent runaway slave colonies from growing, 
and monitor who was coming in and out of their ports. Amid the upheaval of the 
nineteenth century, they had to worry not only about external threats but internal ones, 
as pro-independence movements began to be organised by criollos. Colonial officers 
and administrators provided the immediate response when they felt the crown’s 
7
8 John Gallagher, and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History 
Review, 6, No 1 (1953), pp.1-15; also see Oliver MacDonagh, ‘The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade’, 
The Economic History Review,14, No 3 (1962), pp. 489-501; DCM Platt, ‘The Imperialism of Free 
Trade: Some Reservations’, The Economic History Review, 21, No 2 (1968), pp. 296-306; and Platt, 
‘Further Objections to an “Imperialism of Free Trade”, 1830-60’, The Economic History Review, 26, 
No 1 (1973) pp. 77-91.
9 In fact, it is the title of his study of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. See Josep Maria Fradera, 
Colonias para después de un imperio (Barcelona, 2005).
interests to be under threat, and it is along these lines that I trace fear in this work. 
How did this fear manifest itself? It came out in correspondence – especially between 
island governors. To measure it – if such a thing is possible – requires an examination 
of actions. To determine what was provoking panic or concern, it is necessary to look 
at what was done to quell any disquiet. For instance, in Cuba, one constant action that 
emerges is the repeated refrain that non-Cubans were not allowed on to the island, 
especially anyone from Saint-Domingue. This call went out repeatedly, and was often 
related to rumours that former slaves were going to invade. Another ongoing theme, 
for example, was the treatment of free people of colour within the islands, and their 
surveillance. How colonial authorities responded to fear can help to illustrate how the 
Spanish regime dealt with the dramatic changes that took place during this period. 
 Writing a history that attempts to trace and examine fear raises complicated 
questions: to what extent do emotions and history mix, or is it the preserve of 
psychologists or sociologists? And if emotion does have place in the writing of 
history, how is it, and should it be, discussed?10 Is it only limited to people, or can 
institutions, administrations and governments have an ‘emotional life’? Lucien 
Febvre, the French historian and one of the founders of the Annales school, contends 
that psychology has a very important place in many aspects of history – including that 
of institutions – arguing that:
[T]he very subjects from which people claim to exclude all intuitive 
imagination, i.e. the history of ideas and the history of institutions, are 
precisely for the psychological historian excellent fields for research, 
reconstitutions and interpretation ... For the historian cannot understand or 
make others understand the functioning of the institutions in a given period or 
the ideas of that period or any other unless he has that basic standpoint, which 
I for my part call the psychological standpoint, which implies the concern to 
8
10 See Peter Stearns, ‘Fear and Contemporary History: A Review Essay’, Journal of Social History, 40, 
No 2 (2006), pp. 477-84.
link up all the conditions of existence of men of any given period with the 
meanings the same men gave to their own ideas.11
 Although his idea is clear, the practice is more problematic. Many historians 
have addressed this issue by taking a broad view of emotions, rather than focus on a 
specific one, in order to address this question. For example, William Reddy has 
described as ‘sentimentalism’ the emotions often found among the public in the early 
days of the French Revolution, and he argues there is a noticeable shift in public 
discourse reflecting changes in the interior lives of historical subjects.12 A recent 
volume entitled An Emotional History of the United States examines many facets of 
North American life, from literary expressions of grief to anger in the workplace. Its 
editors contend that: ‘History has been felt; the lives of men and women have had an 
emotional dimension. That dimension had not only given shape to history but also 
created history, as men and women have acted on their feelings, sometimes 
knowingly, sometimes not.’13
 And while analysing emotions opens up new historical doors, focusing on fear 
can bring together the interior world of people and insight into larger political actions 
and group mentalities. It is in the realm of the political that much work has been done. 
Corey Robin argues that there is more than one type of political fear. He says that the 
first type concerns ‘the definition and interpretation by political leaders of public 
objects of apprehension and concern’; the second type ‘arises from the social, 
political, and economic hierarchies that divide a people’.14 Stanley Rachman, a 
psychologist, has noted the difference between the expectation of the real dangers that 
9
11 Lucien Paul Victor Febvre and Peter Burke, A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre 
(London, 1973), p.19.
12 William M Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge, 2001), p.141.
13 Jan Lewis and Peter N Stearns, An Emotional History of the United States, (New York, 1998), p.1.
14 Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford, 2004), p.18.
trigger fear, and the more vague emotion of anxiety. He outlines three routes to fear: 
conditioning, vicarious acquisition (meaning direct or indirect observation), and 
transmission of ‘fear-inducing’ information.15 Despite these pathways, Kate 
Hebblethwaite and Elizabeth McCarthy point out that fear is ‘curiously nebulous’.16 
Perhaps for that reason works which focus on this issue of fear have a wide historical 
range – they stretch from mediaeval to modern times, and examine any number of 
probable causes, from religion to revolution. Around the period of the American 
Revolution, for instance, Gordon Wood examines the ‘paranoid style’ of eighteenth-
century North America.17 In my own work, Georges Lefebvre’s classic book, The 
Great Fear (La grande peur) of 1789, was a very important starting point. In it, he 
picks apart the notion of the ‘great fear’ which stalked the countryside of France at the 
beginning of the French Revolution and argues that there were different streams of 
fear, not just one massive panic.18 More recent events, such as the terror attacks on the 
United States on 11 September 2001, inform Joanna Bourke’s meditation on fear in 
late-nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain and North America. She trawls through 
collective fears and individual responses, as well as the role of the mass media in 
both. And while she points out that ‘fear has become the emotion through which 
public life is administered’ in the context of the present day, such an observation 
would not be out of place with regards to the nineteenth-century Caribbean.19 This 
idea goes further for William Naphy and Penny Roberts, who see fear ‘as an historical 
phenomenon, not as a psychological or instinctual condition, although these factors 
10
15 Stanley J Rachman, Fear and Courage (New York, 1989); Jim Shanahan, ‘Fearing to Speak: Fear 
and the 1798 Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century’, in Kate Hebblethwaite and Elizabeth McCarthy, 
(eds), Fear: Essays on the Meaning and Experience of Fear (Dublin, 2007), p.32.
16 Hebblethwaite and McCarthy, Fear, p.9.
17 Gordon S Wood, ‘Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth 
Century’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 39, No 3 (1982), pp.402-41.
18 Georges Lefebvre, The Great Fear of 1789 (Princeton, 1982[ed]), p.138.
19 Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London 2006), p.x.
may inform our understanding of what constitutes fear’. They claim their interest to 
be the ‘logistics of fear’, examining how people, in this case in Early Modern Europe, 
coped with threats.20 Jean Delumeau, whose El miedo en occidente (La peur en 
occident) is often referenced in Spanish works around this subject, argues the real 
issue is even larger – that we must understand the world’s ‘constant dialogue with 
fear’, and he examines this from ancient to modern times.21 This work was one of the 
influences for a conference and subsequent volume in Peru on the issue of fear. El 
miedo en Perú similarly takes a wide approach, sweeping from early colonial 
encounters to twentieth-century politics, stopping to address the impact of the French 
Revolution and how colonial officials were worried about its influence in Peru.22 
 Of course this is not to overlook or dismiss the personal fears of people on the 
ground, which in many ways are more immediate and understandable. Bodily fear 
during a period of upheaval and uncertainty is an obvious reaction. With regard to the 
time of the Haitian Revolution, personal tales surfaced in contemporary accounts, 
such as the roman à clef Secret History Or, The Horrors of St Domingo, in which a 
young woman, Mary Hassel, tells in an epistolary manner what she sees during the 
last days of Saint-Domingue. For instance, in relating a story of a white family in 
1802, whose eldest daughter spurned the advances of a Haitian soldier, Hassel paints 
a grisly picture: ‘The monster gave her [the daughter] to his guard, who hung her by 
the throat on an iron hook in the marketplace, where the lovely, innocent, unfortunate 
victim slowly expired.’23 An earlier work of an anonymous creole planter from Saint-
Domingue, entitled My Odyssey: Experiences of a Young Refugee from Two 
11
20 William G Naphy, and Penny Roberts, Fear in Early Modern Society (Manchester, 1997), p.2.
21 Jean Delumeau, El miedo en occidente (Madrid, 2002), p.10. Lamentably, this work has never been 
translated into English, though many of his other works have. 
22 Claudia Rosas Lauro (ed), El miedo en el Perú, siglos XVI al XX (Lima, 2005).
23 Mary Hassel, Secret History Or, the Horrors of St Domingo in a Series of Letters, Written By a Lady 
At Cape Francois, to Colonel Burr, Late Vice-President of the United States, Principally During the 
Command of General Rochambeau, (Philadelphia, 1808), pp.152-53.
Revolutions, tells, through a series of letters, about the fighting on the island between 
1791-1798, though he spent some of this time in North America. His letters contain a 
number of poems, lamenting his change in fortunes: ‘I can clearly see the den of 
crimes, / The results of great disaster and of suffering, /And the tombs of many 
victims. / Alas, these burnt plains serve but to remind me / Of that first time, how as a 
pupil of Bellona / I avenged my friends, so vilely slain; / These memories, to this day, 
shake my very soul.’24 Joan Dayan argues that Hassel’s work blurs the boundary 
between fact and fiction, revealing the complicated relationships among the many 
members of colonial society. For Dayan, and Matt Clavin, first-hand accounts and 
histories written around this period about Saint-Domingue are part of a Gothic 
discourse about the slave rebellion, and its ‘pleasing terror’.25
 Interactions between people, not just individual observation, also provide 
valuable information. Events were fueled by stories and rumours, and while there was 
a small print culture in Spain and the Spanish Caribbean, it was subject to approval by 
the Inquisition or wary officials. Additionally, many people – including slaves – were 
illiterate, so the only way they could obtain information was to hear it from someone 
else. Fear and anxiety could materialise out of rumours. Julius Sherrard Scott’s work 
on the networks of communication among black people in the Caribbean world during 
this time is testament to the power of this means of transporting information, as well 
as the potency of misinformation.26 Michael Craton, in discussing how false rumours 
of emancipation circulated around the region after the initial slave uprising in Saint-
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24 Althea De Parham (ed), My Odyssey: Experiences of a Young Refugee From Two Revolutions, By a 
Creole of Saint Domingue (Baton Rouge, 1959), p.168.
25 Joan Dayan, Haiti, History, and the Gods (Berkeley, 1998), p.173; Hassel, Secret History; see also 
Matt Clavin, ‘Race, Rebellion, and the Gothic: Inventing the Haitian Revolution’, Early American 
Studies (2007), pp.1-30.
26 Julius Sherrard Scott, ‘The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of 
the Haitian Revolution’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Duke Univeristy, 1986).
Domingue, called it the ‘rumour syndrome’.27 Likewise, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
Rediker’s The Many Headed Hydra, while focusing on the British Atlantic world, 
reminds historians that the maritime nature of European imperial enterprise could put 
those who spread such rumours and news – sailors, slaves, pirates, contrabandists – 
well beyond the reach of the authorities.28 Such elusive characters fuelled fear in the 
Caribbean as much as events. Because these people were often outside the boundaries 
of criollo society, they could also be on the receiving end of colonial anxiety, bearing 
the brunt of repressive measures to ensure public ‘order’.
 Understanding what compelled colonial officials to act is part of this question 
as well – fear, after all, can only be contingent on the events that prompt it. The 
anxieties of administrators of outposts of an empire in the nineteenth century would of 
course be different to today’s concerns; it is the historian’s challenge not to map 
modern anxieties on to the past. That is not to say, however, that there is no 
commonality with the twenty-first century. Context is still key, and understanding the 
Spanish Caribbean during this period means realising the colonial obsession with 
public ‘tranquility’, which was difficult to maintain in a world in which foreign ships 
could bring invasion or illegal trade, or in which rebellious slaves could subvert the 
existing social order. 
 The different responses of colonial officials and the general climate of fear 
have been given many names over the years by historians of slavery, the Haitian 
Revolution, or the Hispanic Caribbean islands. Antony Maingot has argued that a 
‘terrified consciousness’29 grew out of the slaves’ journey to freedom, as events in 
Saint-Domingue were an example of actual behaviour, and thus a possibility for other 
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1816-1832’, Past and Present, 85, (1979), pp.99-125.
28 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and 
the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000).
29 Anthony P Maingot, ‘Haiti and the Terrified Consciousness of the Caribbean,’ in Gert Oostindie (ed) 
in Ethnicity in the Caribbean: Essays in Honor of Harry Hoetink, (London, 1996), pp.53-80.
slave-owning islands. The Puerto Rican historian Arturo Morales Carrión blamed the 
‘síndrome haitiano’ for actions such as the island’s governor ordering the arrest of any 
people of colour who arrived from Haiti in 1807. He goes on to argue that the 
establishment of Haiti laid deep social division between members of the public who 
wanted slave labour to develop the economy against those who wanted free workers.30 
Clarence Munford and Michael Zeuske have called Cuba’s reaction an ‘ambivalent 
paranoia’, meaning that the elites’ rush to cash in on sugar wealth would only be 
tempered by the possibility that the same type of social upheaval could happen to 
them.31 These contemporary attempts to make sense of the atmosphere are useful – 
especially as they highlight the gaps between what people feared would happen and 
what actually did. Yet these vague notions do not go far enough. As Ada Ferrer has 
written with regards to Cuba,
The fear of Haiti – and in general what is called ‘black fear’ – has penetrated 
 the history of Cuba, and also the historiography about Cuba, that is, the 
 argument that in Cuba independence arrived 80 years late because of the 
 “black fear” ... To allude simply to Haiti – or to black fear – serves as an 
 explanation. It doesn’t demonstrate itself but its existence is assumed ... 
 Although the fear of Haiti is used to explain, it is not itself explained.32
Indeed, Ferrer’s work and that of others in a volume on Cuba and the Haitian 
Revolution examines this question in closer detail. For Sibylle Fischer, however, the 
question is much wider – it is about a long-standing Western ideological rejection of 
the revolutionary modernity offered by Toussaint L’Ouverture, as expressed in his 
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Boletin de la academia puertorriqueña de la historia VIII, No 30 (1983), pp.139-56.
31 Clarence J. Munford and Michael Zeuske, ‘Black Slavery, Class Struggle, Fear and Revolution in St. 
Domingue and Cuba, 1785-1795’, The Journal of Negro History, 73, No 1 (1988), pp.12-32.
32 Ada Ferrer, ‘Noticias de Haití en Cuba, Revista de Indias, 63, No 229 (2003), pp.675-94. See also 
Ada Ferrer, ‘Reading the Revolution: Contemporary Discourse and Ideology’, Doris L Garraway (ed), 
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1801 constitution.33 Likewise, there is the ‘silencing’ of the ‘unthinkable’ past, as 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has described it.34 Indeed, in comparison with the volumes of 
work on the French and American revolutions, events in Haiti have received little 
attention until recent years.35 However, since around the time of the 200th anniversary 
of independence there has been renewed scholarly interest in many aspects of the 
impact of events in Haiti, which include addressing the question of modernity set out 
by Fischer.36
 This would not be the case in Spanish Caribbean literature. The main historical 
themes in Spanish and English about Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic 
during this period can be likened to the overlapping circles of a historiographical 
Venn diagram. One circle contains the march towards nationhood (or not, in the case 
of Puerto Rico); in the next circle is slavery studies, which is usually part of broader 
transnational works; and in the last one is economics, with a focus on agricultural 
development (i.e. sugar and coffee) and trade. Imagining the intersections of these 
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circles, the overlapping sections represent the myriad histories on themes such as race 
or creole identity. Additionally, the islands – especially Cuba – are bit-part actors in 
the larger colonial histories of Latin America and/or Spain, sometimes receiving 
attention, at other times only meriting passing mention.37 The remainder of this 
section will focus on slavery and economic ideas, as there is a very large 
historiography about the struggle for independence across all three islands, but very 
little that just focuses on this earlier part of the colonial period (opting to put it in the 
context of the more significant fights for nationhood that happen after 1830 on all the 
islands).38 Because their respective historiographies have the question of the nation in 
the back of their mind, so to speak, the wider regional connections and comparisons 
often go overlooked, including their responses to Haiti, with the notable exception of 
David Geggus’s work.39 However, the one area in which they are forced together is in 
slavery studies. This, of course, has numerous branches. There are the large 
transnational literatures that tend towards the comparative development of slave 
societies in the Caribbean and the Americas.40 Complementing that are works on 
abolition and the transition to free labour in the Spanish Caribbean, such as 
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37 See for instance, David Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the 
Liberal State, 1492-1866 (Cambridge, 1991); Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of 
Empire in Spain, Britain and France c1500-1800 (New Haven, 1995); John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 
1700-1808 (London, 1993); JH Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 
1492-1830 (New Haven, 2006).
38 See for instance, Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (New York, 1995); 
Gordon K Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (New York, 1963).
39 David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering (eds) The World of the Haitian Revolution (Bloomington, 
2009); Geggus,The Impact of the Haitian Revolution; Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies.
40 There is too large a body of work on this theme to detail here, but see for instance, Hilary McD 
Beckles, ‘Capitalism, Slavery and Caribbean Modernity’, Callaloo, 20, 4 (1997), pp. 777-89; Robin 
Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern (London, 1997); 
Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison, 1969); David Brion Davis, The 
Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, 1975); Seymour Drescher, From 
Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York, 1999); 
Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies: A Comparison of St. Domingue 
and Cuba (Baton Rogue, 1996); Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study 
(Cambridge, 1982); Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1994).
Christopher Schmidt-Nowara’s Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, 1833-74.41 There are works about slaves’ roles across Spanish America, such as 
the volume Slaves, Subjects and Subversives, as well as their African pasts.42 
Additionally there is a growing interest in the legal world of slaves, from the codes 
that were supposed to govern them in the Spanish colonies to the recourse they had 
against bad treatment.43 And of course, the question of rebellion and revolution (apart 
from Haiti), for which there is also an extensive literature.44
 On more economic matters, outside the bounds of slave labour itself, the 
national divisions become clearer. Cuban literature tends to focus on sugar in Cuba, 
for instance, Manuel Moreno Fraginals’ El Ingenio being the key work on the rise of 
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the sugar industry.45 Cuban historians have also undertaken a growing body of 
regional histories which take in other forms of development, such as coffee 
plantations in the East of the island.46 Puerto Rico has its own traditions with regard 
to the histories of both crops.47 Santo Domingo follows a slightly different path, 
formed by its ‘tragic narration’, as Pedro San Miguel has called it, of centuries of 
decline.48 The writing of colonial history would take a different form to the others, 
due to the racism of the island’s dictator, Rafael Trujillo (1930-61), whose rejection of 
the island’s black past – ‘the cradle of blackness’ as Silvio Torres-Saillant has put it49 
– meant that racial questions in a largely mixed-race island would infiltrate many 
aspects of history during his reign and after. The question of Haiti, however, would 
18
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become a historical obsession. The focus at first was on Haiti as an ‘occupier’50 and 
then later, after the death of Trujillo, with both Haitians and Dominicans cast as 
mutual victims of colonial oppression.51 But such binary views have obscured more 
nuanced understanding of the tangled history of the two sides of the island. 
 So this thesis fits into many historiographical gaps. It adds to the wide-ranging 
history of fear, intersects with the rich literature on slavery and race in the Caribbean, 
and pushes it in new directions. It raises again the question of fear and colonial rule. 
Most of the works cited earlier in this chapter examine either the present day or the 
early colonial past, often skipping over the turbulent late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries. Understanding colonial rule in the context of political and social 
fear is something that can shed light on the mechanics of empire, and is fundamental 
in the case of the continuation of colonial rule in the Caribbean. Obviously many 
historical events give rise to fear or anxiety: wars, famines, revolutions. Likewise, it is 
hard to imagine a colonial regime anywhere at any time that does not co-exist with 
some level of anxiety, which can be just as much a historical mover as outright fear 
and even panic. The Haitian Revolution, like the American and French revolutions, 
occurred at a time where many forces gave rise to new ideas and new actions, and this 
upheaval was not limited to France’s colonial world. How other places responded to 
these new threats and challenges is part of its impact as well. Another aim of this 
work is to move beyond the march to the nation and concentrate instead on the inter-
island connections – as well as the relationship to the metropole in a time of dramatic 
change.
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Chapters (and some caveats)
In attempting to define my question and the limits of my investigation, I ran into a 
number of problems. First is the issue of the ‘Caribbean’. While this thesis sets out to 
look at Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo, it necessarily involves Venezuela, 
Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Louisiana, i.e. the truly Caribbean world of the Spanish empire. 
And while the Caribbean story is part of the larger Atlantic world, my work focuses 
on the Caribbean. A more ‘Atlantic’ project would perhaps involve southern US port 
cities, other European metropoles, and slaving outposts in Africa. Indeed it was 
difficult enough to find space and time to do a modicum of justice to the archival 
wealth on these islands alone, much less Spain’s larger circum-Caribbean and the 
wider Atlantic.52 In addition to Spain’s territories, there are the islands of the other 
imperial powers, most importantly Saint-Domingue, as well as France’s Martinique 
and Guadeloupe; Britain’s Jamaica and, eventually, Trinidad; the Dutch territories of 
Curaçao; and the Danish West Indies (today’s US Virgin Islands). They are all part of 
this work, but I took the decision to not write a history of fear in the entire Caribbean. 
These islands faced many of the same problems as the Spanish ones with regard to the 
rise and fall of sugar plantations, though with very different outcomes. Necessarily, 
many of these islands show up in this work, though they often do not in much of the 
existing literature. Although there is not enough space to elaborate, much French and 
British historiography falls into the same trap as the Spanish. It is linguistically 
isolated and although it deals with similar themes, broadly speaking, there seems to be 
little connection. In a work on Jamaica, Cuba may only come up in passing mention. 
Indeed, even in key works on the Haitian Revolution as mentioned above, Spanish 
Santo Domingo, much less the surrounding islands, is virtually invisible, as if the 
struggle took place in some sort of colonial vacuum. And although the scale of such a 
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pan-Caribbean project lies outside the scope of this work, understanding the Spanish 
islands means some level of inclusion of the others. Nor, despite this work’s title, did I 
want to get pulled too deeply into the story of Haiti, despite the new and exciting 
work that has emerged on its revolutionary period. For the purposes of this thesis, 
what happens on that island is the starting point of a new chapter for the Caribbean, as 
well as for Spain and its empire. Indeed, understanding Spain’s dramatic 
transformation and the reconfiguration of its nineteenth-century empire was another 
motivation for this study. 
 The second problem was the issue of fear and how to map it. As the earlier 
historiographical overview shows, there are a multiplicity of approaches. In writing 
this thesis, fear fluctuated within the chapters, as it did throughout the records for this 
period. Thus, like the emotion itself, fear will fluctuate throughout this work, 
sometimes being obvious, sometimes subdued by other events – and sometimes, 
simply, unknowable. So rather than my initial aim of tracing it, and using that as the 
main focus, I am instead looking at its variations and intersections with other social 
and political shifts. Despite its often nebulous form, I attempt to give this some shape 
in each chapter by highlighting the various type of events that were causing anxiety in 
the islands and the metropole and the official responses to them, as will be detailed in 
the chapter outlines that follow. 
 The third issue was that of sources. Because my root concern was the 
formation and manipulation of fear in the context of the many challenges facing the 
Spanish Caribbean islands, I took the decision to focus on colonial correspondence, 
between island governors and in letters to Madrid. Archives in Spain and the 
Caribbean have a rich seam of colonial correspondence, much of it underutilised. The 
abundance of administrative material allowed me to cast a wide net in examining this 
question, leading me away from court documents, which would have provided more 
depth but less breadth. In dealing with slavery and racial issues during this period, it is 
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lamentable that there are no written sources from free people of colour, much less 
slaves. It is only through reports and court proceedings that we can see their treatment 
in Spanish colonial society, something that court records reveal far more than letters 
between administrators. The administrative records show the number of laws and the 
many official attempts to keep ‘order’ and to enforce racial hierarchies, rather than the 
struggle by people of colour to transcend them legally. But to understand the 
mechanics of fear, I wanted to start with those who created it. This has also meant that  
there was not time or space to look at some of the other integral parts of Spanish 
colonial society, especially the Catholic Church, which would be another project 
entirely. 
 The first chapter unearths the roots of this investigation and argues that the 
starting point for understanding what happens to Spain’s nineteenth-century empire 
begins at the height of the ‘Bourbon reforms’ undertaken by Carlos III (1759-1788), 
as he sought to ‘reconquer’ his colonies through administrative, political, military, and 
economic changes.53 One of his key reforms was the usurpation of the evolving 
criollo order with new political and administrative structures, which would necessitate 
the supplanting of criollo elites with peninusulares from Spain. This was not well-
received in much of Spanish America, and would prove to be an important rupture 
between the crown and its subjects, laying the foundations for later independence 
movements. Yet in the Caribbean, reform efforts would result in quite a different 
relationship. This was partly due to the specific historical trajectories, from 1492 until 
the eighteenth century, of each island, which this chapter outlines. Puerto Rico, while 
underpopulated, was an important military outpost, and its potential was 
acknowledged by a military reformer who was quick to tell the crown of the possible 
agricultural wealth such a fertile island could offer. Its neighbour, Santo Domingo, 
however, had long fallen away from the imperial gaze. But with the outbreak of the 
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slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue, it would once again become a frontier. Cuba 
received more attention and benefits than the other two. Fueled by an ambitious 
planter class and supported by a crown humiliated by the British occupation of 
Havana (1762-63), Cuba managed to win many concessions and maintain a degree of 
autonomy during the crown’s reforming years, and elites found themselves party to 
special arrangements with regard to taxation, land use, and trade. The relationship 
between Spain and Cuba during this period was fundamental to the rise of sugar 
wealth that came later; the island would be instrumental in the post-1808 empire. This 
chapter also attempts to focus on some of the political thought of the time, especially 
the influence of French physiocratic thinkers, as the crown was actively engaged in 
trying to fill its coffers.54 Voices of criollo elites were also heard in Madrid, especially 
that of the Cuban planter and lawyer Francisco Arango y Parreño, and this chapter 
argues that to fully understand the discourses of the time, the political economy that 
comes from the Caribbean must be considered alongside the more recognised 
peninsular thinkers. 
 This period too, saw the effect of the French Revolution in Spain. With such 
changes running through the background, this chapter also focuses on the ideological 
struggle of Carlos III’s First Minister, the Conde de Floridablanca. He had the second-
most important role in governing the Iberian world when the French Revolution 
forced him to turn all attention to keeping Spain from being ‘contaminated’ by 
republican ideas. His fear was palpable in his panicked legislation and his rhetoric of 
these ideas being ‘contagious’. Although the Enlightenment had not passed Spain by, 
the perceived threat of French ideas was enough to prompt Floridablanca to impose 
heavy censorship across the empire by the 1790s, and to attempt to drive out any 
French people living in Spain, and later the colonies. But the battle of ideas that had 
set France alight would not be limited to that side of the Atlantic, and in crossing to 
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the Caribbean this European question would become global, an important catalyst in 
the reconfiguration of Spain’s relationship with its colonies.
 The second chapter focuses on the events of 1791-1804, when fighting began 
in Saint-Domingue, which by this point was the world’s wealthiest sugar colony. This 
chapter uses those often paradoxical events – from the mulatto insurrection for 
equality to the slave rebellion that would eventually lead to the establishment of Haiti 
in 1804 – to explore Spain’s reaction to the ideologies and realities of the French 
Revolution and how it was manifesting itself across the Atlantic. But in considering 
the Spanish side of events, and how this fits into the islands’ changing relationship 
with Spain and each other, a number of important themes appear that will be 
elaborated in later chapters. The first is changing racial alliances, as seen through the 
establishment of black and mulatto militias. Each Spanish island had to form them, 
due to their small populations. With the outbreak of fighting in Saint-Domingue, and 
Spain’s declaration of war on France, rebel slaves from the French side entered an 
alliance with the militia in Santo Domingo. Their relationship is the focus of part of 
this chapter. The second is the problem of immigration, where on one hand the island 
administrations realised that many of the fleeing planters could be of great use to 
agricultural projects on Cuba and Puerto Rico, while at the same time legislation from 
Madrid demanded that foreigners were kept out. That did not stop the arrival of 
refugee planters, who would end up having a critical role in Cuba’s economic 
transformation. There was also the paradox that while local legislation wanted to keep 
people of colour out, the number of imported slaves into Cuba, and to a lesser extent 
Puerto Rico, was rising fast. Within all of those concerns lies the beginning of a 
repressive society, and one that by the end of the nineteenth century would have well-
honed ways of dealing with unwanted elements. The course of this chapter, and the 
rest of the work, sees the shift away from political thought and into the realm of 
political action. This shift in tone reflects a shift in sentiment – the islands were facing 
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what they saw as their most serious threat since the Seven Years War. In addition, 
there was the issue of constant slave rebellions or conspiracies throughout the region.
 Of course, a short time after the establishment of Haiti, the colonies would 
find themselves with an even larger problem – Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and the 
placing of his brother, Joseph, on the throne. The third chapter looks at this period, 
roughly 1805-1814, and the emergence of a new cause of anxiety: republicanism. At 
the same time as Cuba and Puerto Rico were trying to establish how events in Spain 
would effect them, other more populated and powerful parts of the empire, angered at 
their continual political marginalisation, would begin to pull away from the 
metropolis, willing to test the waters of independence. Santo Domingo, however, 
would prove to be a counter-example by declaring war on the French in 1808 (the 
island had been given to France in 1795 under the terms of the Treaty of Basle) and 
fighting to return to Spanish rule, rather than strike out on its own. The Cortes of 
Cádiz would hammer out a constitution in 1812, which was heralded as a liberal step 
forward despite raising many problems over the question of political representation 
and citizenship across the empire. At the same time, Cuban and Puerto Rican 
authorities were taking repressive and drastic measures to deal with the French on 
their islands. Cuba established juntas de vigilancia, which were charged with the task 
of driving out most of the French refugees in the island. There were by this point 
some 30,000 immigrants, as most had fled from the violence and upheaval of Saint-
Domingue. They had brought with them the technology that had furthered the 
development of sugar in Cuba, as well as transformed the economy in the east of the 
island by setting up successful coffee plantations. Yet paranoia and politics would 
replace pragmatism, and the French were forced to find new places of refuge, or in the 
case of the Puerto Rico, be allowed to stay but under heavy surveillance. 
 This is not to turn away from the question of Haiti, which, during the period of 
Spain’s crisis, which ends with the return of Fernando VII in 1814, had been divided 
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in a civil war, with the black North and mulatto South splitting along a colour line. 
Henri Christophe in the North, and Alexandre Pétion in the South came to now 
embody not only racialised fears, but republican anxieties, which is examined in the 
fourth chapter. Pétion and to a lesser extent Christophe aided Latin American 
republicans, most notably the Venezuelan Simon Bolívar. Later the island was 
reunited under the power of Jean-Pierre Boyer, and his power would see the return of 
a heightened anxiety, culminating in the occupation of Santo Domingo in 1822, which 
would last until the Dominican independence of 1844. Now Haiti had lived up to the 
decades of rumours that its people were out to occupy other islands and spread – by 
whatever means necessary – their emancipatory message. Yet the other side of this act  
was that Haiti was now strong enough to act in self-defence against attacks from 
France and Spain to take back the island and return it to its sugar-producing days. 
 The final chapter focuses on the post-1822 Caribbean, analysing the shifting 
discourse around Haiti and its numerous alleged plans, and how this intersected with 
anxiety about the new American republics. Not only were there now rumours of 
further Haitian invasions, but Colombian and Mexican ones too, which had the aim of 
‘liberating’ Cuba and Puerto Rico. These events were monitored by the United States, 
which, with its southern slavery and long-standing trading with Cuba, was willing to 
take the island if Spain was too weak to keep it. US presidents during this period felt 
certain that if the island was ‘liberated’ it would quickly descend into another Saint-
Domingue because of the high number of slaves and free people of colour. Haiti 
remained shunned, as the Latin American republics, forgetting its earlier help, now 
saw the island as a potential agitator for race riots in the new nations. This would be 
painfully clear over the issue of who was to receive an invitation to Bolívar’s 
Congress of Panama in 1826. For Spain, the decade saw the near-end of empire, but 
also a renewal of the king’s authority. The Spanish crown had defeated the return of 
liberalism (1820-23), and a renewed regime of repression settled on the peninsula, as 
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well as Cuba and Puerto Rico. The decade saw the cumulation of larger economic 
shifts as sugar output was well on its way to the heights reached by the middle of the 
century. At the same time, the colonial reconfiguration of power meant that Cuba and 
Puerto Rico’s captains-general saw an increasing amount of clout, while the sugar 
planters saw a boom in wealth. Likewise, despite the continuation of independence 
conspiracies and small-scale slave rebellions, these islands would not follow Haiti’s 
example. Slave imports increased, and racial hierarchies took a more rigid shape, 
laying the groundwork for control, repression, and the growth of colonial power in 
Cuba and Puerto Rico throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.
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Chapter 1 
Spain’s Cordon of Fear, 1750-1790
Spain’s engagement with and contribution to the intellectual currents of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment would have profound consequences for its island 
colonies.1 At the same time, new ideas were emerging from the Caribbean. Both 
streams of thought would foster political and economic changes that would have 
ramifications for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo throughout the nineteenth 
century. In addition, the French Revolution triggered the development of a new type 
of anxiety in the Spanish world. This chapter examines this formative period in three 
parts. The first begins with 1789 and the Spanish reaction to the French Revolution 
and the fear of French ‘liberty’, while considering the complicated relationship 
between Spain and France. The second part goes further back, to the reign of Carlos 
III and considers the crown’s engagement with wider eighteenth-century thought, 
especially political economy and the influence of French physiocratic thinkers.2 The 
last part paints a broad picture of the Spanish islands during this period, and the sort 
of reforms American-born Spanish criollos were asking the crown to enact, tracing 
how the changes made under Carlos III crossed the Atlantic and altered fundamentally  
the relationship between crown and colonies.
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Floridablanca and the French threat
One of the Spanish painter Francisco de Goya’s most famous portraits is of the Conde 
de Floridablanca. It depicts Carlos III’s secretary of state staring forward, as if 
comparing the portrait that a young Goya holds in front of him to his reflection in a 
mirror that the viewer cannot see. Floridablanca appears as if he were standing in a 
spotlight, with the background dark, but he is resplendent in red jacket and breeches, a 
shiny golden vest and a blue sash, his turquoise eyes piercing the viewer with their 
steady gaze. In the shadows is a person believed to be an architect, Julián Bort, who 
sits consulting plans for a canal in Aragon. The scene takes place under a portrait of 
their king. The scene is one of power and progress, as the canal plans on the table 
symbolise. 
 This was no ordinary canal, but the Imperial Canal, the highlight of the 
structural regeneration of Spain, linking the Atlantic with the Mediterranean.3 Goya 
painted this portrait in 1783, a time of confidence in the kingdom. Carlos III had been 
on the throne for 24 years, and had seen not only improved finances but also a firmer 
grasp on his colonies. The humiliation of the Seven Years War, in which Spain had 
suffered the embarrassment of British occupation of the key ports of Havana and 
Manilla, had faded. Carlos III, through a series of reforms, had endeavored to increase 
agricultural output and improve infrastructure on the peninsula as well as reorganise 
colonial administration abroad. Goya’s portrait reflects this, depicting the power 
Floridablanca possessed as the king’s most important adviser.
 Known for being cold, reserved, austere, and methodical, José Moñino y 
Redando – later given the title Conde de Floridablanca – was also unfailingly loyal to 
the king.4 Although like many Spaniards during las luces he was willing to engage 
with some new ideas, and even indeed considered ‘enlightened’ for a time. His 
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Fig 1: Goya’s portrait of Conde de Floridablanca, 1783. Collection Banco de España. Image in the 
public domain, obtained from Wikipedia.
beliefs, however, were called into question as events in France progressed towards 
revolution, and he had to defend his views in dramatic fashion. Only six years after 
this portrait was finished, depicting power and strength, Spain stood terrified that 
events next door could unleash a similar level of upheaval at home. No one was more 
concerned then Floridablanca. When news from Paris about the storming of the 
Bastille crossed the Pyrenees in 1789, he lost no time in trying to keep out any further 
information. He established a cordón sanitario, with the help of the Inquisition. While 
a real cordon of soldiers near the Pyrenees continued to keep a potential French 
invasion at bay, the conceptual line Floridablanca demanded aimed to block French 
revolutionary and anti-monarchical ideas, and prevent them from infiltrating Spanish 
minds. Floridablanca tried to stop the arrival of many types of media, while at the 
same time censoring publications within Spain that were commenting on events in 
France. For instance, in the autumn of 1789 he issued a number of orders that were 
aimed at preventing the entry of French newspapers or pamphlets via ports and the 
border regions with France, with the postal service permitted to inspect and seize any 
suspect packages. Even the Spanish Gazeta de Madrid was not allowed to mention 
events in France – a policy which was upheld for three years, only permitting a report 
of Louis XVI’s execution. The following year no newspapers with reports about 
France were allowed into Spain, and articles such as fans or stamps bearing 
revolutionary-themed pictures were not allowed into the country. These sorts of goods 
were also not permitted to be exported to the colonies.5 In 1791 all private periodicals 
were ordered to be suspended. 
 Floridablanca’s tactics were not limited to printed matter – there was a human 
dimension as well, as thousands of French people lived in Spain. In November 1789 
he called for all foreigners to leave Madrid, and by July 1791 there was a real cédula 
in place that forced all non-Spaniards to register as residents or transients, and 
required a declaration of loyalty to the king. Of registered transients, 4,435 were 
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French and of residents 13,332 French heads of families were counted.6 Then, in the 
midst of this upheaval, Floridablanca suffered an attack that would wound his pride – 
and could have taken his life – at the hands of a Frenchman. As the minutes from the 
junta de estado from 21 June 1790 record: 
Señor Conde de Floridablanca did not attend [the session today] due to the 
horrible assassination attempt on his life. On the 18th at 10 in the morning, the 
Secretary, while passing by the patio in the east palace of Aranjuez with the door 
to the garden, there arrived a man, and with a four-cornered spear he lanced him 
in right shoulder saying: die bastard!7 
 
The assassin – a Frenchman by the name of Paul Peret – had been a vocal critic of 
Floridablanca. However, Peret was stopped by others in the palace, and no one was 
seriously injured. Peret was thrown into jail, and later killed. It appeared that he had 
no connections with any larger plot, but rather was acting out of a spirit that was more 
the product of personal animosity than revolutionary fervour. Without doubt the 
unnerving incident added to Floridablanca’s growing catalogue of grudges against the 
French.8 
 Spain’s problems did not stop at the Pyrenees – unrest had been growing 
throughout its colonies in the Americas, but it was a different sort of dissatisfaction 
with the monarch to what the French had been experiencing. Since Carlos III took the 
throne in 1759, he had undertaken reforms within the colonies with the aims of 
reasserting control. During the first 250 years of Spain’s empire, the base of power in 
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its colonial territories had been shifting from Spaniards to locally born criollo elites.9 
Carlos III and his advisers felt that many of these elites throughout the colonies – 
which by this point stretched from Florida, through Central America and down to Rio 
de la Plata and Chile – had too much power, were too inefficient and not making the 
territories profitable enough. In addition, contraband trade and piracy in the Americas 
were an expense the Treasury could ill afford. The so-called ‘Bourbon reforms’, 
which reached their zenith under Carlos III, attempted to change the situation at every  
level – administrative, economic, political, and social. The crown created 
administrative intendencias and put peninsular Spaniards in charge. In addition, it 
drove the Jesuits out of all the Spanish kingdoms, which included the Americas and 
Philippines. The metropolitan usurping of the political and social order would come at 
a price, and the reforms were a cause for complaint throughout the Americas, and, on 
occasion, for rebellion and unrest, such as the Comunero uprising over tax changes in 
New Grenada in 1781. However, continuity won out – until 1813 in the Americas 
only four viceroys were American-born, and of 602 captains-general, governors, and 
audiencia presidents, only 14 were criollos.10 Yet in the Caribbean islands, there was 
a very different response to the crown’s initiatives, as will be discussed in greater 
detail on each island later in this chapter. The island elites, denied political power, had 
growing economic clout, and one underlying aim of the king’s reforms was to refill 
war-depleted coffers, a long-standing problem and one that had recently been 
exacerbated by involvement in the Seven Years War (1756-63). The wealthy criollos 
in the Caribbean islands, especially Cuba, came out of these years of reforms with 
what were considered to be generous concessions, and this laid the groundwork for a 
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more symbiotic relationship with the crown than the antagonism that would evolve in 
other territories. 
 The pace of change, however, slowed down with the death of Carlos III, and 
the arrival of his weak son, Carlos IV, on the throne in September 1789. For 
Floridablanca, the situation was bleak: not only had he lost his king, he had lost his 
most powerful ally while amassing a number of enemies within and outside the court. 
The world of Carlos IV differed significantly from that of his father, as the new king’s 
wife and cousin, María Luisa of Parma, was considered to be far more ambitious than 
her spouse and to wield much power, something she shared with the soon-to-be first 
minister, Manuel Godoy Álvare de Faria, with whom she was rumoured to be having 
an affair.11 These years of transition would prove to be brutal for Floridablanca, as he 
fought constantly against criticism and political chicanery. For instance, from 1789 to 
the following year, he was embroiled in a controversy over the publication of three 
sátiras, or satires. They were political in nature, as the titles indicate: Conservacíon 
curiosa e instructiva que pasó entre los Condes de Floridablanca y Campomanes en 
Julio 1788; Carta de un vecino de Fuencarral a un abogado de Madrid sobre el libre 
comercio de los huevos; and Confesion del Conde. The last was conceived as an 
imagined list of wrongdoings Floridablanca was confessing to, for example, 
‘insolence used with ambassadors’, which was referring to his relations with France, 
something that would finally bring about his demise.12 Despite his unpopularity in the 
court and among the public, Floridablanca survived in his role for a couple of more 
years, adding restrictions against foreigners while increasing his isolation and his 
enemies. His orders had also crossed the Atlantic – news of events in France had been 
banned in the Spanish islands as well. Floridablanca’s hatred of France infused 
colonial administrators already fed up with French corsairs and illegal traders. 
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 For all the criticism he received for his anti-French actions, Floridablanca did 
have to contend with a country experiencing some unrest, and one that he feared 
might see its people follow suit behind angry Parisians. For instance, Spain had been 
hit by severe grain shortages – which occurred with regularity during the Bourbon 
regime – that had led to bread riots in Barcelona in 1789. This local discontent, 
however, was never really enough of a threat to tip the situation into political 
upheaval; Floridablanca gave his largely illiterate and impoverished peninsular public 
too much credit. There is also an irony to Floridablanca’s concerns and actions, in that 
Carlos III, a Bourbon, had French roots. The two countries had by this point the three 
pactes de famille, forming an alliance between French and Spanish Bourbons. French 
culture and fashion, like in other European capitals, was also fashionable in Madrid, 
and the two countries had long had connections of not only geography, but trade and 
religion. ‘Emulation’ had a long cultural and political reach as well.13 However, as 
inspired as some Spaniards in Europe or overseas might have been by the news and 
rumours about events in France making their way over the Pyrenees, the border 
troops, the Inquisition, and a strong monarchy kept a firm hold over the peninsula. 
But to focus on the rupture in relations between the two countries is to overlook the 
many intellectual contributions France made to eighteenth-century Spanish political 
thought, ones that would stretch across the Atlantic and persist into the next century.
      
Remapping the route to riches
In a eulogy published shortly after the death of Carlos III in 1788, the prominent 
thinker and politician Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos recalled the achievements of the 
recently deceased monarch: 
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The list of those orders and statutes with which this charitable king won our 
love and gratitude has been already an object of other more eloquent speeches. 
My intentions permit only a brief recollection. The establishment of new 
agricultural colonies, the reappointment of communal lands, the reductions of 
privileges for the landed gentry, the abolition of rates and the free circulation 
of seeds ... the opening of new ports for outside consumption, the peace of the 
Mediterranean ... the free communication with our overseas colonies in gifting 
them with commerce ... what material so ample and so glorious to praise 
Carlos III and secure his title as father of his vassals!14
The eulogy, read to the Real Sociedad de Madrid, was an opportunity for Jovellanos 
to denounce the Bourbons’ predecessors, the Habsburgs: ‘To such a sad and 
horrendous a state had the poor studies [of the Habsburg advisers] reduced our patria 
by the time the Austrian dynasty had ended with the seventeenth century ... The 
heavens had reserved for the Bourbons the restoration of its splendor and its forces.’15  
Indeed, the reign of Carlos III was marked by a hatred of the Habsburgs before them. 
Blame for military defeat and economic underdevelopment were laid firmly on the 
former rulers of Spain. Even after nearly 60 years of Bourbon rule under Felipe V 
(1700-46) and Fernando VI (1746-59), the peninsula lagged behind its European 
neighbours. The population was only 10,400,000 by 1787, and would scarcely rise 
over the next decade; most of the agriculture was still produced by the one-crop 
system; there was almost no industry, though Catalonia had managed to prosper 
through its textile trade; and infrastructure such as roads was in need of improvement 
or lacking altogether. The crown, therefore, continued to rely on precious metals from 
its American colonies to fill its Treasury, a measure not unlike that of the hated 
Habsburgs.16
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 Bourbon thinkers under Carlos III began in earnest to search for answers to 
these problems, and they drew from wider intellectual currents to find them, both 
internal and external. Within Spain, reformers remembered the cries of the arbitristas, 
who, during the middle of the seventeenth century, had taken to airing their 
complaints with the Hapsburg’s economic policy by publishing pamphlets addressing 
the king and outlining prescribed changes. They put into the public realm the issue of 
political economy.17 They were keen to understand how Spain, with all its mineral 
wealth and colonial resources, was failing to grow as fast as other European nations. 
They also wanted to see off the French, English, and Dutch threats to the Caribbean 
market, understanding that the islands had a key strategic position.18 Their concerns 
were not consigned to obscurity with the end of the Habsburgs, but resurfaced a 
century later among Caroline reformers.19 
 At the same time, the Enlightenment – la ilustración – in the peninsula was 
influenced by ideas in France and Britain that had made their way South. Yet a 
combination of the Inquisition and heavy censorship directed by Floridablanca meant 
ideas did not flow freely as they did elsewhere in Europe, while high illiteracy rates 
meant they did not circulate widely either.20 Spain’s engagement with the 
Enlightenment followed a different course to that of France, or of Britain, marked 
with a conservatism and loyalty to the crown that would eschew British ideas about 
natural rights or the concept of liberty.21 However, currents of changes did reach the 
highest levels, and at the core of the crown’s concern was its ability to bring about 
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‘public happiness’ through improvement in material life, i.e. economic improvement, 
which it began to realise was possible through agricultural advancement. At the same 
time, Carlos III was concerned with preserving the supremacy of the monarch – 
especially against the power of the church – while managing to derive its legitimacy 
from the relationship between the state and its subjects.22 
 What, then, was open for debate was the way to improve the economic 
situation for both the crown and the public, drawing from the climate of intellectual 
exchange throughout Europe. Spanish thinkers found a new range of ideas to engage 
with, especially from France. Habsburg economic habits had not only annoyed 
Spanish advisers like Jovellanos, but had long provoked the scorn of other European 
thinkers. Montesquieu, in his 1748 work L’esprit des lois, criticised Spaniards for 
failing to take advantage of the real riches in the New World, saying ‘when they 
conquered Mexico and Peru, the Spanish abandoned natural wealth in order to have 
wealth of sign [silver and gold], which gradually became debased’. He then pointed 
out that the colonies really had the economic power: ‘The Indies and Spain are two 
powers under the same master, but the Indies are the principal one, and Spain is 
secondary.’ 23
 One of the problems, however, for Spaniards who wanted to read such works – 
especially books critical of Spain – is that they often fell into the orbit of the 
Inquisition. Of course it proved no barrier for intellectuals who had the political 
means to get works that were banned, and others could gain access by reading works 
in other languages by authors such as David Hume which had not yet been translated 
into Spanish.24 However, for some works that were translated, the conversion into 
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Spanish was often less-than-accurate and sometimes politicised.25 Despite the 
criticism of some French writers, their ideas were nevertheless examined by the key 
thinkers in Carlos III’s court. Of special interest were the mid-eighteenth-century 
ideas of Frenchmen such as Abbé Raynal, Marquis de Mirabeau, Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot and François Quesnay, known as the physiocrats, who came to 
prominence in the 1760s. The crux of their argument was that the land could be a 
source of prosperity for all, not just the crown, and that farmers deserved economic 
incentives, raising the issue of value of property. Raynal’s epic work, L'Histoire 
philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les 
deux Indes (1770) put it simply: ‘Gold and silver are not wealth, they only represent 
wealth ... There is another way of prosperity for Spain ... It is the working of the 
land’.26 However, Quesnay, among others, thought that overseas trade was not as 
valuable as domestic activity, while Spanish thinkers saw their economic relationship 
with their overseas possessions as integral to overall economic prosperity, though it 
was perhaps inevitable that much of the concern was focused on Iberian dilemmas.27 
Additionally, there was the idea that a ‘natural order’ was inherent in society, which 
the government had a duty to understand and adapt its policies to, which also differed 
to Spanish ideas about governance. Where physiocrats and Spaniards did agree was 
on the point that a strong monarch was needed to implement reforms, and that the 
improvement of agriculture should be the aim. 
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 However strong the monarch, there would be little he could do with any 
immediacy to overcome decades of neglect and lack of economic innovation. 
Although these ideas about the profitability of agriculture were gaining momentum, 
Spain had many obstacles to clear away before it would be able to reap any sort of 
harvest. The agrarian sector was beset with problems, leaving the country in the grip 
of grain shortages and high food prices.28 Two of the more fundamental problems 
were the country’s geographic and climatic limitations. The central plain was arid and 
not good for planting, while the size of the country and the woeful state of the roads 
made food transportation costly. Unlike Britain and the Netherlands, Spain’s rivers 
were too prone to drying out or flooding to use for transport, and there were few 
canals.29 In addition, Spanish farmers were still using a two-year rotation of cereal 
crops, which were mostly ill-suited for the dry climate, leaving fields fallow. They 
also employed plowing techniques and equipment that had little changed since Roman 
times.30 Output was low and many people lived at a subsistence level. So the 
country’s top thinkers set their mind to this task of revitalising the vital agricultural 
sector. Broadly speaking, there were three actions that were deemed necessary: reform 
of land use; desamortización, which was the taking of land from estates, the church, 
and municipalities to put to better use; and revoking the privileges of the sheep 
farmers, or mesta, whose grazing land many felt could be made to grow crops. Given 
the level of their ambition, such measures did not come in at once. It was decades into 
the nineteenth century before many were legally applied.31
 The contrast of dry, barren Spain, with the lush, fertile islands of the 
Caribbean could not have been sharper. Here, thousands of miles away, was the 
potential for plenty for the island’s inhabitants, and the possibility of surplus for the 
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crown. These problems and solutions being proffered in Spain did not go unnoticed in 
the Caribbean. Criollos knew change was underfoot. Jeremy Adelman has argued that 
this interest in physiocratic ideas and the emphasis on agriculture meant that ‘rather 
than relying on some divine rhetoric and elaborate map of obligations and trust, creole 
understandings invoked a political economy in which a commonwealth’s subjects 
realized their potential through ownership and exchange’.32 Within Spain, a wide 
range of works on these themes began to appear. Early tracts, such as Bernardo de 
Ulloa’s Restablecimiento de las fábricas y comercio español (1740), called for 
increased industrialisation at home and better use of natural wealth of the colonies.33 
Ulloa was followed by José del Campillo y Cosío’s Nuevo sistema de gobierno 
económico para la América, which was written in 1743.34 Campillo – like most 
Spanish thinkers – was a supporter of mercantilist trade.35 He too had recognised the 
value of the colonies and wanted an improved overseas trading system, noting the 
wealth of British and French sugar colonies. He said: ‘We will find that the two 
islands Martinique and Barbados give more benefits to their masters, than all the 
islands, provinces, kingdoms, and empires of America give to Spain’.36 He called for 
‘economic governance’ to bring this about.37 His insights in turn influenced Bernardo 
Ward, who published the influential Proyecto económico in 1779. Ward too spoke 
about how improving trade with and fighting contraband in the Americas would allow 
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Spain the means to build a solid industrial base. He was a proponent of allowing the 
king to use his power to enact reforms and bring these proposed changes.38 Likewise, 
Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, who held much influence as a minister and outside 
of court politics, took an interest in these matters, writing his Tratado de la regalía de 
amortización in 1765, which called for better land distribution, enticing more peasants 
to farm; though he realised agricultural riches had limits, and also agreed there was 
more scope for liberalising trade with the colonies.39 The Conde de Aranda took a 
more dramatic and almost prophetic turn, drawing from these ideas, when he wrote to 
Carlos III suggesting that he should ‘dispossess himself of all his dominions in both 
Americas’ except for Cuba and Puerto Rico, which would be the basis for all trade, 
bringing more revenue into the Treasury. The other territories could be transformed 
into independent kingdoms under a federation that recognised the king, and he 
suggested the establishment of one monarchy in Mexico-Central America, another in 
Peru and a final one in Nueva Grenada.40 Perhaps it is no surprise that this suggestion 
went unheeded. 
 Jovellanos later weighed in to these arguments with his Informe sobre la ley 
agraria (1794) and his views perhaps reflected the meeting of many of these ideas. 
Branding mercantilism a leftover from the decline of feudalism meant he differed 
from many contemporary thinkers, but he did agree with Ward about ending trade 
restrictions. He also sat uneasily with physiocratic thought, drawing instead from 
repeated readings of Adam Smith.41 In fact, a few years later his work on agriculture 
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for the Real Sociedad de Madrid, of which he and Campomanes were key members, 
ostensibly lead to a denunciation to the Inquisition and he was eventually sent to 
Mallorca, where he remained until 1808. Overall, the works of Enlightenment 
thinkers from France, as well as Britain, would prove influential to key Bourbon 
reformers, but the end result was that Spanish political economy became a sort of 
intellectual patchwork. Following on from the physiocrats, as well as British thinkers 
such as Locke and Hume, the crown accepted the argument that wealth could be made 
through agriculture. Yet it balked in the face of ideas advocating a freer market, 
relying instead on tight mercantilism, which would see heavy control on imports and 
exports.42 
 For many of Spain’s economic thinkers there was another obstacle to 
improved trade with the Americas: the southern Spanish port of Cádiz, which held a 
monopoly on trade. For Campomanes, a key issue was Cádiz’s stranglehold, as it was 
the only port for ships to and from the colonies. Its power had to be broken, and 
Campomanes compared Spanish trade to that of the French and English, who could 
direct overseas trade through more than one port, though he kept his work within the 
mercantilist boundaries of the time. But it is worth noting that the main centres of 
Spanish merchant activity were hundreds of miles away from Madrid, despite it being 
the hub of economic decision-making. Barcelona, centre of much of the cloth trade 
with Europe, was more than 300 miles to the East, while the country’s main port, 
Cádiz, was nearly 400 miles to the South. Cádiz by this point had taken over from 
Seville, which is situated some 75 miles to the North, because the River Guadalquivir 
was filling up with silt. Campillo and others thought the power of Cádiz’s merchants 
was stifling great potential. Ward put forth many similar arguments, calling for more 
mercantile protectionism, but at the same time wanting to end Cádiz’s monopoly.43 
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 While these debates were under way, reforms were being enacted that would 
lead to some fundamental changes to the nature of Spanish trade. Until 1776, the 
crown had relied on the flota system, which had been in place for around 200 years. 
Twice a year large fleets would cross the Atlantic – leaving Cádiz and returning the 
following year with hauls of precious metals from the ports of Vera Cruz and 
Portobello.44 There was also a flota from the Mexican ports to Manilla that would 
bring back goods from the Far East, such as silks and spices. Smaller ships with 
registered cargos – registros – had licences to trade at other ports around the empire. 
Flotas only crossed twice a year, though eventually the other, smaller ships could and 
were allowed to make more frequent journeys. Initially gold and silver were brought 
to Spain as well as hides, indigo, and cochineal. By the eighteenth century, Spain was 
sending over agricultural goods such as olives and wine. The hauls were uneven: 
often Spanish products would compose less than a quarter of goods on most fleets, 
though the value of bullion brought back would be worth three-quarters of the fleet’s 
total haul.45 The scale of metal transportation dwarfed all else – between 1492 and 
1800, some 70 per cent of the world’s gold and 85% of its silver were mined from the 
Americas.46 With regard to exports the numbers are less dramatic. Between 1785 and 
1796, some 27% of exported goods were printed cottons and linens, with silk 
following behind at 16%, and other textiles at 12% – making various cloths more than 
half of exports. However much this bolstered the Catalan economy, where much of 
the cloth trade was situated, the reality was that most of this was re-exported cloth 
from the Low Countries and Britain. The remainder of exported goods consisted of 
Spanish-grown agricultural goods, such as oil, dried fruits, nuts, flour, and wine.47 In 
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the same period Spain received, in addition to gold and silver, sugar imports worth 
605,966,253 reales de vellón, as well as 376,715,542 worth of hides, 851,367,551 of 
cacao, and 1,457,111,356 of tobacco, the last of which the crown produced under a 
royal monopoly.48 Indeed, tobacco was seen as an integral part of agricultural 
prosperity from the 1760s onwards – and it proved profitable, though its cultivation 
was heavily subsidised by Mexican silver. Eventually, sugar would supplant it, and 
the royal monopoly on tobacco ended in 1817.49 At this point, sugar, like tobacco, was 
grown on a small scale, by farmers and some slaves in the Caribbean. The above 
figures show that sugar, while significant, had nowhere near the impact it would have 
at the end of the century. But the problems within this balance of trade were evident – 
and that is not even calculating what was lost to smuggling. Unlike Britain and the 
Netherlands, which used raw materials from their colonies to fuel economic 
expansion, as well as industrialisation, the trade between Spain and its colonies was 
not bearing fruit. The metal that flooded into the Treasury washed back out again in 
the service of debt. A poor, mostly illiterate peninsular public was cut off from many 
of the ideas and innovations that had been transforming countries to the North. The 
result of these factors was that throughout the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Spain would be hit with a triple blow. There would be no lasting commercial 
revolution, for instance that could have put Barcelona trade on the same footing as 
London. Agricultural reforms were slow to take effect, if they did at all; and there was 
no significant industrial development.50 
 For people living in the Caribbean, trade could be a fraught enterprise. Aside 
from piracy and plunder, one of the system’s main failings was the high level of 
regulation and abuse in Spain. For instance, Seville’s merchants had established the 
practice of hiking up prices by delaying a fleet’s sailing time, seemingly creating 
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higher demand, but actually giving more scope for privateers trading around the many  
Caribbean ports.51 And given that Spain manufactured little, it was no surprise that 
many colonists ended up trading with and re-exporting goods from the British, Dutch, 
and French, all of whom had more liberal commerce laws in the West Indies and all of 
whom were well-poised to exploit the weakness in Spain’s supply chain. Added to 
this was the growing importance of the North American markets during and after the 
War of American Independence (1775-1783). And, of course, there was illegal 
trading. Contraband was rife, and costly to the crown. It was this practice that 
captured the regime’s imagination. The crown’s advisers, while praising the value of 
Spanish America, were more concerned about the mechanics of trade and peninsular 
output. Much demand for agricultural reform in the Caribbean would end up coming 
from within the islands, with criollos pursuing agricultural possibilities.
 So with the influence of new forms of economic thinking, Carlos III was more 
willing to take some risks in opening trade and allowing for the importation of more 
produce from the colonies. In 1778, he ended the monopoly of Cádiz and established 
his version of free trade, or comercio libre. It was not outside the boundaries of 
mercantile protection of the time, but it did allow other Spanish ports to trade with 
ports throughout the colonies, not just the Caribbean.52 So Alicante, Alfaques de 
Tortosa and Barcelona in the East; Almería, Cádiz, Cartagena, Málaga and Seville in 
the South; and Gijon, La Coruña and Santander in the North; and the Balearic island 
port of Palma, Mallorca and the Canary Island port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife were 
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now free to do business with the key ports throughout Spain’s overseas possessions 
from the Caribbean to the Rio de la Plata.53
 In addition to these political and economic reforms, there was one more key 
element to the changes under the Bourbon regime that would have a lasting impact on 
the Caribbean islands – military restructuring and investment. Not only were there 
threats surrounding the peninsula from European neighbours, the American territories 
had seen the arrival, proliferation, and success of the British, French, Dutch, and 
Danish. In Europe, the century had opened for Spain with the War of Spanish 
Succession (1701-14), with much of Europe fighting against the possibility of a 
French-Spanish Bourbon alliance and dramatically increased power base. The fighting 
was eventually brought to a close under the Treaty of Utrecht, and Spain’s Philip V 
was forced to renounce claims to the French throne. The treaty also further divided 
Spain’s European empire, including the cession of the strategic Mediterranean posts 
of Gibraltar and Menorca to Britain, the latter the British would lose to the French in 
1756. It was also under the terms of Utrecht that Britain was granted the asiento, 
which gave it a monopoly on the lucrative slave trade between Africa and the 
Americas, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The agreement also provided a 
useful cover for illegal trade. Relations between Spain and Britain continued to be 
jagged throughout the century – alternating between alienation and alliance. Despite 
the rivalry being in Europe, the conflicts were global. The theatres of war could be the 
Mediterranean – or the Caribbean. And quite often the motivation was dispute over 
trade. For instance, the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748) between Britain and Spain 
was played out in the West Indies, the result of which was a reinforcement of Spanish 
shipping lanes, making them free from British interference, though Britain would 
blockade Havana for a couple of months and later would nearly take Cartagena after a 
difficult siege in a foreshadowing of what was to happen to Cuba’s main port some 20 
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years later. The security of territories was vital for Carlos III, and the Caribbean port 
cities of Havana and San Juan, with their strategic locations, were key. The crown 
poured money into reinforcing these forts, as well as rebuilding its Navy fleet, though 
it did not have to dig to deep to find the money to pay for these reforms – the majority  
of funding came from New Spain silver.54
 When Carlos III took his throne in 1759, he began his reign in a troubled state, 
as battles had been raging in Europe and North America in the form of the Seven 
Years War. Initially uninvolved, Carlos III declared war on Great Britain in 1761. In 
the Caribbean theatre, Spain suffered the humiliation of a British occupation of 
Havana from 1762-63.55 Britain also took Manilla, in the Philippines, from 1762-64. 
Spain won back its key ports thanks to the Treaty of Paris (1763), though it lost 
Florida in the meantime, which would be gained back in 1783. However, it was really 
an occupied Havana that drove Carlos III to implement military reforms in the 
colonies. By this point Havana was more than strategically important – it was also a 
sizable colonial city, with around 36,000 residents by mid-century, making it larger 
than Quito, Cuzco, Santiago, or Buenos Aires.56 Despite the relatively high 
population, the crown knew that there were not enough troops, and Cubans could 
once again be outnumbered by the British, if the situation arose. One of Carlos III’s 
advisers, Conde de Ricla, suggested in 1763 that creating a militia on the island, 
modeled on ones in Spain, would be a possible solution to troop shortages in the key 
defence positions. Carlos III was very taken by the idea, appointed Ricla captain-
general of Cuba, and sent him out to implement the plan. Charged with the task of 
helping him was one of his key military advisers, Field Marshal Alejandro O’Reilly. 
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The Irish-born O’Reilly had been instrumental in reforming the military in Spain and 
now, with the Conde de Ricla, he set off for Puerto Rico and Cuba.57 
 The manner in which Ricla and O’Reilly interacted with Cuban criollos 
resulted in very long-lived mutual benefits and their deal-making resulted in the 
formation of tighter imperial ties. Ricla told the small group of elite criollo families 
who had been settled on the island for generations that some reforms would have to 
be made, partially to pay for better defence. A new militia would be formed, in which 
they would be expected to play an important role, and economic reforms would be 
rolled out. Cuban elites, who had had access to different markets during the British 
occupation, were as keen to continue this as they were to prevent another occupation. 
So in exchange for a tax rise, the crown experimented with ‘free trade’ via a real 
cédula of 16 October 1765 – the opening of ports in 1778 was in many ways an 
extension of these measures. These reforms allowed limited trade between Cuba and 
nine ports in Spain and were met with local enthusiasm.58 In exchange for a tax rise 
and participation in the militia, Cubans gained political and commercial privileges 
and land, laying the foundation on the island for a very strong connection between the 
elites, the militia, and the colonial government, which would have serious 
ramifications in the future, as the following chapters will show.59 Sherry Johnson 
argues that the restructuring of the military in Cuba was the defining factor within the 
social changes that occurred in this period.60 Like Cuba, reforms in the military and 
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militias in Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico meant that some elite military families 
received the fuero militar, which allowed for privileges such as exempting them from 
trial by jury. Such measures to reform defence would eventually be rolled out across 
the empire, though it would turn out that the crown was sowing one of the seeds of its 
own destruction by allowing local elites high positions in the militas.61 On the islands, 
the inclusion of people of colour among the troops would present later problems as 
well. 
 O’Reilly, in addition to making these ambitious plans for Cuba, had to stop in 
Puerto Rico to take stock of the situation there and make sure the fort and garrison 
were functioning well. After his arrival in April 1765, O’Reilly stayed for two months 
and wrote his report. Although concerned about military reform, he, perhaps without 
quite realising it, had stumbled into the debates about political economy.62 
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Islands of potential
Puerto Rico, since its conquest in 1508, had seen its fortunes rise and fall, and by the 
time O’Reilly had arrived it was more or less functioning as a military outpost. In the 
early Bourbon years, its troops were charged with patrolling the region and keeping 
the annual flotas between Manila and Cádiz secure. However, it had known sixteenth-
century prosperity. It had seen gold mining, and when that had dried up around the 
1520s many of its residents turned to establishing ingenios (sugar mills). Like its 
neighour, Santo Domingo, it found some success. By 1571, Puerto Rico had exported 
8,520 arrobas of sugar and Santo Domingo 51,570, making the equivalent of 751 
tonnes between them.63 However, a combination of ginger production (which was 
more cost-effective); piracy, which drove up the cost of transporting sugar; and 
competition from Brazil – which was producing 25,000 tons of sugar a year by 1610 – 
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killed off the much of the early sugar industry in Puerto Rico.64 By the middle of the 
eighteenth century it had a small civilian population who were engaged in little legal 
trade, and rather a lot of illegal.65 
 Puerto Rico lies, almost like a geographical full stop, in the eastern wake of 
the larger island of Hispaniola, which falls into place behind Cuba. This location in 
the Caribbean was advantageous to protecting the flotas and, for this, the crown used 
around 80,000 pesos a year from the New Spain coffers to keep the finances of the 
island afloat, providing most of the income for the soldiers there.66 When the king 
sent O’Reilly and Ricla to the Caribbean, his aim was to increase security. The 
problem that O’Reilly encountered was a common one – how to pay for 
improvements. Although Puerto Rico did not come close to costing the crown as 
much silver as Cuba, there was the question of finding a way to fund the construction 
of the extensions and re-enforcements on the enormous Atlantic-facing fort that had 
been built in 1529, was well as paying for more troops. First, O’Reilly decided a 
census was in order, to get a sense of the overall situation on this small outpost.   
 As he soon discovered, there was more activity than simply a few hundred 
troops on patrol. He noted there were a total of 44,883 people on the island, of whom 
5,037 were slaves.67 Puerto Rico, like Cuba and Santo Domingo in this period, had 
low slave numbers in comparison with those in British and French Caribbean islands. 
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During the period 1659-1765, Jamaica had seen the arrival of 668,073 slaves, and 
Saint-Domingue 336,323 and in 1764 the latter had a slave population of 206,000, 
and the former one of 166,900. During the same time, 13,253 slaves had arrived in 
Cuba, and 1,148 in Puerto Rico.68 Most Puerto Rican slave owners only had a few 
slaves working on their small landholdings, and large plantation agriculture was rare. 
Slaves were still generally governed under the Siete Partidas, promulgated by 
Alfonso X (1221-1284) which drew from the Roman law of Justinian and set some 
boundaries which would mark out the development of Spanish slavery differently 
from other models in the region. Although there had been amendments through the 
centuries, slave laws like the Siete Partidas had at their core the idea that slavery was 
‘unnatural’ and thus there should be a means of buying one’s freedom, as well as 
protecting the rights of slaves. Therefore there was the system of coartación, in which 
slaves could negotiate a price for their freedom and pay their masters in installments. 
Slaves also had recourse to the courts and the church. This is, of course, not to say 
that it was a benign system, but to give a very general idea of the type of slavery in 
the Spanish Caribbean at this point – it would later change.69
 Among the people O’Reilly encountered were not only soldiers and slaves, but 
contrabandists. The island was suited for this illegal trading, being near so many trade 
routes, sparsely populated, mountainous, and blessed with many hidden coves which 
were ideal for stashing goods outside the eyes of the customs houses. Puerto Rico also 
happened to be near the Danish free port of St Thomas, and people had access to a 
wide range of products that otherwise were sitting in docks in Cádiz, awaiting 
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permission to be shipped, or simply were not attainable from Spain. Likewise, non-
Spaniards had access to goods from Puerto Rico. O’Reilly, in his report to the crown, 
lamented that: 
Illicit trade very frequently takes place in all the Island: foreign vessels arrive 
often to the south coast and the west ... at whichever port and drop anchor: 
they send a lancha or a canoe to land: this is agreeable to the inhabitants of the 
town ... such illicit trade is conducted with the Dutch of Curaçao and St 
Eustatius, The Danish of St Thomas, and St Croix, and the British of these and 
the surrounding islands: the Dutch carry away most of the tobacco, the English 
the mulberry and Guayacan wood; the Danish provisions [viveres] and coffee, 
and they all take the cattle, and as many mules as they can obtain.70
He, like the European contraband traders, also saw the value and potential of Puerto 
Rican products, declaring that ‘it seems to me that ... Puerto Rico is the most precious 
island of America, and is in a good position to be useful in a few years to the 
commerce of Spain, the growth of the Real Erario [Treasury], and still be very 
conducive to the defense of His Majesty’s other colonies’.71  But he also realised it 
was an uphill battle to stifle contraband.72 Illegal smuggling had long been the 
lucrative undercurrent of Spanish imperial trade. This economic resistance to the 
restrictive practices of mercantilism had cost the crown financially as well as socially. 
The world of contraband was also one in which people, news and ideas moved back 
and forth along smuggling routes. These networks and connections would become 
ever more important during later times of instability. 
 But for the moment, O’Reilly was more concerned with better defence of the 
island from foreign invasion – especially the British – and finding ways to pay for it, 
and he saw the potential to do that in agriculture. He extolled the virtue of the island’s 
fruits, of the potential of its sugar industry, the high quality of its wood and cotton, 
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and the further possibilities of tobacco. O’Reilly reminded the crown that he had 
‘demonstrat[ed] the advantages that the King can obtain, and also the Nation, from the 
Island of Puerto Rico’, suggesting ‘for the rapid growth of this island, the 
establishment of some men of wealth who can build ingenios are indispensable ...’.73 
Its riches could be mined from the earth – the only thing that was missing was 
sufficient labour. For O’Reilly this would mean finding more slaves. It is at this 
juncture that the ideas of Europe and the Caribbean began to intersect and take form, 
in this case via a metropolitan observer. Though, of course, O’Reilly was not a 
Spaniard, much less a criollo, but what he began to articulate – the idea that this 
island had value, and all it lacked was slaves to effectively mine it – would become 
the basis of a particular brand of Hispanic Caribbean discourse born out of 
Enlightenment currents emanating from Spain. What makes the Spanish islands 
different to the other colonies was the idea that agriculture, not metal, would make it 
prosperous. This was a sentiment shared by the other imperial powers across the 
Caribbean, in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica, which were producing 
large quantities and sugar and wealth on their islands, and now it was at last being 
articulated with regard to the Spanish islands. This is not to say the crown was 
unaware of the natural attributes of Puerto Rico and the other islands – explorers and 
naturalists had been documenting and writing about them since Christopher 
Columbus landed on Hispaniola. But what made the difference was timing – Madrid 
was being reminded of the islands’ potential in the context of Enlightenment thought 
about the value of land, and in the political atmosphere of a perpetually impoverished 
crown looking at new ways of filling its coffers. And it wanted to be more efficient 
not only in developing the islands, but controlling them, a dovetailing of political 
reform and political economy. What O’Reilly was saying echoed metropolitan 
writings and colonial ideas, engaging with a particular brand of political economy that 
extolled the potential of the earth, in contrast to the mineral wealth the crown had 
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long relied on, and went a step further to make a clear link that there was a need for 
slave labour in order to utilise the full potential of the land. 
 Given the desire to increase agricultural production, labour was a crucial issue, 
as most of the native populations on the Spanish islands of the Caribbean had died 
with relative quickness due to disease, and so attention shifted to the issue of 
importation of African labour. This gives the islands a very different tenor to other 
parts of the Spanish empire, for example, Peru or Mexico. That is not to say these 
regions did not import enslaved Africans, but what was different in the Caribbean is 
that the question of African slavery would become a dominant theme, and the 
dependence on imported labour a dominating economic question, over the following 
years. Also, because all three islands – four, in fact, if Trinidad is considered up until 
its capture by the British in 1797 – had suffered due to a lack of investment and low 
settlement populations. In comparison with the great empires of the Aztecs and Incas, 
the Caribbean seemed mere dots on the imperial landscape. But with the advent of 
plantation slavery on other islands, such as Jamaica and Barbados, as well the later 
independence of Britain’s thirteen American colonies, which were critical in opening 
up new markets, Puerto Rican criollos were beginning to participate in the growing 
trade in the region, knowing there was scope for more. So when considering the type 
of discourses that arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it is 
possible to see a Hispanic Caribbean embodiment of this thinking. Although to 
today’s mind these ideas seem outdated and reactionary, being pro-slavery and 
loyalist, this was the reality of the latter half of the eighteenth-century Spanish world. 
These ideas were an integral part of the trajectory that would see all three islands 
failing to be swept up in the revolutionary wave that was to come, clinging to slavery 
and sugar until nearly the twentieth century. 
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To Santo Domingo, sugar wealth was both a distant memory and a far-off dream. 
Nowhere else in Spain’s empire could the effect of imperial neglect be seen with such 
clarity. For the observer Baron de Wimpffen, who had travelled to the Caribbean, such 
decline was due to the very nature of Spanish imperialism itself. He wrote:  
What a contrast, Sir, in the consequences of the principles adopted by the 
different powers, as they were actuated either by the spirit of commerce, or of 
conquest! That introduced into the new world, vices, arts, and wants; this 
slavery and death. At the voice of the first, I see the indigent Batavian start 
from his barren wastes, traverse the globe, and by his parsimonious and 
persevering industry, cover his marshes with the riches of both worlds; and 
plant at the extremities of the earth, colonies more extensive, more wealthy 
and more populous than the country that gave them birth: while the Spaniard 
depopulates his delicious provinces to go and depopulate the Antilles, Mexico, 
and Peru; and to raise wretched haunts for Capuchins, on the ruins of the 
proud empire of Montezuma!74 
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Santo Domingo, or Hispaniola, as it had been christened initially, enjoyed some 
success in its early colonial days. Within the first fifty years, gold was discovered, and 
a significant amount of sugar was produced.75 At the same time, the sparse population 
and long coastline meant that the many French corsairs roaming Caribbean waters 
used it as a smuggling base.76 Their encroachment and contraband trade became such 
a problem that the crown ordered the Dominicans to leave some of the settlements on 
the Northern coast, in an attempt to stop the illegal trading. By the seventeenth 
century the island’s development had all but been extinguished, with gold mining 
exhausted and sugar planting finished, and even the annual flotas had stopped calling 
in. While the island was larger than Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo was not seen as 
being as strategically located, and Havana’s port was preferred. This combination of 
factors resulted in the ‘devastations’ of 1605-06, when the crown’s measures, as well 
as on-going poverty and disease, forced thousands of residents to leave and seek their 
fortunes in other parts of Spain’s empire. By 1769 the population of the whole 
territory hovered around 70,625, around twice the population of Havana.77 
 The French corsairs, however, eventually got their desired stake in the island, 
via the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), which had put an end to the War of the Grand 
Alliance (1688-97) and gave France the western third of the island. With the 
legitimation of the treaty, former corsairs settled down and began sugar, coffee, and 
indigo planting, and soon French settlers from Europe were making their way across 
the Atlantic. The border between the two territories remained a fluid zone, a line of 
tolerance (raya de tolerancia) more than a fixed boundary, though like that between 
France and Spain it was a boundary the rugged geography of which made crossing 
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difficult. This line, however ill-defined, became a defence priority in the early 
eighteenth century.78 And, of course, this political boundary would often be 
transgressed in the name of commerce, or, quite often, illegal trade. The new French 
territory, Saint-Domingue, was proving to be a lucrative market for trade. As the 
colony grew in leaps and bounds in the 1700s,79 the Spanish side of the island had 
begun to make a living selling cattle hides to its wealthy neighbour, with some 15,000 
head a year sold between 1783-89.80 The business would stir the economy a little, but 
it paled in comparison with the dizzying riches produced by France’s ‘Pearl of the 
Antilles’.81 By the late 1780s, the western third of Hispaniola was the world leader in 
sugar and coffee production, sending from its ports 80,000 tonnes and 40,000 tonnes 
respectively. It was exporting 210 million livres worth of goods to France, and 
importing slaves, goods and other services worth 197 million livres.82 
 As this was occurring, a criollo curate from Santo Domingo named Antonio 
Sánchez Valverde published a tract that outlined the misery of the inhabitants on the 
Spanish half of Santo Domingo, and the potential for similar riches to those the 
French were enjoying, echoing the sentiments in O’Reilly’s report twenty years later. 
For Sánchez Valverde, watching the French grow rich was a source of extreme 
irritation. He too wanted to convince the crown that with some investment – and more 
slaves – similar wealth could be theirs. However, he had fallen foul of the colonial 
officers and the crown. An unlicensed visit to the French side of the island in 1782 
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aroused suspicion and led to his arrest, though he was later released.83 That he was a 
cleric who was in the habit of issuing political criticism from the pulpit and the pen – 
even going so far as to praise Oliver Cromwell – probably did little to help his case.84 
Despite this, he left the island for Madrid, where he published his tract in 1785, titled 
Idea del valor de la Isla Española, y utilidades que de ella puede sacar su monarquía. 
This work would be often considered the first history of the island, as it gives a 
detailed geographical description, as well as a comprehensive account of the flora and 
fauna of the island. In the work he lamented that with all its natural riches, and its 
initial prosperity, it was almost impossible to believe that the island could have fallen 
into such ruin:  
It seems incredible that those depths of happiness ... disappeared with such 
swiftness. The rapidity of this process ... was no more amazing than its 
terrifying ruin ... the reasons for this decline were not one, nor two; but the 
factors that coincided were so powerful that they were capable of destroying 
an empire established on the most solid foundations.85
 He had seen for himself the riches in Saint-Domingue, and knew it could be 
possible on the eastern part as well. But there were, in his mind, two problems. The 
first was the issue of slavery – that there were not enough slaves, and the slaves they 
did have were not of much use. One of the earliest estimates, from around 1790, put 
the number of slaves on the Spanish side at 15,000.86 And although the manner of 
slave holdings were small-scale, Sánchez Valverde’s writings suggest that the slaves 
could be resistant to the regime under which they were submitted. He noted: ‘Our 
slaves are useless or work for themselves nearly a third of the year ... The abuse of 
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allowing slaves to jornal [work as free labourers part of the time, and receiving a 
daily wage], which is too widely spread in our America, renders useless a large part of 
what little we have, because this is a species of Negro that live without discipline nor 
subjugation.’87 Another contemporary observer, the Martinique-born Mederic Louis 
Élie Moreau de St Méry, who wrote three comprehensive volumes about the history 
and geography of both sides of the island, visited the Spanish territory around the 
same time that Sanchéz Valverde was writing his tract in Madrid.88 St Méry claimed 
the society had three classes: white, freed people, and slaves, and noted how the 
Spanish system allowed slaves to buy themselves out of slavery. He pointed out that 
‘the prejudice with respect to colour, so powerful with other nations, among whom it 
fixes a bar between the white, and the freed-people, and their descendants, is almost 
unknown in the Spanish part of Saint-Domingo ... [but] it must, however, be allowed, 
that many of the Spanish creoles of this island would turn with disgust from an 
alliance with the descendants of their slaves’.89 
 The two works present a conflicting picture of slave life in Santo Domingo, 
though it would seem certainly at odds with the intensive plantation slavery that was 
being developed on other islands, and next door. This is not to say that slavery in 
Santo Domingo was not brutal, cruel, or oppressive – indeed, the long history of 
runaway slaves testifies that it was.90 But its scale was entirely different, as the 
number of enslaved Africans had reached hundreds of thousands on the French side. 
In fact, the year before Sánchez Valverde wrote his tract there had been a change in 
the slave laws on Santo Domingo, called the Código Negro Carolino 1784. These 
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reforms took their legal inspiration from the French Code Noir (1685). The Spanish 
version of these laws called for Dominican owners to allow their slaves holidays – 
despite complaints that they were already taking enough time off – to provide better 
health care, not to use arms against them, and to re-iterate the criteria for 
manumission.91 The reason this was aimed at Santo Domingo was because the 
hacendados asked the crown to cut back on the number of holidays slaves could enjoy  
– it seems it was not only Sánchez Valverde who had complaints – as well as wanting 
to ban them from renting land, and prohibiting any person of colour from using 
arms.92 However, the new código largely ignored this and echoed the earlier French 
laws by demanding that slaves must be given religious education, adequate food and 
water, and a limit of 25 lashes for any wrongdoing. According to Gwendolyn Midlo 
Hall, what Carlos III actually did through this legislation was lay the basis and adapt 
the legal structure to provide for the expansion of the plantation-style slavery on the 
Spanish islands that was proving to be so lucrative in the French colonies.93 The 
crown was moving away from the precedents of Alfonso XII. However, for St Méry, 
Santo Domingo’s failure to thrive as an agricultural colony could not be blamed on its 
lack of slaves or their characteristics, but instead on the laziness of their masters: 
The Spanish creoles, now become insensible of all the treasures which 
surround them, pass their lives without wanting to better their lot. A capital 
[Santo Domingo], which of itself indicates decay, little insignificant towns 
here and there ... immense possessions, called hattes, where beasts and cattle 
are raised with little care, are all that present themselves to the view, where 
nature spreads so many allurements to a people who are blind to her charms.94 
 
 This stereotype – the lazy, degenerate Spanish criollo – made up the second 
problem for Sánchez Valverde, who appeared to believe that he was fighting an 
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ideological battle as well as an economic one. Although Sánchez Valverde was dead 
by the time St Méry published his observations in 1796-97, the idea of the tainted 
Spanish creole had been plaguing the Spanish colonies, and was bound up with the 
‘black legend’.95 Perhaps in St Méry’s case it was an unintentional tarring, as he too 
was a Caribbean creole. Being critical of Spaniards, however, was the intellectual 
order of the day. So Sánchez Valverde set out to also use Idea de Valor to fight against 
what he saw as unfair criticism. One of the intellectual battles during the 
Enlightenment was over the history of the Americas and other discovered territories, 
both their founding and their present state, and the ‘type’ of people who inhabited 
them.96 Sánchez Valverde took special issue in his work with the ideas of Dutch 
philosopher Cornelius de Pauw. He argued directly against De Pauw’s idea of the 
‘degenerate’ creole.
Mr Paw [sic], one of the torches of the present illuminated century among the 
 Foreigners, whose clarity has not arrived to Madrid, because it consists in 
 discussing with total liberty about the most sacred, in the crushing of Religion, 
 inflaming the Ecclesiastical state and speaking about the Spanish. Mr Paw has 
 done all this; and over all has used nine or ten years in assigning those tales he 
 has encountered in the East Indies, against their first inhabitants and against 
 those who discovered and conquered them. His fecund imagination added 
 much to his writings, directing all to establishing a philosophical Romance 
 about the degeneration that had been suffered and is suffered in those great 
 parts of the Globe ...97 
 His response to the charge of degeneracy became intertwined with the case he 
was making to the crown, and he offered the island’s fertility as proof of its strength, 
rhetorically asking Du Pauw, who had never been to the Americas: ‘In what part of 
Europe is one able to obtain, still with all the determination of the Monarchs, a 
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plátano, a piña or ananas, a guanávana, a mamey, a zapote, a cacao, an aguacate, a 
molondrón, or any of the innumerable species of fruit of the island?’ citing this as 
symptomatic not of decline, but abundance.98 In returning to economic problems at 
hand, Sánchez Valverde reminded the crown that Santo Domingo still had wealth in 
its mines, and was only lacking the labour to unearth new prosperity. He concluded 
that ‘In order to commence this work with sufficient frankness Negroes should be 
introduced on the Island ...’99 Many strands of Caribbean thought run through his text: 
an early creole pride, as well as pro-slavery, and physiocratic thought. Only a few 
years later, these strands would be woven more tightly by the outspoken and 
influential Cuban lawyer Francisco Arango y Parreño, who became that island’s 
leading proponent of free trade – and slavery. 
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 Indeed, the call for more slaves would be clear and unequivocal from Cuba as 
well, especially from Arango, whose life intersected with key imperial moments. He 
was born in the year O’Reilly made his trip to Cuba and Puerto Rico. In fact, his 
family was one of the long-established and wealthy ones with whom the governor, 
Conde de Ricla – with the help of O’Reilly – made a deal in 1763. In addition to 
benefits gained alongside changes in the militia and tax system, these families often 
had seats on the town council, or cabildo, which controlled land tenure, which 
eventually would lead to great wealth for these families, who often turned the land 
into sugar plantations. At the time of Ricla and O’Reilly’s arrival, agricultural output 
was limited to some sugar production, cattle raising, bee-keeping, and tobacco 
planting. The tobacco trade was controlled by a royal monopoly and as sugar took off  
the producers who could began to change their land use. The crown also controlled 
the hardwood trade, and used most of Cuba’s wood for shipbuilding rather than profit. 
65
Cuba, published by H.C.Carey and I. Lea (Philadelphia, 1822). Image copyright © 2000 by Cartography 
Associates
During the latter years of the eighteenth century, the Caribbean islands provided Spain 
with 22.3% of colonial imports into Cádiz – only second to Vera Cruz’s 34.9% – with 
most ships originating from Havana.100 
 In the late 1700s Cuba was still sparsely populated, at around 171,620 people 
according to a 1774 census, with there being 96,440 whites, 30,847 free people of 
colour, and 44,333 slaves.101 Most farmers were still engaged in the tobacco trade, 
with towns settled along the coast to help prevent contraband trade, though only really  
serving to fuel it. It was Cuba, of the three islands, which would expand in the most 
dramatic fashion a hundred years later. Indeed, the politically powerful, land-rich elite 
families were well-placed to exploit the shift to sugar.102 Havana was key in this 
expansion as it was an important port city – it had come to some prominence when it 
was declared a free port within the Spanish world in 1776, allowing ships from all 
over Spain to call from within the empire, though its first real burst of change and 
growth would be under British rule in 1762-63, during the Seven Years War, when 
less restricted trade was introduced, as well as more slaves, two changes that were 
continued upon its return to Spain.103 By the 1780s an average of more than five 
million pesos a year was coming into Havana via New Spain situados and distributed 
around the region, mostly spent on shoring up military defence, including building 
battleships.104 However, the port of Havana was far busier and more profitable than 
the others in the region, by virtue of its position. Ricla and O’Reilly’s deal was made 
only a couple of years before the real orden opened up trade, but once that started to 
take effect, Cuba began to cover some of its own costs – an average of 534,404 pesos 
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were collected between 1765-75, almost five times more than what had been there a 
decade before, and in the following decade it averaged 1,000,745 pesos a year.105
 Arango, like many criollo men of his class, arrived in Madrid in 1787 to study 
law, and that year too turned out to be a very busy one for the Caroline reformers. 
Although it would seemingly have no impact on Arango, a key re-organisation of the 
state was under way which saw the establishment of the junta de estado and the 
dismantling of the Ministry of the Indies. The ministry had been established by José 
de Gálvez, who had been minister since 1776, and was a cumulation of many reforms 
stemming back to 1717, and more recently those of Fernando VI in 1754, which re-
organised the government into the ministries of state, war, navy, finance, and Indies. 
Carlos III created the junta de reforma and involved all ministers in deliberations 
about the overseas territories, which would eventually turn into the powerful junta de 
estado by 1787, with Floridablanca at its head, along with four others, functioning 
like a Cabinet. Responsibilities for the Ministry of Indies were divided into justice, 
and war, finance and commerce.106 This re-alignment put Floridablanca alongside the 
king, and give the first minister unprecedented powers at home and in the overseas 
reinos. At the same time, change would be under way in social spheres of influence 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 A real cédula in the same year established the first Sociedad Económica de 
Amigos del Pais in Santiago de Cuba, organised by a small but enthusiastic group of 
planters.107 These societies had been established on the peninsula starting in 1765 
with the Bascongada de los Amigos del Pais, in the Basque country, in the north of 
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Spain, and others sprang up throughout the peninsula.108 The numbers reached around 
60 by 1800, and these organisations had spread throughout the colonies as well. These 
societies were born out of Enlightenment Spanish political economic thought, and 
they had as their aim wanting to expand knowledge about agriculture and better ways 
to develop it and other aspects of the economy. However, they were not without their 
detractors, and as tensions between France and Spain mounted over the French 
Revolution, such societies could not avoid Floridablanca’s censorial ideological 
scrutiny.109 Generally, the peninsular societies focussed on peninsular problems and 
the colonial societies on colonial ones. There was a failure to consider the possibilities 
and connections with the colonies; rather, they wanted to study political economy and 
improve economic techniques and labour within a given area, rather than within a 
wider imperial reach. However, these societies were not just an occasion for the 
patrician men to ponder agricultural development – they had some liberty to make 
suggestions to the crown on ways to improve and develop agriculture, and possibly to 
be heard.
 But even before the establish of a sociedad in Havana, Arango, who had been 
appointed the city’s apoderado in 1788, spoke to the crown on behalf of his island. 
The year before he was given this post, he wrote to the crown over the problem of 
labour shortages in Cuba, invoking the language of ‘public happiness’ while 
addressing the issue of slavery, saying: 
All the attention of the apoderado should be occupied in promoting and 
 encouraging the happiness of his country. With this single principle he will 
 consult their ideas and direct all their operations. In consequence, he will 
 endeavour with tenacity to remedy the ills produced in that colony [Cuba] by 
 the shortage of Negroes, but he will not be so hasty as to favour parties that 
 may perhaps make matters worse. Absolute liberty in this branch of commerce 
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 with all other nations would of course be the most useful; if the Government is 
 resistant to it, he will at least try to conserve it among us so that we are not 
 deprived by the Allwood contract [with slave firm Baker and Dawson].110
After finishing his legal studies in 1789, he undertook further education in economics 
with the aim of helping to develop agricultural output in Cuba. This would also be the 
year that an important real cédula was issued. Its subtitle, concediendo libertad para 
el comercio de negros, gave a clear indication of the direction in which the crown was 
moving. Like the earlier código, it called for the religious education and proper 
feeding and clothing of slaves. But the difference lay in the fact that the market for 
buying and selling slaves now was open, ending the asiento and allowing Spaniards 
and criollos to enter the slave trade. The Spanish islands had watched this take place 
around them via the many free ports that had been set up in the Caribbean after the 
Seven Years War, especially in places that had been hotbeds of smuggling, such as 
Castries in St Lucia, and Môle St Nicholas in Saint-Domingue. The British were not 
far behind, passing their Free Ports Act in 1766.111 Free British and Danish ports such 
as Kingston and St Thomas engaged heavily in slave trading.112 Yet by the time of 
Carlos IV’s código, the tide was slowly turning. The order was disseminated across 
the empire only a year after European abolition movements – especially that of 
Britain’s – had begun to gain momentum. Additionally, the Société Amis des Noirs in 
France had been established the previous year, while the Danish, British, Dutch and 
Portuguese were moving towards banning the slave trade, which they did in 1792, 
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1807, 1814, and 1815. Spain, under international pressure, would agree to abolish the 
slave trade in 1817 but in practice it was much later before it was stopped.113  
 Arango lobbied with much force for free trade in slavery. Only a week before 
the junta took its decision about this issue, Arango wrote to the government, arguing 
that there were three ways to go about acquiring slaves. The first being ‘absolute 
liberty’ for those who are going to bring and distribute slaves in Spain’s possessions; 
second, to allow only vassals of the kings to do what they want; and third, to keep 
with exclusive contracts with slave-trading houses.114 Arango was in favour of the 
first option. The minutes from the junta de estado in 1789 echoed Arango’s argument, 
convincing the monarch of the need in Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico and 
Caracas for more ‘hands for agriculture, without which they [islands] will not prosper, 
nor produce for the King and the State the profits that the climate and fertility 
offer ...’115, to which the king assented. The minutes went on to decree that ‘the 
Negros must be of good castas, and those who are useless, infected, or suffering 
habitual sickness will not be allowed to enter and be sold ...’116 And just over a week 
later the official real cédula 28 February 1789 was issued, pleasing Caribbean 
planters who had long had to deal with British, Dutch, Portuguese, and French slave 
traders to find their labourers, giving them a two-year trial in the slave trade, which 
ended up lasting until 1796.117 Arango and his fellow planters were pleased. This 
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peculiar outcome was yet another twist in the political economy of Spain and its 
colonies: free trade – in slavery.118 
 As Dale Tomich has pointed out, Arango’s writings ‘demonstrated not the 
incompatibility, nor even the simultaneous coexistence of liberal ideas and proslavery 
thought, but the ways these positions derive from the shared conceptual field of 
political economy’.119 Indeed, Arango and others had constantly pointed out the 
island’s potential, and he was able to synthesise prevailing intellectual ideas with local 
economic need. For these reasons, Cuba received more official attention. Puerto Rico 
was a garrison, Santo Domingo a failure, but Cuba was key in both an administrative 
and economic sense. It would eventually be known as the ‘ever-faithful isle’, and, like 
Saint-Domingue for the French, it would become a source of wealth – and increasing 
anxiety. As Josep Fradera has put it: ‘The colonial pact was clear. On the one hand, 
complete liberalisation of the economy of the island, liberty to import labour and 
foreign trade; on the other, the formation of the impressive military presence in the 
island.’120
 The timing of these changes to the slave trade was unfortunate for Spain. As 
news of liberté, égalité, fraternité spread to France’s Caribbean colonies, it was only a 
matter of time before its slaves, as well as its free people of colour, would question 
where they fit within this new equation of liberty. The Spanish appeared to be a step 
behind, gearing up to assemble a sugar plantation economy – beginning what Tomich 
labeled ‘second slavery’ – just as the other imperial powers would soon feel the 
weight of both its moral redress, and public revulsion of the slave trade.121 Yet the 
crown thought it was in its financial favour to follow this route, as the decline in the 
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sugar trade of other islands offered enticing economic possibilities that could not be 
refused, and it would be proven right.
 As news of the fall of the Bastille reached Floridablanca, he was presiding 
over a weak metropole bolstered by increasingly strong colonies recently brought 
back into line through various administrative, political, and economic reforms. 
Bullion from New Spain and Peru helped shore up the troops on the Pyrenees and in 
the Caribbean. Floridablanca, however, in his attempt to stifle panic, tried to prohibit 
foreigners from entering Spain’s kingdoms, which meant all over the Americas as 
well. Suspicion of France was high, and there were anti-French riots throughout cities 
in Spain, with many French residents forced to flee in the face of public anger as well 
as official policy. Trying to stem the momentum of ideas, Floridablanca cracked down 
on the movement of printed matter, though in a country bordered on three sides by 
water, port culture would always been more amenable to subverting the rules. Indeed, 
those parts of Spain’s kingdom completely surrounded by water in the Caribbean 
would become even more susceptible to events in France, though at first it would 
seem to Floridablanca and others in Madrid that the only real threat was the one 
marching southward from Paris. But this was far from the case, and the French 
Revolution would have its own Caribbean version, one that would have an enormous 
impact on the region at a time when Spain was beginning to reawaken to the potential 
of the islands and bring them in from the imperial hinterlands. This process would 
result in the end of France’s prized colony and the beginning of a new chapter in 
Spanish imperial rule.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided context for the events that will follow in the Caribbean by 
examining the period of rapid change and reform on the peninsula and how that 
affected two aspects of the colonial relationship: trade and defence. Reforms 
undertaken in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo would go quite a long way in 
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renewing the crown’s economic interest in them, and their loyalty to the crown, 
something that would prove very important later on. All this occurred in a climate of 
uncertainty, as exemplified by Floridablanca and his actions – which ranged across 
the Caroline years from being engaged with new currents of thought to censorship and 
paranoia – laying the roots of a colonial anxiety that was born of the manifestations of 
Enlightenment thought. His reaction, and that of the colonial officials who followed 
his orders, goes some way to explaining the response in the Spanish Caribbean when 
the French Revolution arrived at its shores.
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Chapter 2
Liberty, Anxiety, and Revolution, 1790-1804
This chapter turns from Europe to the Caribbean to examine the arrival of 
Enlightenment ideas to the French colony of Saint-Domingue, and how this was 
received by the neighbouring Spanish islands. It argues that the entry of the French 
Revolution in its sugar colony, which was part of a series of events that led to a 
massive slave uprising, drove the Spanish islands deeper into their relationship with 
the crown. This was articulated through many measures taken by colonial officials 
stemming from an immediate fear that battles for ‘liberty’ among slaves would erupt 
in Cuba and Puerto Rico. However, this loyalty would pay no dividend for Santo 
Domingo, as it was ceded to the French by treaty in 1795. Building on the paranoia of 
the Conde de Floridablanca, this chapter seeks to trace the emerging forms of fear that 
arose through these new and terrifying possibilities and how the Spanish 
administration responded to them. This chapter will outline the events in Saint-
Domingue, and examine certain key intersections with the Spanish islands, such as 
the arrival of refugees or the use of censorship. In addition, it will examine the 
economic landscape, which was changing with dramatic speed during the last decade 
of the eighteenth century. Through anxiety and actions of colonial officials, the limits 
of Enlightenment thought in the Caribbean become clear.
The fight against French ‘contagion’
It would not have been the first letter the Conde de Floridablanca had received about 
events in Saint-Domingue, but it may have been the most honest one about what was 
taking place. The oidor decano of the Real Audiencia of Santo Domingo, Pedro 
Catani, explained to the prime minister that ‘in the neighbouring colony, according to 
the truthful news that I have received, complete anarchy reigns’.1 Indeed, by 
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December 1790, Catani had seen at first hand the events in Saint-Domingue which 
had been triggered by Vincenté Ogé, a leading gens de couleur.  Ogé was a mulatto 
slave-owner and upon hearing the promises of the French Revolution, he led a 
delegation to Paris to petition the National Assembly for racial equality. Ogé cited the 
fact that mulattos such as himself were free property owners who paid tax, yet by 
virtue of their mixed-race status they were denied the full égalité promised under the 
revolution. Their pleas, while sparking much heated debate in Paris, would ultimately 
remain unfulfilled. Ogé soon left for London and met with British abolitionist Thomas 
Clarkson. During his time in Britain, Ogé was able to obtain money and credit though 
which he could buy arms that later would be put to use in a revolt.2 Upon his return to 
Saint-Domingue, he ignited a rebellion in the northern Atlantic port town of Le Cap 
(Cap Haïtian), which was stifled with swiftness by gran blanc plantation owners and 
colonial officials, and other whites, the petit blancs, who were now united against the 
mulattos. Ogé and fellow conspirators fled over the border into Spanish territory, and 
were eventually caught and handed over to the French. After a grueling trial, they 
were executed as an example to other people of colour.  
 Although it was a dramatic incident, this not the first report Floridablanca had 
received about Ogé’s aim and the state of the Caribbean. The governor and captain-
general in Santo Domingo, Joaquín García, had been keeping the junta de estado in 
Madrid informed with a steady stream of correspondence. Indeed, when Ogé was 
caught, a full account of events was duly sent over.3 For Floridablanca, it was a 
growing worry in addition to the more immediate one on the other side of the 
Pyrenees, which had become the junta’s preoccupation, and one that saw him turn 
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from being a cautious supporter of reforms to imposing his own bloqueo psicológico, 
retreating into ultraconservatism, as outlined in the previous chapter.4 In a meeting on 
14 March 1791 it was noted that Floridablanca had said that ‘[we] ought to execute a 
defence of the frontier and in order to stop the spreading of bad ideas, and the 
insubordination, and the conduct and its manifestation, with all the French Colonies. 
This instruction [will] be circulated to all the governors of our islands’.5 Like equality, 
enlightenment also had its limits. It was a complicated situation – French culture and 
thought, as the previous chapter has shown, was embedded in eighteenth-century 
Spain, especially among those known as the afrancesados.6 French ideas had been 
examined and absorbed, yet there was hostility to the events in Paris as the hold of the 
crown, tradition, and the church inevitably stymied Spanish thought. What did emerge 
instead, however, was fear. And out of that fear was born an anxiety that could only 
be quelled with repression.
 The situation was such that Floridablanca had called for a cordon of troops to 
stand at Spain’s northern frontier ‘in the mode that one makes when there is a 
plague’.7 These regulations were only the beginning of his fight against ‘contagion’. 
The metaphor is striking. Germs and disease can spread through the air, invisible and 
deadly, infecting people, often without them realising it. Biological germs had led to 
the death of millions of indigenous people in the Americas. Could ideological disease, 
initially undetected, wreak similar catastrophe? He understood how easy it was for the 
ideas of the French Revolution to be carried through the air or indeed by sea. For 
Floridablanca, these French upstarts were a direct challenge to the monarchy; and the 
state bankruptcy and bread riots of France had an uncomfortable familiarity as well. 
He thought it could be a lethal combination. A kingdom without an absolute ruler – 
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even if he was as weak as Carlos IV – was almost as unthinkable as the prospect of no 
kingdom at all.8 These actions and concerns were at the same time being mirrored on 
the border between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo, as troops began to arrive. 
By November 1789, Havana and other ports had already started enforcing the real 
orden that required any foreigner who was not permitted to be in the port to leave 
within a month, though to what extent it was followed at this stage is difficult to say, 
as ports were porous places, easy for people to slip in and out of.9 But from this point, 
any non-Spaniard who attracted the attention of the authorities would be told to leave. 
Likewise, runaway slaves from non-Spanish territories who fled to Cuba found, 
according to the law, that they would not be free upon arrival, something that had 
previously been allowed.10 There would inevitably be some people sympathetic to the 
French republican cause throughout the peninsula and the colonies, but for those in 
the seats of power across the Spanish world, what was happening in France could 
only lead to ruin. As one commander in Santo Domingo remarked in a report to 
Governor García: ‘With those two words “liberty and equality” these people will do 
much damage...’11
  Indeed, these two words would pose numerous questions for France and its 
most valuable slave colony, as Ogé had made clear. But the riches of the colonies and 
the problematic means by which they had been acquired been articulated by French 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, Raynal, and 
Diderot, who tried to address the fraught question of slavery, which at once was seen 
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to be ‘against nature’ as well as the bringer of great riches. The Société de Amis des 
Noirs, which included advocates such as Abbé Grégoire and Mirabeau, was formed in 
1788, yet its calls for abolition and equality, despite the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen, fell on deaf ears. The sway of rapid economic growth produced by 
the Caribbean colonies and the powerful planter interest of the Club Massiac were too 
strong.12 The colony had, after all, produced by 1776 more wealth for France than all 
of Spanish America had done for Spain.13 
 The Spanish islands at this moment could hardly have been more different. 
Saint-Domingue had by the eve of its revolution some 30,000 whites, divided 
between gran and petit blancs, 28,000 free people of colour, and, significantly, more 
than 450,000 slaves.14 In contrast, around 1790 the Spanish islands combined 
contained less than a quarter of Saint-Domingue’s total: Santo Domingo had 15,000 
slaves and Cuba had 84,590 in 1792, with 17,500 by 1794 in Puerto Rico, and 6,451 
in Trinidad by 1789, for a total of 123,851 slaves across the islands.15 Alongside this 
was a lack of metropolitan debate about the ending of slavery in Spanish territories – 
indeed the Sociedad Abolicionista Española was not founded until 1864. That is not 
to say there was no concern about the slavery, but it did not attract the same 
intellectual scrutiny at this time as it did in France. However, in 1789 Carlos IV felt it 
necessary to update the slave code again, creating the Codigo Negro, which was a 
further extension of the 1784 reforms. It generally stipulated and re-iterated the need 
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for a religious education for slaves and to be sparing with punishments. But the clause 
setting out the appointment of inspectors to make sure conditions were bearable 
would increasingly attract the ire of planters, especially those in Cuba.16 Though for 
the moment, the slaveowners – long schooled in the colonial mindset of se obedece 
pero no se cumple (one obeys but does not comply) – paid little mind, and there was 
initially little enforcement of the code.17 
 At the same time, the communities of free people of colour were growing, 
especially in Havana. The bustling Cuban port had long held most of the island’s 
population, allowing for free blacks and mulattos to engage in the many artisanal jobs 
needed by the growing city. They also played an important part in manning the 
militia, which will be discussed later in this chapter. This was not a recent 
phenomenon – free people of colour had been with Havana since the earliest days of 
colonialism, their numbers augmented by their right to buy themselves out of 
slavery.18  They were very well-organised in Havana, often grouping themselves into 
collective societies known as cabildos de nación, organisations based on their African 
identities but which also resembled sixteenth-century Spanish religious 
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confraternities.19 During this time, colonial officials had little knowledge about the 
members of such societies, though later they were keen to keep close watch and to 
make sure African-born and Cuban-born members were separate, fearful of the 
potential of such possible alliances.20 Overall, the free people of colour comprised a 
substantial community – by 1774, their numbers reached 30,847, or about 18% of 
Cuba’s population.21 By 1792, there were 54,152 free people of colour, about 20% of 
total population, though the slave population had nearly doubled to 84,590 over the 
same period.22
 The debates about slavery, race, equality, and citizenship in France show how 
the metropole’s future was also being determined in Saint-Domingue as much as it 
was in Paris. These battles were also taking place in the middle of Spain’s Caribbean 
world – with Coro and Cartagena on the North coast of the Spanish main; Trinidad to 
the East; Louisiana and Florida to the North; and Veracruz to the West, the territorial 
positioning would not have been lost on Floridablanca or the junta, and certainly not 
the governors in Spanish territories. These islands and their nearest points of land 
were, by virtue of geography, bound up in France’s ideological struggle. Like France, 
the future of Spain’s empire would be contingent on events in the Caribbean. And like 
the French had done in Saint-Domingue, the Spanish islands were pursing a course of 
action that would make Cuba, and to a lesser extent, Puerto Rico the centre of 
imperial attention and vast wealth. Now the aim for the colonial regime and the 
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planters was to make sure their islands avoided the fate that had befallen the pearl of 
the Antilles.
 Although this ‘contagion’ from France had the potential to spread through the 
region, the Caribbean was no stranger to such upheaval, having already watched the 
War of American Independence, which Spain and France had supported. North 
American ideas of liberty could also move more surreptitiously with sailors off the 
ships and into the taverns, be taken from the barmaid to the market, or spoken 
between a merchant and a house slave. But with its retention of slavery and its 
growing power, the United States, becoming an economic outlet, not a political 
model. For as much as news and ideas, rumours and misinformation could move 
informally, so too could letters, quill pens and wax seals from Madrid attempt to keep 
order.23 In the absence of authoritative sources such as newspapers, many people were 
forced to sift through the rivers of hearsay to grasp some nuggets of truth. Yet this 
distillation of information would not be limited to the public, but to the powerful as 
well, informing and influencing their actions. 
 For instance, rumour of a French invasion of the Spanish side of the island, 
similar to what was taking place in the mountains in Spain, began to circulate. Don 
Domingo Gonzalez, a ship captain, relayed to Juan Bautista Vaillant, the governor of 
Santiago de Cuba, that he had been told ‘[the French] were thinking of taking the 
Spanish part of the Island of Santo Domingo’, and Vaillant dutifully passed it along to 
Santo Domingo’s captain-general, and it was eventually relayed back to Spain.24 
While in this instance, the information was directed to the colonial regime, just as 
often rumours about emancipation, or equality, could be directed towards those who 
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might act upon them. It was this momentum that Floridablanca set out to stifle by 
taking away the one thing that could feed the rumour mill: information. As in Spain, 
censorship became the frontline of ideological defence in the Caribbean, though in 
these early days, it had not become clear in the Spanish mind the exact manner of the 
threat that was developing in Saint-Domingue. Caution was the order of the day. In 
Trinidad, a French publisher, Juan Viloux, was deported after it was discovered that 
the gazeta he edited had been full of news about the events of 1789. The island’s 
governor, Don José Maria Chacón, wrote to Madrid about the incident, saying that it 
‘[was] my intention to anticipate the evil and suffocate in its early stage without 
alarming the public nor exciting their curiosity to discuss the motives of my prudence 
in whose investigation, the difference of opinions would be to speak at least of this 
matter that are better in silence’.25 No government, however, has been able to stop the 
power of gossip, and when there is social upheaval in one of the most powerful 
countries in Europe and its colony, which also happens to be the wealthiest island in 
the region, everyone is going to have something to say about it. 
 Though the spread of rumours and gossip was worrying, Governor García had 
a more practical matter to grapple with – the border. As Ogé’s failed uprising had 
made clear, it was too easy for troublemakers from Saint-Domingue to flee and bring 
their ideas to the Spanish side, disturbing its cherished ‘tranquility’. García wanted to 
station more troops along the porous line between the two territories, and to do that, 
he needed more enlistees. The particular point of contention was Dajabón, a town 
established near the river of the same name with a border crossing that saw much 
activity during this time, though due to its location it long had been an armed area. 
Extra infantries were sent as reinforcements, such as the Infantería de Cantabria, 
which left Spain in 1791, called in Puerto Rico, and ultimately was posted around 
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Dajabón.26 During the first round of military reforms in the 1760s when O’Reilly was 
establishing the militias, one of the decisions taken was to include people of colour, as 
well as any remaining indigenous people. For instance, in Cuba in 1778 the small 
population in many regions meant that tactics such as declaring Indians who lived 
around Bayamó as ‘white’ and enlisting them were taken. There were also mulatto 
infantries, which had both black and white commanders.27 Even before that, the 
enlisting of black and mulattos had already been in place and they accounted for 
nearly a third of militia troops –  3,400 out of total of 11,667. They became divided 
into two infantries, one pardo (mulattos) and one moreno (blacks).28 As Sherry 
Johnson has pointed out, militia service gave free people of colour a status that would 
have otherwise been denied to them, providing an ‘esprit de corps between the 
European sector of Havana’s community and the free populations of color’.29
From around 1790, as these troops were being called up and deployed when the 
situation increasingly demanded it, and the need to keep the militia numbers high 
meant that worry among officials about this ‘esprit’ among non-white soldiers was 
little discussed, though it later would become a cause for concern.  
 While these re-enforcements were under way, events moved with alarming 
speed in Saint-Domingue. During the night of 22 August 1791, with the blow of a 
conch shell, Dutty Boukeman, a slave and voodoo leader, called slaves into action on 
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plantations around the northern port of Le Cap.30 At once, Ogé’s initial fight took on 
an entirely new dimension, moving from the hands of slave-owning mulattos to the 
slaves themselves. Shortly after the opening gambits of this new battle, Governor 
García received a letter from the Saint-Domingue governor, Philibert François Rouxel 
de Blanchelande, pleading for help from the Spanish: ‘The white race, and the class of 
people of colour, and free blacks are united, and there is no one but the slaves that are 
in open rebellion.’ He pleaded to García that the defence of the island was a common 
cause, and invoked an article from a treaty as proof, and underlined it, noting that they  
were both loyal subjects of the Catholic Church.31 García sent him some food, and 
contacted generals about re-enforcing the border.32 He also wasted little time in telling 
Floridablanca about the incident. Floridablanca advised him and the other islands to 
observe ‘perfect neutrality’ while at the same time building up the frontier in Santo 
Domingo. He added the impossible order that there was to be no ‘incorporation, 
mixing nor communication with the French, in order to avoid the results and 
consequences of their bad example’.33 By October, distraught French members of the 
Colonial Assembly had taken their pleas for help across the Windward Passage to the 
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suspicious governor of Cuba.34 Indeed, a long-standing mistrust of the French thanks 
to their reputation as corsairs underpinned the reticence with which Cuba and Santo 
Domingo offered support. The Spanish governors were in a difficult situation, on one 
hand wanting to fight ‘contagion’ as ordered from Madrid, but yet being uncertain of 
the situation in Saint-Domingue and what it could mean for them. Despite the 
wariness of García and other governors, later orders from Madrid called for the whites 
who fled to Santo Domingo to be given arms and protection.35 For Arango, the 
situation was alarming – but not for Cuba. He wrote to the crown explaining the three 
main differences that would prevent any similar sort of uprising in Cuba: people of 
colour were loyal to the king, there was a strong military garrison in Havana, and the 
way slaves were treated, arguing ‘the French have treated them [slaves] like beasts 
and the Spanish like men.’36 Others would disagree with his assessment.
 Indeed, the Caribbean cordón was starting to crumble. So far the strategy in 
Spain and Santo Domingo had involved troops and censorship. Yet as the months 
wore on, fighting continued, the rainy season began, and more people from Saint-
Domingue begun to cross the border, though often they were slaves accepting refuge 
and support from the runaway slave communities in Santo Domingo, something they 
had began doing since the spring. From the early use of slavery in the colonies, there 
had been cooperation between runaway slaves and cimarrón (maroon) colonies. 
Despite the relatively low slave numbers in Santo Domingo, it, like all slave-owning 
societies in the Caribbean, had a long tradition of maroon colonies. Such communities 
on the Spanish islands played an often contradictory role – the inhabitants often 
managed to secure their autonomy by making deals with the Spaniards, and even 
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sometimes worked on behalf of the crown in chasing down runaway slaves. They 
were keen to invoke their rights through the legal system, or to appeal for the 
protection of the crown when needed.37 One of the main colonies in Santo Domingo 
was Maniel, located outside of the capital and in the mountains, which was often the 
case, as difficult terrain offered better protection.38 During this time, they seemed to 
have helped those fleeing the uncertainty of Saint-Domingue. One report said ‘[They] 
inform us now the group of the bozales [African-born slaves] have hidden in the 
vicinity of Maniel 28 negros simarrones [sic], and the rest French, who have been 
received [by the creole slaves], and protected to increase [the size of] their party ... 
these Negroes are armed with rifles for protection, and amongst them are mulattos 
taking shelter in this Spanish part ...’39 
 At the same time, the whites of Saint-Domingue were beginning their exodus, 
one that would accelerate so quickly that few would be left by the end of the decade. 
Only white planters were given permission to come to the Spanish islands, usually on 
the condition that they planned to work in agriculture, such as Monsieur De Vanmeuf, 
who wrote from the southern port of Jérémie (Jeremías to the Spanish) to officials in 
Cuba, saying: ‘[From] this great disturbance that we have undergone in this part of 
Santo Domingo, I undertake to solicit from Your Sovereignty a few years of asylum 
for the knowledge I have of how to cultivate sugar, and plant coffee, united in the 
knowledge of the afflictions of the Negroes, and the way of overcoming them.’40 The 
convergence of all these pressures, the proximity to ports, coupled with metropolitan 
distance, meant that the colonial authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico would have little 
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choice but to let refugees in, and events began to push colonial policy away from the 
auspices of the crown. As the situation took on its own Caribbean dimensions, the 
usefulness of Spain’s policies and edicts issued from Madrid would vary, and often 
not sit well with the governors.41
      
Islands on high alert
At the beginning of January 1792, the situation remained volatile. A report to Madrid 
from Dajabón remarked that ‘although the French of this part of the North have had 
some hope of ceasing the hostilities of the Negroes through the proclamation of civil 
commissioners, I hear they find themselves with the same affliction as before, because 
the Negroes of the mountains go in parties and run everywhere, robbing everyone and 
taking what they find, particularly animals and goods ...’ The report noted that many 
plantations had been set ablaze and that people were fleeing the island.42 Attempts to 
placate mulattos and stem further slave rebellions went beyond Saint-Domingue, and 
on 4 April 1792, the French National Assembly granted equal rights to mulattos and 
free people of colour – but it still had not addressed the question of slavery. 
 By now the entire Caribbean had been pulled into the dispute. Slave rebellions 
had, of course, been part of plantation life throughout the region, such as in Jamaica 
and the US South, but now the example of Haiti was also cause for concern for the 
British and North Americans.43 For instance, even in Bermuda, hundreds of miles East  
of Saint-Domingue, members of its Council Chamber were so worried they wrote to 
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their governor, Henry Hamilton, imploring him to secure regular troops on the island, 
saying: 
‘That since the Dissemination of opinions respecting the lawfulness of Slavery 
 through these Islands, as also the account of the Insurrections, Depredations 
 and murders committed by Negroes of St Domingo, a very manifest alteration 
 has taken place in the behaviour of the Negroes here, which together with their 
 frequently assembling in large bodies in the night-time, have occasioned great 
 apprehensions in many of the Principal Inhabitants respecting their own safety, 
 as well as the safety of the Community.’44 
In Jamaica, which was much nearer to Saint-Domingue, there were calls for more 
troops, coupled with planters’ attempts to present a picture of calm to metropolitan 
creditors who were becoming concerned about their West Indian interests.45 The 
Danish too were concerned about a slave uprising, and formed a contingency plan that 
called for establishing links with other slave colonies to which they could turn if 
needed, especially nearby Puerto Rico.46 Other colonial powers saw that it was clear 
that the news was spreading through the slave communities, and refugees and 
runaways were fleeing to their shores – some even making the 100-mile journey from 
the South of Saint-Domingue to Jamaica by canoe.47
 Meanwhile, Spain was dealing with its own domestic political chaos. It was 
under pressure to approve Louis XVI’s acceptance of the French constitution, as other 
European nations had – especially considering Carlos IV and Louis XVI were cousins 
– but Floridablanca stood firm in his francophobia.48 Increasingly considered a 
diplomatic liability, he was finally dismissed from his duties on 28 February 1792, 
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and replaced by Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, Conde de Aranda, who also happened 
to be the cousin of Conde de Ricla. Aranda and Carlos IV promptly dismantled the 
junta de estado and the corresponding power it gave the first minister over other 
ministers, replacing it with the consejo de estado, a seating chart of which is entered 
in the minutes, with the king and secretary (Aranda) across from each other, and five 
ministers on either side, representing a new configuration of power.49 Aranda ignored 
the myriad proclamations of Floridablanca with regards to foreigners in Spain and the 
circulation and censorship of printed matter, lowering Floridablanca’s cordón – but he 
did not completely let up, indicating some continued concern about France. In a 
meeting in the summer of 1792, an order was given that ‘all the stamps, printed paper 
and manuscripts, boxes, fans, and whatever other elusive things that occurs of said 
kingdom [France], have been retained in Customs, and remitted to His Majesty ...’50 
Aranda, however, was soon replaced in November by the 25-year-old Manuel Godoy, 
whose attention would be soon absorbed by court politics, Spain’s failing agriculture, 
and looming war with France.51
 Despite all these political disruptions, events in Saint-Domingue were still 
being as closely monitored in Madrid as was possible. In fact, discussion in the 
consejo about Saint-Domingue during this time more than tripled.52 A steady stream 
of impassioned letters arrived with regularity from García and other officials in the 
Caribbean apprising the king and ministers of the situation, and asking for more 
financial and military support. For instance, a letter from the Archbishop and Regent 
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of Santo Domingo asked for more troops to be sent to Santiago de Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, to build up defences on the points nearest to Santo Domingo.53 
 Beyond the issue of security, however, was that of finance. All these 
disturbances were not only causing military problems, but commercial ones as well. 
The fighting, burning, and fleeing in Saint-Domingue, and the disruptions this had on 
shipping and supply lines made for an ideal contraband situation. At the same time, it 
also provided useful reconfigurations in trading patterns, with the British, for 
instance, picking up trade in Jamaica with the Spanish islands where Saint-Domingue 
was now falling off.54 But with restrictions growing on who was allowed to enter 
ports, as well as antagonism between France and Spain, legal commerce was being 
severely hampered. A letter from a merchant to Santiago Governor Vaillant decried 
the ‘deplorable situation’ and regretfully informed him that a cargo of tobacco for 
Havana was not going to set sail on time due to all the upheaval in the region.55 
Officially, economic concerns were the only ones that seemed to enter the public 
sphere of the Spanish islands. The largest publication in the Spanish islands, the Papel 
Periodico de la Habana – which was edited by, among others, Cuba’s governor and 
captain-general, Luis de las Casas y Aragorri  – carried no news of events in France, 
much less in Saint-Domingue.56  The preoccupation of many elites in Cuba, as 
reflected by this publication, appeared to be agriculture, though the subtexts of 
articles would often be obvious. An edition from 24 May 1792, which appears 
oblivious to neighbouring events, lamented that:
Agriculture is, for the most part, a vain science, a name without object: others 
imagine that it is not necessary in fertile land; and very few think that the 
principles, the reasoning, and the experiences on which this science is 
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founded, can be useful in furthering their own interests. To prove this 
carelessness one needs only to observe, that our knowledge [of agriculture] is 
today, nearly the same now as it was 100 years ago, while the foreigners, our 
neighbours, have made by their application agriculture progress so rapidly, 
and have acquired such clear enlightenment about the best means of 
cultivation ...57
 
While the ‘neighbours’ remained nameless, and the high cost of their agricultural 
riches unremarked on, the message was clear. It was time to take action. Dominance 
in the sugar industry could fall into Cuba’s hands if its planters took their chances 
while their wealthy neighbours fought. While Cuba had been steadily expanding since 
the independent colonies of the United States had turned into lucrative trading 
partners, the events in Saint-Domingue provided the catalyst for expanding sugar 
production on the island.58 But this adjustment would take some time. In 1791, Cuba 
only produced 16,731 metric tons of sugar, compared with Jamaica’s 60,900 and 
Saint-Domingue’s 78,696, but Cuban planters understood what was at stake, and they 
also realised that sugar production was going to have to be large scale.59 Saint-
Domingue’s prodigious output was, not surprisingly, severely disrupted by the 
fighting. Arango and the other land-holding elites were well-positioned to exploit this 
and indeed planters had been clearing land to make room for more sugar. Arango 
again implored the crown, in his well-known work, Discurso sobre la agricultura de 
la Habana y medios de fomertarla (1792), saying: ‘The confusion and disorder than 
reigned in their [France’s] colonies diminished their production and gave value to 
ours ... Today, in happier circumstances, because of the fatal increase in misfortune of 
our neighbour, we sell our sugar at an advantageous price; but tomorrow, what will 
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be? Here is the real concern the island of Cuba should have.’60 The consejo agreed 
that the situation in Cuba merited a closer look, remarking: ‘Before we take any 
resolution we agree to send the discourse and project to the Indies, in order to 
examine it with the attention, brevity, and reserve the matter asks for, in that the 
happiness of the island is treated with importance, whose growth in population and 
power ought to be one of the primary attentions of our government’. It could ill afford 
to pass up the potential revenues. The crown made three signification decisions: that 
foreign slave traders were now allowed to stay on the islands up to eight days where 
they were not permitted before; for ten years, the island would not be charged import 
duty on cotton, coffee, and indigo, though not sugar; and the establishment of a junta 
– which would be set up the following year – with the aim of improving agricultural 
techniques and increasing sugar production was permitted.61 
 In the same year, a Sociedad Económica de Amigos de Pais was founded in 
Havana, also with the support of Governor Las Casas and Arango.62 And while this 
branch was being set up, the one established in Santiago in 1787 had already stopped 
meeting. The members of the Santiago branch had hoped the organisation would also 
be able to help in the aims of increasing the population, as well as establishing 
schools and studying agricultural techniques. The Havana branch would, not 
surprisingly, have a strong interest in sugar production.63 The difference in the 
economic societies show the contrast between the North and South of the island, 
separated not only by 760 kilometres (470 miles), but also their different relationships 
with other islands in the Caribbean, as well as with Spain. The most obvious contrast 
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was the amount of maritime traffic each port had with Saint-Domingue. Santiago de 
Cuba, along with nearby Baracoa, lies in the far South-East of Cuba, known as the 
oriente, and only a few hundred miles North of the Saint-Domingue ports of Môle 
Saint-Nicholas and Saint-Marc, and West of Le Cap in Saint-Domingue. Havana, 
meanwhile, also received ships from Saint-Domingue, but that was in addition to 
many from other nations and places within Spain’s empire. Havana was a 
cosmopolitan port city, and because of this, much of the island’s agricultural 
investigations, economic societies, and intellectual thought came from it, and it also 
became one of the most important imperial administrative centres in the Caribbean, 
and eventually the empire. Santiago, on the other hand, was smaller and less 
developed. However, these balances would soon change, with the arrival of coffee 
planters from Saint-Domingue. They were keen to settle in the hills of oriente and 
resume their work. Often the refugee planters wanted to bring their slaves as well. The 
pressures of immigration quickly engulfed Santiago. It also meant that port also 
become a place where some of the new racialised rules were forged and exercised. 
During this period such control was not as clear as it would be ten years later, but 
even at this point concern about Saint-Domingue meant that the provincial towns 
were bound up in events as much as Havana, if not more so. The pressures on 
Santiago de Cuba were great, and it became quite clear early on that these French 
planters could offer something in return. They could bring not only their capital to set 
up plantations, but also their knowledge, helping to modernise sugar and coffee 
technology. For non-whites, the situation was more complicated. Madrid’s edicts and 
Havana’s determination to prevent any people of colour from any of the French island 
from disembarking in Cuba presented numerous difficulties as they were almost 
impossible to enforce. Unlike a land border, coastlines were often impossible to 
police. 
 These complexities can be illustrated by the case of a Genovese planter with 
the (probably Hispanicised) name of José Corsí who wanted to leave Jérémie and 
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move to Santiago. His wife, Maria Balenina, claimed to be from Santiago, as she 
explained in a letter to Governor Las Casas. She told him how the slaves were 
destroying the island and now, having fled to Cuba, they were ‘wanting to put in 
safety, his life, mine, and that of our five children’ by being allowed to emigrate, and 
bring over 30 slaves.64 The question of the slaves is where Las Casas drew the line, 
informing them they could bring their goods over but not their slaves.65 It was 
certainly not the first of such pleas, and within a few years the volume of such 
requests rose dramatically.66 Beyond the planter/slave divide there was also the 
question of who was ‘French’. Many of the whites in Saint-Domingue, like those in 
Santo Domingo or Cuba, had been born in the Caribbean. Or like José Corsí, they 
claimed to be from elsewhere. Even among the ‘French’ there were different groups, 
such as the fleeing members of the royalist military, the free people of colour, 
runaway slaves, or the recent arrivals from France.67 Yet this term to the Spanish 
signified inhabitants of the whole of the French world. In the case of Corsí the only 
‘French’ were the 30 slaves. And while it was Havana extolling the virtues of the great 
riches to be made at the expense of the faltering Saint-Domingue, it would be 
Santiago where the true cost of such wealth would be questioned; after all, Corsí 
wanted to settle there, not in Havana. But while Havana often attempted to make the 
rules, it often would be Santiago that suffered the consequences. 
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 Still, both cities and the other islands soon realised they had to find a way to 
deal with the influx. For the immigrants, especially the French refugee planters, an 
acceptable means for settling had to be constructed, and so religion became another 
way around this question. In Puerto Rico, for example, instructions from the crown 
involving land stipulated that it could be sold to ‘foreigners’ but they had to be 
Catholic and ‘not suspicious’.68  However, many people were in no state to begin 
farming, often fleeing with nothing, and instead had to rely on the generosity of their 
places of refuge. The governor of Trinidad felt compelled to write to the crown asking 
for enough support to give 1 real 4 pesos daily to the 89 ‘elderly, women and children 
that find themselves in absolute, total abandonment’.69 The overall influx of people 
was becoming a growing problem for Cuba as well. The lieutenant governor of 
Holguín expressed his concern to Santiago Governor Vaillant, who passed it along to 
Las Casas: ‘Without doubt being vigilant in observing what you have communicated 
to me with regard to the French, they will not introduce contagion to our possessions’ 
but goes on to lament that  ‘[the ports] frequently have feared the enemy nation in 
them ... and the situation of the population ... it is impossible to contain the arrivals, 
and departures ...’70 Despite this being a local problem, Las Casas ended up using 
larger European rivalries to take drastic action and issue an edict declaring that due to 
the hostilities between the two nations in Europe, the French no longer had ‘a just 
motive’ for living in Spanish Cuba, except those ‘with mercy, and the blessing of 
nature’ who had lived there for more than six years in an official job, recognised trade 
or by marriage to a Spaniard. Those who did not meet the residency requirements had 
to leave within 10 days, and he also granted the auditor de guerra the right to 
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investigate and take whatever measures he needed to find any ‘unauthorised’ French 
person.71 
 But the people of colour – and keeping them out – would continue being the 
real cause for concern, like the 20 people who Las Casas heard turned up in port of 
Baracoa. Writing to Vaillant, he reminded him of the royal order that blacks who were 
bought or fugitives from the French islands were ‘not to be introduced or allowed to 
remain’ on the island.72 Orders given to the Guardía de los Ríos in Santo Domingo 
stipulated that, ‘If you apprehend any Negro, or French Negroes, take care to send 
them to this command with the arms, and the rest of what is encountered, giving an 
account of the day, and hour, in which they were caught ...’ also telling them that they 
would have to go on a daily patrol in parts where ‘one presumes they can introduce 
Negroes of the French part to ours, and give an account of what you observe’.73 
 However, amid all the edicts to keep people out, there was one group the 
authorities were very keen to allow in: new slaves. Even though there was this worry 
of ‘contagion’, and a constant monitoring of borders and ports, there was also a 
willingness to let slave traders dock in Spanish ports – and now stay for longer – 
bringing on shore their human wares from Africa.74 Certainly, there was a noticeable 
jump in slave disembarkations between 1790 and 1792. In 1790 some 2,718 slaves 
left the ships carrying them in Cuba; the following year that number went up to 6,731, 
and in 1792 it would remain at that level, at 6,564.75 Land was being cleared and more 
sugar was being planted around Havana, which in turn would lead to higher tax 
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revenues for the crown. Although the economic configuration of Cuba was changing, 
it would do little to stem the looming crisis that awaited Carlos IV.76 
 The following year began with a dramatic start: the execution of France’s 
Louis XVI on 21 January 1793. Anti-French sentiment in Spain rose, and the war 
between the two countries that erupted that year lasted until 1795 and had very high 
costs.77 Now even more rumours of a French invasion circulated throughout the 
Caribbean, and even into Louisiana, with the Governor, Barón de Carondelet, fearful 
that long-standing trade links with France and the relatively high number of French 
people living there would mean ‘[their] contagion would ferment in secret and will 
produce a terrible explosion’. The crown, therefore, allowed him the power to 
‘monitor and arrest whatever species blows contrary to the public quiet and calm...’ 78 
In Santo Domingo, Governor García continued to bulk up defenses on the border, 
though in one report he pointed out that while they only had around 2,000 men in 
Dajabón, they were being attacked by some 8,000 troops.79 Keeping soldiers alive as 
well as armed, supplied, and clothed was a difficult and costly task, and García was 
constantly forced to ask for extra funds to be remitted from the coffers in New 
Spain.80 Adding to the overall military struggle was the fact that on one hand, many 
soldiers chose to desert, while on another there were questions about what to do with 
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the mounting numbers of prisoners of war.81 García tried to send the captured French 
Republicans and slaves to other territories. One letter noted a fleet of five ships 
heading to Puerto Cabello to drop nine immigrants, which then continued on to the 
port of La Guaíra, the final destination for the 188 prisoners of war and 234 slaves of 
Caracas.82 Despite their status as prisoners, the French could still cause problems in 
their shackled condition, as one order pointed out: ‘It is strictly prohibited that all the 
French prisoners of whatever class or condition, discuss the public business of their 
Country during their time in the dominions of His Majesty ...’ 83
 By this point, some of the rebel slaves had decided that an alliance with the 
Santo Domingo’s troops could give them the leverage they needed to fight off the 
whites, and in exchange García saw his troop numbers receive a much-needed boost, 
a deal the captain-general could not afford to turn down. The black auxiliary troops 
were led by former slaves Jean François and Georges Biassou, and later on Toussaint 
L’Ouverture joined them.84 For Spain, the fight at this point was still against France. 
There was potential victory with the help of these soldiers, as Governor García 
pointed out to the crown. He argued that the black soldiers were of great use and they 
should be offering those former slaves who were unwilling to fight on the Republican 
side the protection of the crown, while at same time ‘also taking advantage of some of 
the Negroes of our colony, of accredited faithfulness...’85 The boost in troop numbers, 
and their tactical knowledge of the north of Saint-Domingue, would also mean that 
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Spain could focus not only on defence but also its other ambition – a somewhat 
improbable clawing back the French side of the island, reclaiming what was lost in 
1697.86 García in many ways found himself in a paradoxical situation by 1793. Santo 
Domingo was a slave-owning society and part of a larger imperial world that was 
concerned with getting more slave labour into the Caribbean, while at the same time it 
would have to rely increasingly on an alliance with former slaves to meet its military 
objectives. And despite a tradition of allowing slaves to buy their freedom, and the 
tolerance of the subsequent communities of free people of colour throughout the 
region, many criollo members of the militia were wary of these former slaves from 
the French side. They had not been freed through a long-standing legal process, but 
through a violent rupture, causing many Dominicans to consider them little more than 
runaways.87 Many of these former-slave soldiers reiterated their anti-Republican 
beliefs, and professed a long-standing loyalty to the crown in the hopes of gaining 
favour and further privileges among the Spaniards in addition to the freedom they 
would now be guaranteed in Spain’s dominions. In a memoria of 1793, General 
Biassou declared: ‘That without flattering myself, I dared to call myself the chief of 
the counter-revolution ... I undertook a war, scarcely without arms, without munitions, 
without supplies, and in the end without many means ... on August 23 of the year 
1791 ... I undertook a war to save my King [Louis XVI], who I have always 
considered with the most profound respect.’88
 In June events reached a crescendo with a violent, bloody attack by the rebel 
slave forces on Le Cap. They torched the town, a symbolic act, as it was one of the 
key ports in a region of many plantations. It also was a turn away from burning down 
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plantations, which they had been doing, and towards targetting more populated areas. 
The attack sent scores of whites into boats and away from the burning city. The 
Spaniards, with the help of their black auxiliaries, were able to make territorial gains 
from the chaos. By now France was also losing its grip on its other islands of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe, as they too were pulled into the complicated fighting.89 
Soon after the events in Le Cap, the recently arrived French Governor, Léger-Félicité 
Sonthonax offered freedom to slaves in the North who fought alongside the French, in 
the hopes that they could win back some of the people lost to the Spanish flag. The 
offer was taken up by many slaves, and then extended to the provinces in the South 
and West. As Spain advanced and the number of rebel slaves grew, and, combined 
with internal Revolutionary political pressures, Sonthonax found himself forced into 
completely abolishing slavery on 29 August 1793, ahead of the National Assembly, 
which would have no option but to ratify the move.90 Upon receiving the news of 
Sonthonax’s decree from some of his black troops, Governor García issued a 
proclamation praising his men and condemning the French: ‘... these revolutionaries 
were only intent on giving the earth all the good and having put the Colony in a state 
where the eyes have nothing else to look at but the dust and the blood that has been 
left in the ruins ...’ 91 Navy lieutenant-general and former governor of Santo Domingo 
Marqués de Socorro noted to the consejo de estado that, ‘the declaration of liberty of 
the Slaves of the French part of Santo Domingo I believe to be extended to the rest of 
the Islands or French Colonies; and the equality of the Negroes and free mulattos to 
whites that the French Convention has made, has put in immediate risk the dominion 
of Your Majesty in those islands because the Towns of the coast are for the most part 
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blacks and free mulattos ...’92 He continued by arguing that the greatest risk still came 
from France itself, and recommended boosting the sea squadron as part of the overall 
defence strategy.93
 The shocking abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue had numerous 
repercussions, but one that would have immediate results was the decision by General 
Toussaint L’Ouverture to stop fighting for the Spanish. He had quickly realised that 
Spain had absolutely no intention of following Sonthonax’s abolitionist example, and 
so left Georges Biassou and Jean-François by the following spring, and returned to 
fight for the now abolitionist France. He united the warring factions within Saint-
Domingue to defeat not only the French loyalists, but Spain and now also Britain. 
Indeed, by the autumn, L’Ouverture made gains in Northern Spanish-held territories, 
while Britain took a serious plunge into this conflict in the South and West of the 
island, sending 15,000 troops over the next five years.94 With Jamaica as a nearby 
base, the British had long had trade connections to Saint-Domingue. Now it too was 
caught up in territorial ambitions. The news of Britain’s involvement spread rapidly. 
Santo Domingo’s Governor García wrote to the crown that ‘it seems that the ministers 
Pit [sic] and Dundas have agreed to surrender both said Possessions [Saint-Domingue 
and Santo Domingo]’.95 The British hoped that France’s loss would be their gain.
 France’s revolutionary struggle had not only crossed the Atlantic, but so too 
the European wars that followed in its wake. The battle of Saint-Domingue had turned 
into a European war, with France seeking to quell the slave rebellion, Spain hoping to 
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regain the part it traded away, and for the British to try and take territory from the 
French. The arrival of British troops was another headache for Spain, for Britain had 
long been an enemy and Spain still had nowhere near the same troop power. The 
forces in Santo Domingo were struggling. García had to ask the crown to drop import 
charges on boats that were near the port of Bayajá so they could call in and could re-
supply the ill-fed and ill-clothed troops.96 In the search for food, he had to go so far as 
to beg for wheat to be sent from New Spain as well, and he received 8,000 petates, or 
small bags.97 At the same time, war between Spain and France was well under way. 
The Spanish crown was becoming increasingly burdened with the cost of so much 
fighting, and in 1793 it had been forced to take a loan from the Dutch to the value of 
48,110,000 reales de vellón. That soon was insufficient and in the following years 
Spain was forced to raise money through bonds, or vales reales.98
 As the summer wore on, the Spanish black auxiliaries gained more ground 
under Jean-François and Biassou, despite the difficult conditions. Jean-François began 
to act outside of General García’s wishes, and in July 1794 massacred some 700 
French colonists in Bayajá (known on the French side as Fort-Liberté) who were 
technically supposed to be under the protection of the Spanish crown.99 Dominican 
officers were horrified, and the events were quickly relayed back to Madrid. But they 
now found themselves in a dilemma – they were in no position to stop the black 
soldiers from fighting on behalf of Spain, as they relied on their numbers, yet there 
was growing concern about how their generals were exercising their power. In 
addition, throughout these months of conflict, the issue of prisoners and what do with 
them kept returning. The problem was two-fold: food already was scarce enough for 
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the troops, but also they still feared that these prisoners would spread French 
‘contagion’. The regent of Santo Domingo’s Audiencia wrote to the crown, saying 
‘slaves, prisoners of war, and the rest of the criminals remitted from the French 
Colony, would be moved in succession of four embarkations to Puerto Rico ... in 
order to strengthen this mode of our internal security ...’ José Antonio Urizár’s lengthy 
informe focused on what he considered to be mounting threats to security, such as the 
lack of protection in the capital, as he pointed out that most of the troops were at the 
border, and explained there was ‘distrust of the blacks with which we must live’.100At 
the same time, many people fleeing Saint-Domingue were trying to leave the island, 
rather than seek refuge in the impoverished Spanish side. They were making their way 
to Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, or anywhere of safety that the currents could carry 
them. A list in Santo Domingo noted the ‘French families that miserably left fleeing 
Bayajá’, which included ‘Madam Leman, with four children, presented the worst 
misery’. She and the other refugees were given some reales to give them immediate 
assistance until they could leave the island.101 By 1794 some 30,000 whites had fled 
in this first wave of emigration, with more than 10,000 heading to the US cities such 
as Charleston and Norfolk. Like their West Indian counterparts, these American ports 
would soon attempt to stop the non-white immigrants.102 Some 15,000-20,000 
refugees fled to Cuba, and around 1,000 made their way through Santo Domingo and 
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on to Mayagüez and San Juan in Puerto Rico.103 A few hundred went to Trinidad, and 
the rest scattered around the Caribbean region, going to places such as Spanish New 
Orleans, which had earlier French connections, and the coast of Venezuela.104 Around 
the same time, the Sociedad Económica in Havana formed a junta de población 
blanca, which called on the king to allow more whites to settle on the island, 
especially in the east of the country, with its proximity to Saint-Domingue, though 
more decisive royal action on the question of Cuba’s racial balance would not be 
settled until more than a decade later.105
 While the planters brought their cafetales in the East and landowners around 
Havana expanded their sugar operations, the crown decided to grant Cuba a 
consulado. This was a body which oversaw trade, yet also had administrative and 
judicial functions. They were not new bodies, the first having been established in 
Seville (1543) and in the first in the Americas in New Spain (1594). The crown was 
establishing more in the colonies, including Havana’s in 1794. One of its aims was 
supposed to be developing economic growth, though Arango criticised it for being 
little more than a tribunal.106 Indeed, throughout the other colonies, they were using 
them in an attempt to give criollo elites some privileges in exchange for some of the 
ones lost through peninsular appointments. While this was not so much the case in 
Cuba, it does indicate the sustained economic and political interest the crown was 
taking, as Cuba’s economy underwent a transformation amid the upheaval. In 
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addition, the Cuban elites and the crown had been able to come to arrangements that 
would appear advantageous to both, building on the initial ones undertaken by Ricla 
and O’Reilly. Gradually, it was becoming clearer to the king and his advisers that 
sugar revenues could help shore up the Treasury, and in exchange for this, the island 
would continue to receive certain concessions. Indeed, during this time, the Cuban 
planters managed to get the crown to back down over its list of demands as outlined 
in the Codigo Negro, forcing Carlos IV to give up on his reforms, while at the same 
time importing ever higher numbers of slaves. 
 The labour question was exacerbated by domestic unrest brought about by the 
growing animosity between Las Casas and the military. He was especially annoyed at 
the lower-ranking officers who could potentially help the growing sugar economy – 
especially infrastructure improvements such as building roads – but who refused to 
undertake such work. Throughout these years the captain-general faced domestic 
political battles to have this sort of work done. His eventual means of doing so was to 
strip back the privileges of the fuero militar, and this prompted great unrest on the 
island among Spaniards and criollos and between the military and Las Casas.107 At 
the same time, the need for agricultural workers meant that Cubans turned in 
increasing numbers to the slave trade. Estimates range from a total of 21,683 to 
40,000 new slave arrivals from 1790-94.108 In addition, Arango and the Conde de 
Casa Montalvo went on an expedition to Madrid, Portugal, England, Barbados, and 
Jamaica to discuss slavery, discover the latest technological advances for sugar 
production and observe the workings of plantation societies.109 Yet despite the money 
and technological knowledge many of the fleeting planters from Saint-Domingue 
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would bring to the east of Cuba, Havana was more wary about what they had to offer, 
as evidenced by Las Casa’s edict banning communication with the French, quickly 
acting upon a recent real órden to do so.110 He decreed that:
No person, of whatever class or condition, have correspondence with nationals 
or foreigners, and especially with the French, relative to the present 
disturbances; nor receive, read or communicate to another, books or papers 
that contain or recommend the depraved designs they endeavour to 
propagate ... I make the same special order to the Judges and Magistrates so 
they can apply all their zeal in order that they [the French] do not propagate 
similar books and papers ...111
      
The end of Santo Domingo
In June 1795, the regente of Santo Domingo, José Antonio Urizár wrote to consejo 
member Eugenio Llaguno in Madrid. In his lengthy discourse, entitled Modificación, 
y limite de esclavitud, he pondered the treatment of the slaves in the face of a 
changing Caribbean and imperial world, pointing out:
We are seeing the fierce debates ... in the House of Commons in London about 
the abolition of the slave trade [comercio de negros], and the extinction of 
slavery, as it is opposed to humanity, just legislation, and national dignity: we 
see that Denmark substantially agreed with England in its resolution and 
providences, and we are looking at what the Convention of Paris has declared, 
and proclaimed, the general liberty extinguishing slavery with the terrible 
expressions it is accustomed to, [expressions which are] infuriating to other 
Nations, and to their previous system.112
 
Understanding the subtleties of the global shift that was under way, and presumably 
drawing from his experience of watching events unfold in Santo Domingo, he went 
on to tell Llaguno that ‘it seems to me very important to examine, and try to see if 
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there any means to modify slavery without damaging the State, [or] Agriculture ...’113 
But his proposal was ignored, as the crown and its key thinkers were busy 
contemplating how best to allow for growth in Cuba and more slavery. 
 Santo Domingo, meanwhile, was about to be pushed out of the empire 
altogether. Godoy had put the finishing touches on the Treaty of Basel (1795) that 
would see the Spanish side of the island given to the French in order to stop the 
fighting between the two countries. In fact, Godoy received the title Príncipe de la 
Paz for his role in crafting the deal. A short time later, a real órden was issued 
proclaiming that oldest part of Spain’s empire was to be evacuated and handed to the 
French.114 As might be imagined, the shock for the Dominicans was immediate and 
this action was seen as a painful betrayal, as well as a fulfillment of everything they 
had been told to fight against – rule by the French, much less the prospect of life 
under a regime that supported abolition and republicanism. In practical terms, 
however, the evacuation would take much longer, and many residents, while upset 
about the situation, would not or could not go to another island. French rule also took 
some time to materialise because of their entanglements in the West of the island, 
which demanded all their attention.115 In seeing battles raging on two fronts, the 
crown had made it clear that it was willing to write off its oldest colony in an attempt 
to keep the power balances on the peninsula in check. Dominicans’ years of pleading 
for resources, for more investment and for more slaves had come to this. Even the 
small prosperity made with trade to Saint-Domingue had collapsed, while at the same 
time Cuba and Puerto Rico were receiving the very things that would prevent them 
from facing imperial irrelevancy. Another type of unification would later come to 
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Hispaniola, though in a more dramatic fashion than the signers of the treaty had 
envisioned. But it is at this point the trajectories of the three islands diverge, and 
Santo Domingo began a difficult, uncertain, and completely different path.
 It was not only the island of Hispaniola, however, that faced upheaval. 
Throughout the region, the year 1795 saw rebellions ignite in other slave colonies. 
Not all involved slaves on plantations – some dealt with maroon colonies. There had 
been instances in the Bahamas, Jamaica (Second Maroon War 1795-96), Demerara, 
and Curaçao, as well as the earlier rebellions in France’s other colonies, Guadeloupe 
and Martinique.116 These were often inspired by rumours of emancipation, though 
others were born out of more local unrest.117 The Spanish territories, too, would get 
their share, partly thanks to confusion born of the real cédula de gracias al sacar of 
10 February 1795, which allowed some non-whites, such as pardos (mulattos) in 
Venezuela the right to buy certain white privileges.118 Indeed, that May the 
Venezuelan port of Coro saw an uprising organised by some 300 free and slave 
blacks, mulattos and zambos (someone who is part indigenous and part black). One of 
the leaders, José Leonardo Chirino, a zambo, was familiar with Saint-Domingue, 
having accompanied the master of his wife there many times.119 According to the 
expediente, they ‘asked for liberty for the slaves, the surrender to them of the city, 
with the aim of establishing a republic’, the definition of which is never fully spelled 
out, though the meaning of what they were asking was implicit.120 The rebellion was 
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‘Se le presentaron en numero de mas de Trescientos y cinquenta...’
suppressed, but not without a violent fight involving the use of the militia and the 
execution of some 170 people.121
 In July, Puerto Príncipe in eastern Cuba had a smaller-scale incident. Led by 
two slaves named Romualdo and Josef ‘the Frenchman’ (el frances), they attacked the 
boss of haciendo Cuatro Compañeros, Serapio Recio. They left him, and went to 
round up more slaves and were later caught. In the later testimony, it was claimed that 
‘they purported to destroy the town of Puerto del Principe, sack it, kill the caballeros, 
and want to do the same to all the whites’, though they claimed that they only wanted 
the freedom that was due to them, as evidenced by Josef declaring, ‘No one has a 
master now; we are all free’.122 The Puerto Príncipe leaders were later sent to the 
Audencia of Santo Domingo for further trial, while the governor of the province was 
prompted by the whole affair to issue a decree forbidding anyone of colour from 
carrying arms.123 Romualdo was also implicated by his association with the cobreros, 
an autonomous community in the East which had claimed in 1788 that the king had 
freed them. They would eventually come to an arrangement with uneasy colonial 
officials who did not want them adding or lending support to the unrest that was all 
around, and by 1801 they managed to receive official recognition of their 
autonomy.124 
 In August 1795, a Cuban mulatto named Nicholas Morales would invoke not 
the king, but the recent real cédula de gracias al sacar in order to gain equality. In 
doing this, he gathered a group of about forty men to convince the governor of 
Bayamo, in the East of the island, to publish the document, as well as make some tax 
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and land reforms, all of which were more than enough incentive for the authorities to 
arrest him.125 The following October, a rebellion broke out at the largest ingenio in 
Santo Domingo, in Boca Nigua, about 15 miles outside the capital. Six of the 
plantation’s two hundred slaves were killed and about one hundred people were 
hospitalised or put in prison once it had been quashed. Despite threatening to kill the 
whites, the centre of the plot involved revenge for mistreatment by overseers.126 
David Geggus has argued that the very localised nature of events in this case points to 
the fact that the events in Saint-Domingue are not necessarily ‘a good principle for 
typologising slave revolts’.127 Indeed, the purpose of outlining so many different 
rebellions that sprang up in the mid-1790s is not to ‘prove’ in any sense that slave 
unrest and the fighting in Saint-Domingue were necessarily linked – though in some 
cases they certainly were – but rather to emphasise the very unstable nature of 
colonial society during this period. Not only were there external threats to stability, 
there were internal ones at the same time as the plantation culture of Saint-Domingue 
was being destroyed. This too weighed heavily on the minds of planters and 
administrators.
 In addition to such groups, there was the ongoing problem of slaves running 
away to join maroon communities. In 1796 new regulations were unveiled in Cuba 
about how to deal with maroons and runaway slaves whose numbers were on the rise 
during this period thanks to both the arrival of people from Saint-Domingue, as well 
as the arrival of more slaves to the island, some of whom managed to escape. 
Effectively, the code institutionalised the practice of hunting the slaves, while at the 
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same time demanding, for instance, that the slaves should be not be mistreated upon 
capture. Arango and others considered runaways and maroons a threat to the 
burgeoning sugar plantations.128 
 Puerto Rico, too, did not go untouched by these rebellions. In October,  
Aguadilla, a port in the west of the island saw a small disturbance.129 Like the other 
islands, it had found itself with a few hundred refugees from Saint-Domingue.130 The 
governor, Ramón de Castro, had already taken ‘precautions’ against French 
propaganda, but found that they were not sufficient. Whether this had any connection 
to this insurrection is difficult to surmise as much of the documentation about the 
uprising has been lost, but like the others, it was quickly stifled.131 Although many of 
the ‘conspiracies’ were home-grown, some of the rhetoric used, as well as the 
involvement of non-Cubans, such as the declaration of freedom by Josef ‘el frances’, 
was enough for the colonial officials to increase their restrictions and monitoring of 
outsiders. By September, Governor Las Casas had stipulated that all temporary or 
resident foreigners in Cuba present themselves to their district judge to receive a 
certificate that verified their situation, with the aim of forming a register that would 
hold their personal information.132
 Meanwhile, as the Spanish involvement in Saint-Domingue had now ceased, 
the evacuation of Santo Domingo had become problematic for Governor García, not 
least of all because of the question of what to do with the generals Jean-Françoise and 
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Biassou, as well as the other black auxiliaries and their families.133 A plan to send 
them to Cuba was met with Las Casas offering them the option of the isolated Isle of 
Pines, a small island off the coast of Cuba, or to carry on to Spanish Florida; under no 
circumstances did he want former rebel slaves on the main island. Nor was he 
interested in buying any of the slave prisoners of war who were accompanying them, 
citing the edict of 1790 prohibiting the entrance of bought or fugitive slaves from the 
French colonies.134 García wrote to Godoy in their defence, calling the governor of 
Cuba’s action unjust and saying that the soldiers would be under threat if they 
returned to Saint-Domingue: ‘The real órden supports that they are not admitted there 
[Cuba] and is not responsible for the variety of their danger, the quality of the 
Negroes, nor of the absolute domination of those who admitted in their states after 
their atrocious and murderous masters ...’135
 Some of the 700 soldiers and their families went to Florida, others to Spain, 
Campeche, New Spain, and Trujillo, on the Honduran coast, as well as Trinidad.136 
But the 144 men and women who went to that island were also met with immediate 
resistance. The governor of Trinidad explained he did not wish for them to settle 
there. At that time, the island’s population was still sparse, but the whites were 
outnumbered: in 1795 there were 5,257 free people (which does not specify how 
many were free people of colour); 8,944 slaves, and 1,078 people classified as 
indios.137 While the arrival of this group would not have in any way tipped the 
demographic balance, the background of these troops aroused Governor Chacón’s 
suspicion. He wrote to Las Casas saying that unlike Cuba, Trinidad had a weak 
militia, composed of only 112 men and that ‘the negroes being sent over know the use 
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of arms, and what is worse is they have employed them in disobedience of the 
Spanish Governor committing an outrage [the attack in Bayaja] if one cannot call it an 
atrocity ... but if the number of veterans [in Trinidad] were at least 800 or 1,000 men, 
I would tentatively employ the Negroes with certain precautions’.138
 The auxiliaries were not the only ones vacating the island, and during the year, 
members of religious orders and families who could afford it left too. Joining the 
steady stream of people leaving Saint-Domingue, they were a further drain on limited 
resources in Cuba and Puerto Rico, causing Las Casas, for instance, to ask for more 
money from New Spain to help pay for the immediate care of the Spanish criollos 
who were coming ashore.139 In fact, Cuba’s captain-general decided that the way to 
deal with the problem was to establish a junta to decide what to do with the 
individuals and families who arrived in Cuba.140 The criollo settlers often left as they 
could, when they were able to find boats willing to take them. Records from July 
1796, for instance, show that six boats brought a total of 48 whites, 12 free people of 
colour, and 55 slaves from Santo Domingo to Cuba.141 By early September, five more 
boats brought a total of 73 whites, 26 free people of colour, and 81 slaves.142 
 This issue of immigration would be one that the newly appointed governor and 
captain-general, Conde de Santa Clara, had to contend with immediately. There were 
often rumours and instances of unwanted people coming to Cuba. He wrote to the 
governor of Santiago de Cuba in June 1796 telling him of secret orders among 
lieutenant governors and local judges to block a group of blacks who had been 
‘sacking, killing, and making as many extortions as they have been able to against the 
whites, to whom many families have been forced to look for security while fleeing, 
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hiding in the capital in the Spanish part ... if they were white, then the asylum is 
momentary: they do not believe the government will allow their continued 
residence ... with the most vigilance do not let them come in furtively ... in view of the 
people of colour who proceed from that island, or one of the other of the French, they 
will be put in jail in the moment they disembark ...’143 The governor, clearly troubled 
by the recent news wrote again, complaining of the influx of people, to which Santa 
Clara replied, ‘I recommend to Your Excellency that you see to this matter with 
caution, pondering the many political and gentle means that can be used to move 
these immigrants to colonies or other destinations far from this Island ...’144
 In addition to the creation of the junta earlier in the year, the former Governor 
Las Casas had relayed the legal changes with regard to slaves before he left the post  – 
now they must only be bozales from Africa, and nowhere else. Although many of the 
slaves who had participated in the uprising in Saint-Domingue had been African, there 
was a sense that it was the creolised ones who could be more dangerous and likely to 
be potential instigators of rebellions. He finished his edict by adding ‘so that this 
beneficial providence [edict] is obeyed as fully as possible, I charge and recommend 
the Justices and all the inhabitants of this island, that acknowledging that the most 
minor indulgence or condescendence [in enforcing this edict], may cause, sooner or 
later, the most fatal and ruinous consequences’ ...’145 
 As Dominicans were trying to leave the island, fighting in Saint-Domingue 
intensified and the British made gains in the South. At the same time, Spain through 
the second Treaty of Ildefonso (1796) entered an alliance with France to fight against 
the British, starting the first Anglo-Spanish War (1796-1802). For a Treasury only just 
out of a war with France, this would plunge the crown into further debt – by 1798 its 
114
143 Conde de Santa Clara to Isidro Limonta, 4 December 1798, ANC, Fondo Correspondencia de 
Capitanes Generales, legajo 30A, sig 16.
144 Conde de Santa Clara to Isidro Limonta, 30 December 1798, ANC, Fondo Correspondencia de 
Capitanes Generales, legajo 30A, sig 11.
145 Luis de las Casas, 25 February 1796, ANC, Asuntos Políticos, legajo 255, sig 26.
deficit would reach 800,000,000 reales de vellón – while at the same time needing  to 
extract more revenues from the Indies.146 The colonies brought in 224,115,000 reales 
de vellón to the crown in 1796, but this would drop to 14,176,000 the following year 
as trade throughout the region was disrupted, not least of all due to the blockade of 
Cadiz, which lasted until 1798.147 Caribbean ports had to open up to ‘neutral’ trade 
with American ships, something the crown belatedly approved by the end of 1797, 
hoping that continued trading would keep revenues high.148 These problems were a 
serious concern for Cuba Governor Santa Clara, who wrote to Godoy, telling him that 
‘the need for vigilant precaution that had been impressed upon me by the repeated 
news of the preparations that the English are making in their Windward Islands, made 
me not disregard the suspicion that the neutral boats coming from Enemy Ports might 
lend themselves to the hiding of some individuals in the service of the English who 
could come to spy on our operations and plans, and to obtain an advantage over the 
forces of this Plaza and Island ...’149 His concern was not unfounded – by this point 
Britain had attempted to take Puerto Rico in February 1797, with the aim of 
capitalising on its strategic location and its economic potential. The British wanted to 
build on the island’s nascent sugar industry by resettling planters fleeing Saint-
Domingue.150 Although they did not realise their ambition, when the British turned 
toward the poorer and nearly defenceless Trinidad, they were able to occupy the 
island by April, while at the same time fighting to take French territory. By now, 
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Britain had taken Martinique, and was fighting in Saint Lucia, had gained and lost 
Guadeloupe, so rumours of an invasion of Santiago de Cuba were not surprising to the 
region’s new governor, Juan Nepomuceno Quintana.151 Britain had become a serious 
threat. However, the reunited and invigorated forces led by Toussaint L’Ouverture 
were proving to be a difficult enemy, and his gains on the British were happily relayed 
around the Spanish islands.152 By 1798 the British had lost some 15,000 troops, with 
many killed by disease as well as fighting, and they stopped their battle to take Saint-
Domingue, surrendering to L’Ouverture in August.
 Only a few months later, at the beginning of 1799, Santa Clara decided that 
more drastic action would be needed in Cuba to contend with the dramatic events in 
the region. As L’Ouverture was consolidating his control in Saint-Domingue, refugees 
kept leaving for Cuba, often in more impoverished and distressed states than people 
who were able to get away earlier. One eyewitness, Briton Hugh Cathcart, who was a 
clerk in Jamaica’s colonial administration, wrote: ‘The Master of His Majesty’s 
Schooner Mosquito / Mr Arnold / was a short time a Prisoner at Jérémie – from 
whence he escaped and is now here – He tells me that their are not about seventy 
whites, in that town and that they are daily going over to Cuba – he describes them to 
be in the greatest misery ... ’153 With immigration and anxiety high, Santa Clara had to 
harden his stance, and he issued a proclamation of more than one hundred different 
rules for Havana. The banda gives some idea of what sort of social activities people 
of the city engaged in, and why they might be a cause for concern. The list starts off 
demanding that bozal slaves must be baptised and instructed in the Catholic faith, as 
well as being given Sundays off. Free blacks were not allowed to have altars for 
dances in their gatherings. Justices were to be vigilant about arresting prostitutes and 
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‘suspicious’ vagrants. There was to be no begging without a license – and absolutely 
no gambling or games of chance. Pardos and morenos were not allowed to use arms 
without clearly wearing a uniform, and no one from the countryside was allowed to 
use a machete in the city, and everyone was banned from using a garrote. There 
would be no singing or chanting in the streets or in houses after 11pm; in fact, no one 
should be in the street at all then unless it was an urgent problem and he was carrying 
a lantern. No gunpower was allowed to be sold. No one could receive a slave inside 
their house, and the taverns could not give slaves wine to take to their masters. 
Taverns and shops in the countryside could not buy goods from people of colour. But 
the one thing that could be permitted was the whipping of slaves.154 
 In considering what Santa Clara was trying to address, Havana comes across 
as a chaotic, unlawful town, where people of colour sang and danced, carried arms, 
and worried officials. These myriad problems, and the many unenforceable 
proclamations that came from the governor, not the crown, were designed to give the 
semblance of control. This would soon be the concern of the next capitan-general of 
Cuba, the Marqués de Someruelos. In addition to the domestic worries, the situation 
in Saint-Domingue was still unresoved. L’Ouverture and the French and the rebel 
slaves continued fighting as if the incursions and Spain and Britain had never taken 
part. It was not long before Someruelos received correspondence from General 
L’Ouverture. The General wrote asking for assistance in an internal matter, which was 
the catching of a ‘traitor’, his mulatto rival Andre Rigaud, who controlled the south of 
Saint-Domingue. Rigaud apparently had sent one of his ‘agents’ to Santiago de Cuba 
to obtain an armed boat and return to the key Southern port of Jérémie.155 Someruelos 
wrote to the short-lived first minister, Mariano Luis de Urquijo, about the exchange, 
however he seemed far more concerned with the form of the letter, rather than its 
content. He pointed out L’Ouverture’s use of ‘Vos’, which is the informal way of 
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saying ‘you’ in Spanish, as opposed to the polite ‘Vuestra Exelencia’, and complained 
to Urquijo: ‘The language of Vos is unusual between us, and the General Toussaint is 
black: I believed, in order to continue with security in this point to represent Your 
Excellency, I ought to continue with regard to him in the same style’. His instinct was 
right – Urquijo said ‘you have done well in corresponding with him with equal 
treatment, and you can continue to do so...’156
 The British also maintained contact with L’Ouverture despite their defeat, as 
Hugh Cathcart wrote in 1799. ‘He [Toussaint] has pressed me very hard, lately to 
bring him a Frigate, and seems rather dissatisfied, at my not complying with his 
request – altho’ I assured him that it was totally out of my power – He then asked me, 
if that I thought Lord Balcares, would procure him one.’ Later he noted that: ‘He has 
lately become very inquisitive to know the distance Saint Domingo is from France 
and England, and also from Jamaica, Cuba and other islands, and seems very curious 
to know their strength and in what manner they are governed.’157 Around the same 
time two conspiracies were uncovered on the mainland, in the Caribbean ports of  
Cartagena and Maracaibo. These were claimed to be connected with Saint-Domingue. 
The first involved a group of French slaves who were allied with naval officers, some 
residents of Cartagena, and local slaves who wanted to kill the governor and other 
whites. The plans in Maracaibo were supposed to involve two French captains and 
their black crew who wanted to introduce a Saint-Domingue style of equality.158
 While the fighting continued in Saint-Domingue, a different battle emerged, 
but this time it was economic. The neutrality laws that had allowed much-needed 
provisions in – though the illegal entry of goods had been a constant – had been 
118
156 Marques de Someruelos to Mariano Luis de Urquijo, 8 August 1799, AGI, Estado, legajo 2, No 14.
157 Hugh Cathcart to Thomas Maitland, November 26, 1799, TNA, Public Record Office, Colonial 
Office, 245, Nos 68-75.
158 Aline Helg, ‘A Fragmented Majority: Free “of All Colors”, Indians, and Slaves in Caribbean 
Colombia During the Haitian Revolution’, in David Geggus (ed) The Impact of the Haitian Revolution 
in the Atlantic World, (Columbia, 2001), pp.157-159.
rescinded. The powerful consulado of Cádiz had managed to get comercio neutral 
revoked on 20 April 1799, and so ‘neutral’ boats again were not supposed to call in 
Spanish ports. Neutral trade would eventually be re-instated in 1801, attesting to the 
difficulty in stopping trade with non-Spanish vessels. Indeed, the question of ships’ 
‘neutrality’ or otherwise was causing problems. For instance, there were American 
boats that wanted to go Baracoa and trade with the French planters, and enter the port 
legally and without having to pay a higher tax. To this, the governor of Santiago de 
Cuba replied, ‘It is fully disgraceful that the named port of Baracoa suddenly exists in 
a theatre of foreign embarkations, and that our minister in Philadelphia promotes this 
project’.159 But the activity of ships came under fire away from Cuba as well, as 
Someruelos received a stern letter from Commissioner Roume in Saint-Domingue, 
claiming that informers in Santiago de Cuba had told him that boats were coming to 
the island and taking ‘black French citizens to sell like slaves and like the inhabitants 
of that island are ignorant without doubt of the immortal declaration of the rights of 
men’.160
 Although Roume’s claim goes against Cuban fears of having ‘French’ slaves in 
the island, it also illustrates the extent to which Cuba and Puerto Rico were entangled 
in France’s domestic problem. The Spanish islands were using the opportunity to 
enrich themselves with the sugar trade, and it was clear to all. Alexander von 
Humboldt, the German explorer and naturalist, arrived in Cuba for the first time in 
1800, and again in 1804. He became good friends with Arango, and eventually wrote 
about the island more than 20 years later (see chapter 5). He was interested in the 
agricultural development and the rise of slavery on the island, and noted that: ‘The 
greatest changes which have been produced in the culture of the sugar cane, and the 
laboratories of the plantations, took place between the years 1796 and 1800. First, 
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mules were substituted for oxen, as motive power for the sugar mills; then water-
power was introduced ... having been used even by the first settlers in St. 
Domingo’.161 He later added that the customs house in Havana from 1797-1800 
contributed an average of $1,900,000 in revenues, having only produced $600,000 in 
1794.162
 The colonial officials in Saint-Domingue were, despite the fighting, also trying 
regain some export wealth by encouraging people to work on plantations, even though 
they were no longer slaves. And at the same time they were losing a valuable labour 
pool, and many of the planters who they hoped could make the island profitable again 
had fled. Cuba was still reluctant to welcome them, as reflected in a bando published 
in December. Someruelos declared that foreigners, especially those who had managed 
to disembark beyond the gaze of port officials, had 15 days from its publication to 
register with judges, magistrates and mayors of where they lived. They also had to 
prove they ‘have some establishment of agriculture, or useful and necessary 
occupation in the Towns of their Residencies’.163 Anyone who had been refused or did 
not meet the criteria had two months to leave Cuba. Someruelos also later felt 
compelled to add to Las Casas’ bando of 1796, which only allowed for bozales to be 
brought to Cuba, decreeing that under no false pretense should any slave – especially 
those who had worked in Saint-Domingue – from any other nation be allowed into 
Cuba. Although this is roughly what other decrees had said, he felt the need to 
reiterate the point. 
  The problem of what to do with fellow Spanish criollos mostly from Santo 
Domingo who were still coming to the island, however, was another matter. A debate 
had arisen over their treatment. A long plea by Don Cayetano Reyna to the junta de 
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emigrados reminded the justices – who included Someruelos and Arango – that there 
had been a similar situation in Florida when it was given to the British from 1763 to 
1783. Of course, one of the prevailing problems with fellow criollos in this case is 
that the Dominicans were generally much worse off than their Cuban counterparts and 
lacked the technical and agricultural knowledge the French planter refugees had 
brought. Reyna noted that, ‘All of a family or person that came enjoying a table in the 
boats to Havana have a pension of three reales daily; the rest that do not have this 
circumstance, and their children, give them a real y medio.’164 Arango, speaking on 
behalf of the junta, explained that their aim was to decide which migrants needed 
support. He claims they were ‘preparing all that is necessary to welcome those poor 
people’, though to do this they would have to ask for money from the Viceroy of New 
Spain, while ‘the number of pensioners augmented daily’. He reminded his audience 
that they had been contending with this problem for five years, but concluded that ‘the 
junta resolves as always that which is sensible’.165 However, this problem would soon 
be further exacerbated.
 On 6 January 1801, Governor García, who had remained in Santo Domingo 
despite the Treaty of Basel, received notice that the island would now fully switch to 
French rule, and L’Ouverture was prepared to use force to back up this edict. 
Although he had been engaged in negotiations with some of the French generals who 
were worried about the growing power of L’Ouverture, they were unable to stop the 
general’s rise. Fueled by these power struggles, L’Ouverture marched into the east. 
His nephew, Moyse, led troops into Santiago, an important provincial capital in the 
centre of the island, and on 11 January, L’Ouverture’s brother, Paul, brought his troops 
into Santo Domingo. Governor García had no choice but to submit, and a handover 
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was arranged on 22 January. García would later write to Puerto Rico’s Governor 
Castro, explaining his anger and disillusion with the events: ‘I, during my time as 
Governor of Santo Domingo, despite having the best knowledge of Toussaint, and 
him having been under my orders, and of my favour from 1793 until the end of May 
1794, always treated him, and wrote to him (when it was necessary) like a Chief of 
the French Nation, giving him the treatment that had been customary with 
Governments of foreign nations.’166
 Throughout the next few months, more criollos left Santo Domingo. Two 
members of the real hacienda who departed in February described there being ‘a 
powerful reason to leave; the rain, the laments, the disorder of the changeover, the 
lack of help from the old government ... and all the city in general full of terror and 
fright, waiting for sacking, death and violence ...’167 García also left, and arrived in 
Maracaibo in February on a Danish goleta, along with his family and secretary 
Nicolas de Toledo.168 They were followed by boats bringing the 148 troops remaining 
in the Infantería de Cantabria.169 Leaving the island was proving to be difficult for 
many, partly due to British corsairs sailing nearby and plundering these ships. Many 
people arrived completely impoverished and had to beg for charity. Such was the case 
for Pedro Sánchez Valverde, who had been a curate in towns such as Higüey and 
Santiago. He claimed he had tried to leave the island in 1796, but that his application 
was denied due to war with Britain and subsequent blockades meaning that transport 
would have been difficult to secure. In his suplica to the officials in Maracaibo, whom 
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he hoped would give him a daily pension, he maintained that he did his share to help 
‘so equally the loyalty, love and courage with which I exalted the honour of your 
Royal Arms against the negro Toussaint Louverture’. Now he was forced to draw on 
his loyalty to ask for help for himself and family members, which consisted of two 
women and five children, whom he claimed had lost everything to the English 
privateers, ‘from their jewelry, and their only clothing ... they are exposed now to 
begging’.170  By the end of March, some 1,247 individuals, 10 political and military 
corps, the Infantería de Cantabria, 118 administrators, and 250 people without 
passports had arrived in the Venezuelan port.171 In Cuba, as some Dominicans arrived, 
the authorities reminding them of the many rules for accessing financial assistance, 
such as having to present the correct documentation to officials, as well as not being 
born in Cuba, nor having emigrated before 1795.172 
 For the criollos who stayed behind, the situation was also difficult. 
L’Ouverture wasted no time in reforming the land use system in the East of the island. 
Rather than allowing cattle farming to continue, he planned to use the land for more 
than just grazing. He knew very well the riches that could be made from agriculture, 
but with a free labour force that was largely resistant to return to plantation-style 
working in the West, and three-quarters of the whole island almost completely lacking 
in necessary infrastructure in the East, he faced some serious challenges. In the West 
of the island, former slaves in the North found themselves coerced into this work 
again, while in the South former slaves were allowed to work their freeholds rather 
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than being forced back into plantation agriculture.173 He tried to lure French planters 
back, offering promises that no harm would befall them. By 1801 there had been a 
rise in exports again – sugar was up 13% from the collapse in 1791, coffee up more 
than 50%, and even cotton managed to rise by 1.54%.174 L’Ouverture began his 
reforms in the East by limiting the granting of lands to new proprietors and not 
allowing new settlements – the Spanish system, based on the notion of terrenos 
comuneros, had allowed for multiple possession of land and no formal system of 
surveying or using titles, which L’Ouverture considered to be ‘backward’.175 These 
measures were unpopular with many Dominicans. Once the land distribution system 
had been re-organised, the new governor also demanded that agricultural workers 
were given a quarter of profits, and he pushed for higher output. Dominican farmers, 
more accustomed to cattle ranching and some tobacco and small-scale sugar 
production, were ordered to cultivate more sugar cane, in addition to coffee and cocoa 
for export, as L’Ouverture wanted to make subsistence agriculture into a commercial 
enterprise on that side of the island as well.176 With that aim in mind, he also opened 
up more Eastern ports for trade with North America and other Caribbean islands. As 
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well as changing agriculture, he also attempted administrative reform on the Eastern 
side of the island, giving offices to mulattos and blacks.177
 At the same time, rumours were circulating that this newly strengthened 
L’Ouverture would be striking out at other territories. The Spanish plenipotentario in 
the US wrote to Someruelos, reporting, ‘I have had various conversations about the 
actual state of that Island [Saint-Domingue], the character and means of General 
Toussaint ... I do not waste time in informing Your Excellency of the general result. 
This is reduced to recommending the most vigilance in the Island of Cuba, since the 
ambitious and active temperament of Toussaint will not let him be idle for long ... this 
caudillo would do something against that Island or that of Puerto Rico'’.178 Puerto 
Rico’s governor had already earlier that year issued orders reiterating that people from 
the now-united island should be kept out, ‘the present very critical occurrences with 
the motive of emigration from the Island of Santo Domingo, I have understood that in 
those days many people of Colour of the French Nation have entered this Island that 
should be repelled’.179
 On 3 July, L’Ouverture unveiled a constitution. Drawing from his 
interpretation of Enlightenment thought and adapting it to the historical contours of 
Saint-Domingue, while addressing delicate French politics, the extraordinary 
document declared first and foremost that the island was part of the French empire 
and that the only faith was Catholic. But by then went on to assert that ‘there cannot 
exist slaves on this territory’, following this by asserting that ‘all men are born, live 
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and die free and French’,180 which would include the newly added Spanish criollos, of 
which some black and mulatto members were thought to have helped with the 
constitution.181 He also made himself governor for life of the colony. The constitution 
was unveiled with some fanfare and speeches: 
... at three in the morning the corps drummers played music ... at  5.30 the 
 General Paul L’Ouverture ... arrived with half the troops; at the same time the 
 music became Patriotic songs ... Citizen Mondion pronounced the following 
 speech, that was equally translated and read in Spanish: Citizens ... Citizen 
 Toussaint Lovuerture, whose actions are of such benefit to humanity; the boss, 
 brother ... in whose glory greatness is founded, in whose liberty rests his 
 power ... the people of Santo Domingo have spoken that they want to be free: 
 now they have attained it.182
 It is difficult to know how this was received by the former Dominican slaves, 
or free people of colour who remained in the East, as most the sources from this 
period are limited to official correspondence. One British observer remarked in a 
letter: ‘Informed you in my last that the Spanish part of the Island had submitted to 
the power and authority of General Toussaint, after little or no resistance, - It appears 
however that the Spanish are by no means at their ease under the new Government, a 
great many of them wishing to quit the country, which the General ... indeed of 
prohibits.’183  It hardly comes as a surprise that his move had many detractors among 
the former slave-owning ranchers and farmers. News of this constitution spread 
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around the Spanish world. The governor of Caracas, Manuel de Guevara Vasconcelos, 
enclosed a copy of the constitution to the most recent secretary of state in Madrid, 
Pedro Cevallos Guerra. Attached to it was a long letter about the ‘despotic hand’ of 
L’Ouverture, saying that ‘the authority is clad with this superior character, reserving 
for himself all the representation and influence necessary to make himself Sovereign 
under the name of Governor: it seems that the Sovereign has a short time in his life to 
enjoy the relationship with his Sovereignty’.184 
 However, none of these events went unnoticed by Napoleon, who by now had 
had quite enough of his increasingly autonomous black general. Although he had 
named L’Ouverture captain-general in March 1801, he in no way supported the 
constitution, and plans were afoot to undermine L’Ouverture and his black followers 
and regain political control of the island. Additionally, the previous year Napoleon 
had recovered Louisiana from Spain under the third treaty of San Ildefonso (1800), 
and was eager to reassert French authority in the region, though in the end he would 
sell the Louisiana territory to the United States in 1803, partly to pay for the high cost 
of the ongoing battle on Saint-Domingue. On 31 December of the same year 
Napoleon’s brother-in-law, General Leclerc, set sail for the island with thousands of 
troops and orders to reinstitute slavery.185 L’Ouverture and his generals heard these 
rumours, and when they received news that the French authorities had indeed began 
to institute such a measure in Guadeloupe, they turned against Napoleon. In June of 
1802, L’Ouverture was captured and sent to France, where he died in 1803.186 His 
successor, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, continued what had turned into a bloody battle, 
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though he was aided by some 14,000 French troops dying of yellow fever. Indeed, by 
the end of 1802, Leclerc would also be killed by the disease. Napoleon then sent 
General Rochambeau to finish off the job. During this time the remaining whites – 
who had come back to Saint-Domingue trusting L’Ouverture’s promises – would flee 
to the closest point of refuge, bringing another wave of immigrants to Cuba and 
Puerto Rico.
 Meanwhile in the Spanish colonies, Cuba again re-iterated the prohibition of 
any non-‘authorised’ person to be on the islands, though this time it also mentioned 
neutral traders who had overstayed their welcome – Governor Someruelos had the 
order printed in the Papel Periodico de la Havana.187 Of course in those islands there 
was no official report of events across the Windward Passage, and instead, the theme 
of an October issue of the Papel Periodico de la Havana of the same year was yet 
again on agriculture. A discurso examined the reasons behind agricultural decline, 
which the author put some of the causes down to the bad distribution of land, and the 
uneven development of towns.188 Yet this was clearly just an intellectual exercise, as 
agriculture was improving in both Cuba and Puerto Rico. In fact, Arango was sent to 
Saint-Domingue in the same year, under orders from Governor Someruelos that 
included to ‘know the state of tranquility or altercation in which the island finds itself, 
as much in the former Spanish side as in the French’ and to ‘acknowledge the state of 
agriculture with regard to the fruits produced at the present time, and the measures 
being taken for their increase’.189 Arango reported back, somewhat predictably, that 
‘The pen fell from my hands, when I try to begin the sad picture that today can be 
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made of the place that was a little while ago the most flourishing and rich colony in 
the world’ and went on to detail the woeful state of Saint-Domingue.190 
 In the East the number of immigrants in Santiago de Cuba now totaled around 
20,000.191 They were transforming the coffee agriculture in that part of the island. 
With its high mountains, the Sierra Maestra in South-East of Cuba had become a 
region of cafetales.192 But the immigrants were not strictly limited to coffee, and some 
returned to sugar planting, with about 300,000 arrobas of sugar being produced in 
1803, compared with earlier averages of around 80,000 arrobas.193 Still, that had not 
stopped Someruelos earlier in the year issuing another edict about foreigners in 
Havana, as it would appear that he was having some difficulty in enforcing them, 
claiming ‘I have arrived at the understanding that the bandos published by me and my 
predecessors have not been duly observed’. He went on to order that people who 
illegally disembarked without a passport would have to pay a 200 peso fine and their 
slaves would be put in public shackles, and anyone who brought in slaves that were 
not bozales would be fined 100 pesos for the first one and 200 pesos for the second.194 
He went as far as to request to Rochambeau to respect the same law, to which the 
French General replied: ‘You ask me, General [Someruelos] to not allow the 
disembarkation in the possessions of His Catholic Majesty any man of colour: your 
wish will be punctually executed. I will give my resulting orders to the marine 
officials and I will punish in an exemplary mode those who contravene them.’195 
129
190 Arango, ‘Comisión de Arango en Santo Domingo’, 17 June 1803, Obras, p.344.
191 Marqués de Someruelos to Pedro Ceballos, 20 December 1803, AGI, Estado, legajo 2, exp 43; 
Emilio Bacardí y Moreau, Crónicas de Santiago de Cuba (Barcelona, 1909), p.45.
192 Protocolos notariales escribanias de Santiago de Cuba, 1803, Archivo Histórico Provincial de 
Santiago de Cuba (hereafter AHPSC), Escribanias Giro, No 235.
193 Bacardí y Moreau, Crónicas, p.46.
194 Marqués de Someruelos, 18 February 1803, ANC, Asuntos Políticos, legajo 255, sig 35.
195 General Rochambeau to Marqués de Someruelos, 12 March 1803, AHN, Estado, legajo 6366, caja 
1, no 52.
Though in his response, Someruelos, while thanking the French General for his 
cooperation, informed him ‘my resources are already spent, and though my desires 
are the same, I am absolutely unable to attend to the demands that Your Excellency 
mades of me, even if I receive orders of my king to execute them, which still I have 
not received...196
 By the summer, the next governor of Santiago de Cuba, Sebastián Kindelán, 
was forced to issue edicts of his own. In July, he printed a bando entitled ‘Orders for 
Public Order’. He demanded that landlords report the sex, colour, age, occupation, 
and duration of stay of every tenant. No one could buy a slave who had previously 
had a foreign owner. After 11pm no individuals, resident or foreign, were allowed out 
in the street, unless it was to find a doctor, in which case they should have a lantern 
with them. The use of arms or machetes was prohibited for everyone. Tumbas – 
traditional dances held by the French and often involving people of colour who had 
managed to find a way in to Cuba – were only allowed on festival days, and even then 
they had to finish by 8pm. No one could have a private dance in their house without 
official permission. And, of course, no card games or gambling.197 Again, turning this 
around, it would appear gambling was rife, too many people were out at night, and 
social dances of the free people of colour, as well as the new immigrants, were clearly 
a cause for anxiety in this small port town.
 The French settlers in Santiago had their own neighbourhood, their own 
theatre, spoke their own language, and had their own social world. There was tension 
between the settlers and Spanish criollos as well, as illustrated by their mutual 
antagonism over the crown and the church. The immigrants were often taunted with 
the insults such as the French being ‘baptised in the water of rotten cod’, to which the 
reply was ‘Godoy’s Spain’, which was a reference to the unpopularity of the first 
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minister.198 Reports of alleged ‘disorder’ by the French even reached Madrid, as 
disgruntled residents made a complaint to the king, who ignored the problem and re-
iterated that foreigners could not settle in Cuba outside of what had already been 
established by law.199 Yet in a letter from Someruelos to Kindelán, the capitan-general 
pointed out that ‘I have to say in regard to the people of colour you know well that the 
slaves that have arrived with their respective Masters, remain tranquil in their 
labour’.200 It would seem that private and public fears sometimes did not tally, 
especially as both governors realised the value of what the French immigrants had 
brought to their economy. To further protect this, the following month Kindelán set up 
the compañía de cazadores, a group of 60 soldiers and 10 officers posted at five sites 
around the south coast who were given the duty of contending with the cimarrones 
and runaway colonies, also known as palenques, by stifling their coastal incursions 
and making sure they did not plan any rebellions.201
 Meanwhile, in Saint-Domingue, Rochambeau was running out of troops and 
supplies, and he began to realise it was a losing battle, especially after the British 
blockade meant he would not be able to receive re-enforcements.202 Finally, with 
losses mounting from yellow fever and endless fighting, Rochambeau had to 
capitulate. In December, a ship captain named Caleb Allen brought news of the 
surrender to Havana, reporting that ‘On December 2 Rochambeau left the port in a 
Frigata de Guerra Surveillante which was immediately captured by British warships 
manning the blockade of that port; the following day the entire flota left.’203 Soon 
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thereafter, Rochambeau and his remaining troops retreated, leaving Dessalines 
victorious. On 1 January 1804, Dessalines declared the establishment of the nation of 
Haiti,204 and the former slave colony began its life as a free republic.205 As British 
abolitionist James Stephen noted in the same year, ‘A new order of things has arisen 
in the West Indies, to which former precedents are quite inapplicable.’206
 For Spain and its island colonies, the end of the 13-year fight in Saint-
Domingue also would be the start of a new imperial relationship. The changes had 
been dramatic, and lessons were learned in seeing how abolition and republicanism 
wreaked havoc in France’s empire. Indeed, the crown was willing to get rid of its 
oldest colony in an effort to stop warring with France, and doubtless also to get away 
from the chaotic situation on the island. But this struggle was beyond the boundaries 
of Santo Domingo – the years of fighting saw Ogé’s cry for equality turn into a 
European war in the Caribbean. Indeed, Britain’s ability to take advantage of the 
situation meant that it added Trinidad to its imperial fold. There was no staying away 
from the disruption for Spanish officials, however, as refugees from all of Hispaniola 
looked to Cuba and Puerto Rico for safety and a new life. This in turn caused 
problems for the Spanish colonies, which at once wanted the knowledge of planters 
who could help the economy, yet not the labour of their dangerous slaves, and not free 
people of colour who could also disturb the ‘tranquility’. So more colonial repression, 
born out of local problems and desires to keep the status quo, became one of the 
foundations upon which economic and demographic shifts that would for ever change 
Cuba and Puerto Rico would be built. Here were planted the seeds of the ‘fear’ that 
would later grow large enough to cast a long shadow over the islands. This would be 
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compounded by the growth of the nation of Haiti, and the threat of black rule to all 
islands who still used slave labour. But of all the contradictions of this period, the 
most surprising one is that despite knowing what happened and being caught up in the 
events of Saint-Domingue, the Spanish crown and its two Caribbean colonies thought 
that they could now have the wealth France had squandered by similar means but 
without the same violent, bloody downfall. 
Conclusion
The Spanish response to the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue forced a tightening of the 
pact between planters and the colonial authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, while 
Santo Domingo was traded as a pawn in the ongoing fight between the French and 
Spanish in Europe. Thus the three islands were inexorably bound up with these wider 
ideological and social transformations, as well as economic ones. Cuban sugar 
planters were well-positioned to pick up the sugar trade the French had left behind, 
while the crown’s war debts were spiraling. The colonial response to this uncertainty 
was one of deep anxiety – all around war was raging, yet the real threat, as Saint-
Domingue had shown, was within. Once colonial officials realised they had to be 
wary not only of strangers but also of their own criollo slaves and people of colour, a 
much more repressive colonial Spanish state emerged. This is shown through actions 
such as the authorities’ stream of repressive bandos, the treatment of refugees, and the 
censorship and conspiracy of silence aimed at keeping information about Saint-
Domingue away from Cuba and Puerto Rico’s slaves and free people of colour. This 
was a starting point for racialised fears about the destructive possibilities of not only 
slaves, but also all people of colour, as well as the dangerous ideas about liberty from 
the French that had ignited it. But the damage France was able to inflict on Spain thus 
far was only a small foreshadowing of what was to come on the peninsula. 
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Chapter 3
Between Liberalism and Repression, 1805-1814
The years that followed what became known as the Haitian Revolution brought 
further tumult to the Spanish Caribbean. Spain saw its king deposed and Joseph 
Bonaparte put on the throne. While under occupation, the government and Cortes 
would make a series of decisions that resulted in the unmooring of most of Spain’s 
colonies. The constitutional debates in 1812 would show Spain and the other colonies 
the true power of Cuba’s planter classes. Fear took on an internal dimension during 
this time of uncertainty, as Spain’s colonies were now worried about the fate of their 
king. In many ways the anxiety that many criollos harboured about the French and 
their capabilities had come true. With the fall of the king, an existential crisis of sorts 
materialised. Not only did the islands have to contend with an uncertain imperial 
future – without the security of which they felt certain to fall into French hands as 
Santo Domingo had – the political reforms implemented among occupied Spaniards 
was dividing opinion and even putting at risk the Cuban sugar industry. This chapter 
traces how fear takes on another layer. The previous chapter looked at how 
Enlightenment ideas were embodied across the Atlantic, but in this decade, it was 
colonial demands and anxieties that shaped events in the peninsula and in Spain’s 
colonies. This chapter will focus on four interrelated themes: the first is the ongoing 
issue of rumours of an attack by Haiti; the second is the fall of Spain and its political 
ramifications; the third is anti-French sentiment in the Caribbean and the loyalist 
rebellion in Santo Domingo; and the last is the continual growth of the sugar economy 
and the rising power of the planters.
Race and the rise of republicanism
Readers of the Papel Periodico de la Habana would have picked up the January 6 
1805 edition to find the publication’s main article expounding on the problem of 
childhood fears. It explained that ‘it is evident that fear is natural in man’ but that ‘our 
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fear grows greater or smaller in proportion to how familiar we are with what causes it, 
and in such a way it happens, for example, that he who becomes accustomed, hears it 
continuously’.1 Viewed in retrospect, this article – of course – has a bitter irony, as 
after more than a decade of violence in Saint-Domingue and instability throughout the 
region, habaneros, as well as others throughout the island, would have been well-
accustomed to the many faces of fear: the fear of slave rebellions, the fear of French 
invasions or British incursions; the fear spread by the refugees who had witnessed the 
horrors of Saint-Domingue at first hand; and now the fear of the new black Republic. 
 The ideals of the French Revolution had entered the Caribbean and not only 
transformed it, but those ideals were also transformed. There was a new type of 
liberty, equality, and fraternity in France’s former ‘pearl of the Antilles’. Unlike the 
peasantry and bourgeoisie in France, it was the enslaved who fought the battle in the 
Caribbean. It set a worrying example for slaveholders throughout the region. In Santo 
Domingo, which had been Spain’s oldest colony, sat Napoleon’s generals and 
administrators, relegated to the margins of the crumbling remains of France’s 
Caribbean colonies as tactical attention turned back to Europe. Haiti, the newly born 
republic of former slaves, now sat ringed by slave societies. Of course fear and 
slavery have always had a symbiotic relationship, but now they were more tightly 
bound than ever. Within the space of a few years, the emotional landscape of the 
Caribbean had seen a fundamental reconfiguration. The nature of slavery had 
changed, as numbers rose and African slaves were supplanting Cuban-born ones, 
while the former slaves of Haiti were trying to establish their republic. Likewise, the 
nature of fear had changed. Part of being a slave society in the Caribbean meant living 
with the threat of runaways, with maroon colonies, even with local disturbances and 
small-scale rebellions. But the events in Saint-Domingue had changed the scale of 
those fears. Now, rather than control and discipline over a single plantation, a larger 
economic project was at stake, as was a larger social and racial order. In addition, 
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Saint-Domingue and the French Revolution had convinced many criollos and 
Spaniards of the perils of equality and the security of a monarchy. They would soon 
realise the fragility of the latter. The idea of loyalism would see a dramatic 
transformation over the course of only a few years. Napoleon’s invasion, coupled with 
Spain’s experiment of liberalism would forever alter the colonial relationship. The 
first and second decades of the 1800s were full of even more uncertainty than the 
years that preceeded them. The Papel article concluded that ‘to cease to be concerned 
by any fantastic fear, all that is necessary is to find its cause, and thus convince one’s 
reasoning of its falseness’.2 Yet for the public, amid such uncertainty, the causes of 
fear could not be reasoned away quite so easily. In fact, motives and causes only 
seemed to become more muddled as events grew in complexity. 
 A very clear source of this new anxiety began with the rise of the Republic of 
Haiti in 1804. Now the worry was not only about the French and their ‘contagious’ 
ideas – this was something else altogether: a republic of former slaves. Dessalines, 
who had taken charge after the capture of L’Ouverture, appointed himself emperor 
and issued a new constitution in 1805, overwriting the work of his predecessor. In the 
document, Dessalines christened the former colony with the name of Haiti, and for 
ever abolished slavery.3 His document went much further than L’Ouverture’s work, 
declaring that ‘no white man of whatever nation may he be, shall put his foot on this 
territory with the title of master or proprietor’, and that all Haitians ‘shall hence 
forward be known only by the generic appellation of Blacks’, thus attempting to end 
the colour gradations that had plagued the island.4 
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 This constitution was not well-received by the surrounding islands. Indeed, the 
Spanish colonies immediately became concerned about infiltration – and potential 
attack – from emissaries representing this new republic. A report from Puerto Rico 
alerted officials to be on the lookout for ‘a suspicious French Mulatto named 
Chanlatte [Chaulette] of the age of about 18 to 20 years, ordinary stature, curly hair, 
and who speaks French, English and also Spanish ... This French mulatto Chaulette, is 
an emissary of Dessaline [sic], that Negro who has notoriously risen up in the island 
of Santo Domingo’, claiming his aims were to ‘sow his evil seed in an island that 
enjoys the most perfect tranquility, loyalty and honour’.5 Months later, it was said that 
Chaulette’s mission was to organise a slave conspiracy throughout the Caribbean, 
which was supposed to be coordinated in Haiti.6 This would not be the last of such 
rumours implicating Haiti. The idea of Haiti as a propagator of slave rebellions 
persisted throughout the century. The unease found in Puerto Rico was not unique. 
Reports from around the region filtered in about alleged attacks and aggression from 
the new nation, such as the taking of a ship from Santander, Spain, which was 
captured by ‘the same negroes from Port-au-Prince’.7 It appears that in many cases 
being a non-white from Haiti was enough to brand a man an accomplice in this larger 
revolutionary project, whether or not he simply happened to be in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. Authorities in the Spanish Caribbean, long accustomed to dealing 
with their own rebel runaway groups, became increasingly concerned that the 
maroons on their islands would make contact with Dessalines’ men. There was also 
fear that Haitians would infiltrate the population of free people of colour in their 
islands and incite them into action too, and so measures were quickly taken in an 
attempt to prevent these connections from forming. In Santiago de Cuba, for instance, 
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such measures included the further formation of bands of men to attack maroon 
colonies, as well as more surveillance and restrictions on free people of colour.8 
 Meanwhile, French rule, such as it was, continued in Santo Domingo. Many 
Dominicans were distraught at this change in fortune, and no one had expected the 
Treaty of Basel to come to fruition under L’Ouverture, much less for the French to 
continue to oversee the territory after their humiliation at the hands of former slaves. 
Yet the small band of troops led by General Louis Ferrand persisted. In any case, the 
island was large and sparsely populated enough for most of the people living away 
from the capital, Santo Domingo, not to notice the difference. What they could not 
overlook, however, was hunger and poverty. And this, coupled with political 
embarrassment, was enough for many to leave the island if they could scrape together 
enough to pay for their passage. General Ferrand, however, remained optimistic, at 
least on paper. He had written a letter to the Governor of Puerto Rico which ‘inspired 
confidence, and destroyed the misconception that France had abandoned its precious 
possession’, as Toribio Montes later related. It appeared that General Ferrand had told 
him of his plans offer housing and land to any French planter who had fled from Haiti 
but remained in the Spanish side, with the aim of building up the island’s population 
and improving agricultural output.9 His territorial control, however, was not as strong 
as he liked to imagine. 
 Soon after the Haitian emperor had unveiled his new constitution, General 
Ferrand ignited the wrath of Dessalines by decreeing it permissible to capture and use 
or sell as slaves any black and mulatto children found in the frontier zones between 
French and Haitian territory.10 The reinstatement of slavery by Napoleon in 1802 had 
not been rescinded, and General Ferrand had every intention of taking advantage of it. 
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The news reached Dessalines, who sprang into action, mobilising troops and 
mounting an invasion later that month, taking much of the northern territory in violent 
fighting, which included the razing of the village of Moca on 5 April 1805. He later 
justified his actions, explaining in a speech how, ‘provoked by the decree sent out by 
Ferrand ... I resolved to go and take control of this integral part of my states and erase 
there until the end the last vestiges of the European character’.11 The fighting between 
France and Haiti was far from over when it concerned the question of slavery. The 
Dominicans were proving to be a disappointment for Dessalines, with their inability 
to drive out the French. Because there are few Dominican records from this period it 
is hard to ascertain how enslaved and free black Dominicans reacted – if they fled to 
Haiti or if they accepted French rule. But it would appear that Dessalines found them 
overall to be weak. He said later in the same speech: ‘It would be natural to presume 
that Spanish Indians, those descendants of the poor Indians killed by the lust and 
avarice of the first usurpers of this island, would avidly take advantage of this 
precious occasion to make a sacrifice to the souls of their ancestors; but this species of 
wretched and degraded men, rather than the sweetness of a free and independent life 
preferred a master to tyranise it, and made common cause with the French.’12
 These developments in Santo Domingo, as well as Haiti, meant even more 
people were fleeing to Puerto Rico and Cuba. In May, around 418 people arrived in 
Baracoa, and Governor Kindelán in Santiago was forced to write to Capitan-General 
Someruelos in Havana asking for help in dealing with the situation.13 Previously he 
had reported ‘the arrival of eight French canoes from ... Jeremías [Jérémie] 
commandeered by mulatto and white families that came fleeing from their fear of 
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being sacrificed by the Negroes’.14 As had been the case since the beginning of the 
conflict, they were not always welcome. It was a similar situation in Puerto Rico, 
where Governor Montes acknowledged that there was still very much the problem of 
illegal former and current slaves in the island, but rather than deporting them he 
issued instructions that 25 pesos should be paid for each one to properly accredit their 
worthiness, and then they would be allowed to stay and be put to use.15 As in Santiago 
de Cuba, the authorities of Puerto Rico were also trying to retain people who had the 
potential to improve the economy of the island. Although there was a long-running 
anxiety about the ‘danger’ of people from Saint-Domingue, it had become clear that 
these refugees were fueling economic changes in the region and officials continued to 
grapple with the question of how to keep them on the island and remain within the 
law. At the same time, there was unease about their loyalties in larger geo-political 
battles. Governor Montes wrote to Madrid about the case of Pedro Gautier, a French 
planter who had stayed without the requisite papers. Montes used the letter to outline 
his concerns: 
... I suppose that when His Majesty deigned to declare that it is not his Royal 
Will that the population of his colonies grow with all the French who have 
taken refuge in them, this was after a prudent examination of all the 
inconveniences that might arise; [still] I cannot help to at least raise the issue 
to Your Excellency, that given the local situation of this island [Puerto Rico], 
and that of Santo Domingo, which belongs wholly to France, a great danger 
would be posed to the conservation of that [island of Puerto Rico] by the 
settlement of a considerable number of Frenchmen in it, since they would 
consider themselves enemies [of the regime] or be at least suspicious [of it] in 
any case of discord between the two Governments.16 
140
14 Sebastián Kindelán to Marques de Someruelos, 30 June 1804, AHN, Estado, legajo 6366, caja 2, No 
87.
15 Circular, Toribio Montes, 10 October 1805, AGPR, Fondo Gobernadores Españoles, Asuntos 
Políticos y Civiles, caja 18, ‘Las pruebas positivas con que me hallo de que en toda esta isla ...’
16 Toribio Montes to Pedro Cevallos, 31 October 1805, ANH, Estado, legajo 6375, No 5.
 Montes had already taken action over this issue, telling island officials to 
register all the foreigners, dividing them into three classes: French from Santo 
Domingo/Saint-Domingue, foreigners who had already been domiciled on the island 
for a long time, and any other arrivals who were not in either class.17 Kindelán in 
Santiago de Cuba had noted that the people who had fled before the rise of Haiti had 
also turned against the new Republic, and were willing allies: ‘ ... every Frenchman 
who remains here ... is a watchtower against that bloodthirsty race which had caused 
such desolation to its families ...’18 
 Puerto Rico lacks the size of Cuba or Santo Domingo, the two largest islands 
in the region. The effects of the establishment of Haiti, coupled with the constant flow 
of rumours, was unsettling to the small island, but it was not alone in this, as other 
colonies in the region which were smaller in size and had limited defences, such as 
Trinidad and Jamaica, were concerned as well. For instance, the wife of the Governor 
of Jamaica, Lady Nugent, described in her journal the climate of unrest and 
uncertainty: 
Dear Clifford returned here yesterday, and she is so courageous that she is a 
great comfort to me; but she tells me that, before she left Spanish Town, the 
negroes appeared to be inclined to riot, and to make a noise in the streets, 
when the troops marched out, but they were soon dispersed by the militia. The 
black servants here [Port Henderson] seem to rejoice at the bustle, but ... 
profess to hate the French.’19 
Likewise, in the now British colony of Trinidad worry was also growing. A report by 
the governor of the island of Margarita (near Venezuela) to Governor Montes, which 
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was forwarded to Madrid, contained news of a ‘a conspiracy by people of colour – 
hatched, discovered and punished in Trinidad – with the implication that there are 
other islands in communication with that of Santo Domingo, from which the chaos 
originated’.20 A short while after relaying that news, a list of slaves in each part of 
Puerto Rico was ordered to be drawn up, as well as reports on anyone deemed 
‘suspicious’.21 
 Meanwhile, complaints were reaching General Ferrand about the treatment of 
the French in the Spanish islands, especially Cuba. With linguistic and cultural 
differences, not to mention the anxiety of connections with Saint-Domingue, the 
French refugees who fled to the Spanish islands had often kept to their own 
communities, as discussed in the previous chapter. While they helped modernise sugar 
technology, and took over much of the coffee-growing in the east of Cuba, for 
instance, socially they held their own events, communicated in French, and lived near 
each other. In addition, the long-running and complicated political relationship 
between France and Spain meant that it would have been more surprising had there 
not been hostilities between the two groups. Governor Someruelos was forced to write 
to the French general and counter the claims, which he did by arguing that ‘the large 
number of French who voluntarily reside in Havana and the rest of the towns of this 
island and its countryside is the best testament that they are neither ... insulted nor 
treated badly; on the contrary, it is proof that they are well taken care of and looked 
after with consideration, as has happened and happens now’.22 The real core of the 
dispute, however, appeared to be over the issue of the so-called French ‘agents’ 
caught in Spanish territory who were not supposed to be there. After all, many of the 
142
20 Toribio Montés to Pedro Cebellos, 22 January 1806, AHN, Estado, legajo 6375, No 2.
21  Francisco Montes, 28 January 1806, AGPR, Gobernadores Españoles, Expedientes Municipal, 
Manatí, legajo 63, from appendix VII in Raquel Rosario, Los efectos de la revolucion en Saint 
Domingue y de la venta de la Lousiana en Puerto Rico: las migraciones en la isla (unpublished PhD 
thesis, Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe, University of Puerto Rico,1988).
22 Marqués de Someruelos to General Ferrand, 4 August 1806, ANC, Asuntos Políticos, legajo 138, sig 
33.
refugees had simply slipped in, as Spain and Cuba’s strict laws to prevent the arrival 
of undesired and undocumented immigrants were nearly unenforceable away from the 
ports. Someruelos ended his letter with a stern reminder: ‘And finally, that French 
emigrants are not permitted, but are refused.’23 Despite a pause in their European 
warring, the animosity between France and Spain in the Caribbean still ran deep. 
 As Santo Domingo under Ferrand lingered, Cuba’s agricultural output and 
cities both grew. The western region around Santiago de Cuba was experiencing a 
boom in coffee production. Before the bulk of Saint-Domingue refugees arrived 
around 1800, production had never risen above some 8,000 arrobas a year, but by 
1805 production had risen to 80,000 arrobas, soon rising to around 300,000.24 Sugar 
production, meanwhile was averaging some 185,000 metric tonnes during this period, 
compared with 89,090 metric tonnes in the period from 1792 to 1796.25
 However, this prosperity, mixed with the continual arrival of slaves, created 
unease. Colonial life was full of uncertainties, wrought by the very nature of society 
itself. Atlantic crossings took months, news was often more rumour than fact, slaves 
could not be trusted, crop prices could fall at any moment, and political power could 
be subverted by unscrupulous politicians. Wealth was no insurance against this, as the 
lessons of Saint-Domingue made clear; making more money only meant there was 
more to lose. That Puerto Rico, by virtue of its size, and Cuba, by virtue of its 
proximity to Haiti, felt under threat is not surprising. Many of these rumours were 
without foundation, but the vicissitudes of colonial life meant that any piece of 
information could often be taken as fact. The state of affairs in Haiti was such that it 
was difficult to obtain good intelligence. In retrospect, given that the republic was 
virtually born divided, and that it had been exhausted by war, it is difficult to 
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contemplate Dessalines conjuring up a widespread revolt with his tired troops and 
poor provisions. But amid the swirls of rumours, this seemed more than a possibility – 
it was considered a reality. Yet in those uncertain early years of the republic, the only 
weapon that Haiti had was rumour. As long as people thought Haitians more 
dangerous than they actually were, they could spread the country’s emancipatory 
message and further insulate the island from the threat of European incursion. One 
factor that colonial officials throughout the region had overlooked was Haiti’s own 
fear – the return of a European power and their re-enslavement. For the moment, 
however, the rumours of Haitian aggression meant that Europeans stayed away and on 
guard. At the same time this republic was being shunned, ideas about independence 
were beginning to dawn in Spanish America. Far richer and more powerful than the 
Caribbean islands, criollo elites in territories across the Spanish main had long been 
discontent with the metropole. For these nascent republicans, Haiti was well-
positioned geographically and ideologically to help them with their goals, as a 
Venezuelan named Francisco de Miranda discovered. 
 On 2 February 1806, a boat named the Leander left New York and sailed 
towards Haiti, carrying Miranda, who had fought in the French Revolution and now 
had plans to ‘liberate’ his homeland. The boat was captained by Thomas Lewis, 
whose brother, Jacob, was well-known in Haiti as a trader who could easily procure 
guns and ammunition.26 Miranda spent the next six weeks planning for his expedition, 
but he never left the southern port of Jacmel, and did not meet Dessalines; it was 
future Haitian leader Alexandre Pétion who helped with preparations.27 Of course, 
rumours of what was going on had already washed up on Venezuela’s shores, and the 
Spanish islands enlisted a spy to find out more. Madrid panicked about this ‘Haitian 
danger’ and announced that this ‘virus’ was part of a plot to unleash revolutions on all 
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the European colonies in the Americas.28 Once again, this fear of Haiti began to 
spread, and it seemed to signify more than a slave revolt. Emancipation coupled with 
republicanism was an even more dangerous threat. At the same time, news of the 
expedition was relayed back to London, and so too was that of Dessalines’s ongoing 
last push against white planters, with the Times of London reporting that ‘Captain 
Dodge, of the schooner Mary-Ann ... states that on the 14th and 15th of May, a 
general massacre of all the remaining white inhabitants of Cape François took place ... 
On the night of the 14th ... these unfortunate people were strangled in their bed, by 
order of the Emperor; the blood-thirsty villains, not content with this, plunged their 
bayonets into their bodies...”29 A few months later, more reports of Miranda reached 
London. One described how 120 French troops from Guadeloupe had become 
involved in a fight against him. Another, from Puerto Rico, proposed that he had 
reached the Spanish Main.30 Miranda, in the end, was unsuccessful: he instigated a 
number of expeditions, but he was captured and killed by Spain. With regard to the 
attack he launched from Haiti, however, Miranda would later deny he was helped by 
‘Haitian blacks’, illustrating the contradictory treatment of these former slaves.31
 Miranda’s story adds a new layer of complexity to Haiti’s place in the 
Caribbean world. He embodied the emerging ‘creole patriot’.32 Born in the Americas, 
and increasingly angry about continued Spanish rule, these criollos did not share the 
Spaniards’ hatred of the French Revolution. The emergence of creole patriots – which 
of course is not to say that there was no previous criollo unrest in Spanish America – 
would become another long battle for the Spanish crown. The Bourbons had indeed 
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paid for their reforms, as criollo unrest in many other territories could attest, 
especially in New Spain, but it would get worse in the next few years. Added to this 
was a growing concern of slave rebellions, which included parts of New Spain, 
Venezuela, Peru, and New Granada, and not just the islands. These, compounded with 
more long-standing preoccupations, such as piracy and plunder, and illegal 
contraband trade, meant that the Treasury still did not have enough to pay for Spain’s 
costly European geopolitics. So in many ways, the issue of slaves and Haiti was of 
less importance to Madrid than more pressing concerns in Europe and issues in its 
more valuable colonies. Policy directed at the whole empire often would not be 
received well in the Caribbean, and often seemed confused and contradictory. 
 For example, an 1806 consulta argued that pardos as well as Indians and 
mestizos should by allowed to obtain ‘whiteness’, echoing previous legislation, but 
only when it would not threaten the interests of order.33 But at the same time pardos 
and morenos were seen as being a potential threat to order. The documents noted that 
Miranda’s failed expedition was composed of some 2,000 pardos, of whom, they said, 
‘we can only fear terrible effects if they are extracted from their humble and repressed 
state’.34 The Caribbean islands mulattoes and pardos already had their own militia 
units, and were deemed necessary owing to the overall lack of manpower.35 There 
were laws, however, ensuring these militia members could not carry their own 
personal guns. Likewise, this consulta laid out strict guidelines by which people of 
colour could obtain their ‘equality’. It entailed appealing to the king on the strength of 
their individual merits, or by proving four generations of free and legitimate 
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ancestors, which would be difficult for almost any non-Spaniard to prove. The 
document concluded that: 
With the aim of conciliating these two extremes, [given that we are] not 
admitting them absolutely to the graces, or make them fully capable of 
receiving the honours that the whites of America enjoy, it seemed convenient 
to give them the possibility of appealing for them to the good will of the 
sovereign, in light of their [individual] merits and unique and extraordinary 
accomplishments. [Still, it was also] declared that those mestizos who can 
prove to be the legitimate sons of a pure Spaniard and Indian, can alternate 
[their status], and obtain all the dignities, offices, and destinies enjoyed and 
exercised by Europeans and [white] Americans; and as for morenos and 
pardos, those able to certify, with all the correct form and solemnity with 
proper documents and not [just] the information of witnesses, their free and 
legitimate ancestry for four generations, are capable of any office or rank open 
to anyone of general or plain status in Spain.36
While this was being written,  Governor Montes, upon hearing about the Miranda 
expedition and Dessalines’s alleged plans to cause revolts in the region, ordered the 
arrest of every person of colour who tried to set foot in Puerto Rico, with local judges 
given the task of enforcing the law. Security trumped labour needs for the moment, or 
at least on paper. Cuba, too, was no stranger to such plans. The contrast between 
official policy and Caribbean practice could not have been clearer.
 In October 1806 an assassin’s bullet extinguished Dessalines’ emancipatory 
fire, and Haiti immediately descended into a brutal civil war. Less than a year later, 
the country was divided into two, between former revolutionary generals. The 
Northern half was run by the black former slave Henri Christophe, who eventually 
made it a kingdom and crowned himself emperor. The mulatto Alexandre Pétion had 
wanted a united country, but failing that he proclaimed the South his republic, and so 
the nation was divided along colour lines, with darker-skinned Haitians in the North 
and mulattos in the South, despite Dessalines’ constitution declaring everyone to be 
black. There were economic ramifications to this split as well, as both leaders had 
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very different ambitions and styles of rule. Christophe made deals with other 
important Haitian men such as military chiefs, and allowed them to lease or run 
surviving plantations. They were required to pay a quarter of their profits to the state, 
and a quarter to the workers. The system was criticised for its brutality – the workers 
had almost slave-like conditions – but it managed to revive some of the export 
market.37 Pétion, meanwhile, distributed land among his soldiers in lieu of cash in 
order to pay them for their services, allowing the development of smallholding. There 
were still some large plantations but with many people more concerned about the state 
of production on their own land, there were few willing volunteers for arduous 
plantation agriculture. The result in the South was the decline of exports.38 For more 
than a decade, these two halves would follow their different trajectories, with the 
North growing comparatively wealthier, or at least Christophe and his coterie. Indeed, 
Christophe managed to raise enough money to build over the course of his reign the 
enormous fort, the Citadelle Laferrière, near the regional capital of Cap-Haïtien, and a 
palace. In the South, the population lingered in poverty, unaided by the North, and 
shut out from international trade by embargoes. The two sides, however, were united 
in one aspect – abolitionism, and the desire to spread it. Christophe exchanged letters 
with British abolitionist Thomas Clarkson.39 Pétion, for his part, continued to aid 
disgruntled Spanish criollos who were ready for dramatic changes, as he had 
illustrated with his involvement in the Miranda expedition. 
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 In addition to all the changes in the Caribbean, Spain had been caught up in 
even more problems in Europe. It had chosen to enter an alliance with France, and 
had lost heavily against the British in the Battle of Trafalgar (1805). Compounding 
the problems of piracy and incursions in the Caribbean, the British were also about to 
launch a new and different kind of attack: ending the slave trade. Although the British 
abolitionists won their battle in March 1807 the impact would not immediately be felt 
in the Spanish islands.40 Slave imports in Cuba and Puerto Rico continued their steady  
rise, with the arrival of enslaved Africans reaching a total of 45,002 between 1800 and 
1805, the majority going to Cuba.41 Although there was not a strong abolitionist 
movement in the Spanish world, there were Spaniards and criollos who were willing 
to speak out against the practice. The bishop of Havana, Juan José Díaz de Espada y 
Fernández de Landa, who had arrived in Cuba in 1802, was one such person. Six 
years after his arrival, he completed a report about the disturbing aspects of colonial 
life on the island. His Informe sobre diezmos of 1808 contains evidence of his 
thoughts about the disturbing aspects of colonial life, and he also leaves no doubt 
about its high moral cost. He said: 
All the Reales Órdenes and Cédulas point to the same thing and are directly in 
favour of agriculture, ignoring the whole population ... Whether or not this 
[slave] trade is fair, has it influenced the public? Is it necessary and useful to 
agriculture? Experience and reason will always be persuaded in the negative.42 
During this time, Britain began to apply diplomatic pressure to Spain to follow suit, 
which would turn into a very long-running battle. Initially, a real cédula of 24 April 
149
40 On the issue of British abolition there is a large historiography. See for instance, Eric Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1994); Seymour Drescher, ‘Whose Abolition? Popular Pressure 
and the Ending of the British Slave Trade’, Past and Present, 143 (1994), pp.136-66; and From Slavery 
to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (New York, 1999); 
Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill, 2006); 
Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (London, 1988).
41 The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database 2009, Slave Voyages, Estimates, http://
www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces last accessed 18 May 2010.
42 Eduardo Torres-Cuevas and Eusebio Reyes, Esclavitud y sociedad: notas y documentos para la 
historia de la esclavitud negra en Cuba, (Havana, 1986), pp.105-112.
demanded that the ports of the Indies did not admit counsel, agents, nor 
representatives of any foreign nation who attempted to press an abolitionist agenda, or 
in any way attempt to hamper slave imports.43 Sugar output and price was rising, and 
there was much incentive to make sure they carried on doing so. Cuban ingenios were 
producing an average of 11,819 arrobas per mill in 1804, compared with 3,772 
arrobas in 1761.44 But another series of dramatic events was around the corner, and 
one that would not only fundamentally challenge the beliefs of criollos throughout the 
Spanish colonies, but for ever reconfigure Spain’s empire. This time, it had nothing to 
do with Haiti, slaves, or abolition, though they would all figure in the following years. 
This particular problem started with Napoleon Bonaparte marching into Spain and 
installing his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne in May 1808.
Political crisis and the Cortes, 1808-1814
This extraordinary change in rule came about under a complicated set of 
circumstances. Initially, there was intense pressure on the king from a faction of the 
public to dismiss his prime minister, Godoy, whose political career had been 
resurrected in 1801. This demand eventually turned into agitation for Carlos IV, who 
had long been perceived to be weak and ineffective, to abdicate in favour of his son, 
Fernando VII. A growing number of people wanted political reform, and the fact that 
the years leading up to 1808 were plagued with poor food supplies and inflation only 
added to the discontent.45 However, this local difficulty was compounded by the 
arrival of Napoleon and his troops. The French emperor had been fighting wars and 
gaining territory across Europe. His loss of Saint-Domingue and the sale of the 
Louisiana territory to the United States to pay for the war had not dinted his power in 
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Europe. In 1808 he had managed to gather key Spaniards at Bayonne, and in June 
declared his brother king of Spain and the Indies, while Fernando VII was forced to 
go into exile in France. 
 This political upheaval was met with rioting across Spain. The anti-French 
sentiment of the previous years had not gone away. In response to the loss of the king, 
political leaders in Spain decided to divide the country into provincial juntas. The 
juntas would be vital to organising the resistance to France throughout the Peninsular 
War (1808-1814).46 It was decided that a larger body was also needed, and members 
of the local juntas came together at the Junta Suprema Central, which was eventually 
settled in Cádiz. As Spaniards took up arms, the conflict also drew in Portugal – 
Napoleon’s initial Iberian target – and Britain, which would send troops to help the 
Spanish and patrol the waters around Cádiz. At the same time, it was becoming clear 
to many people who wanted political reform that perhaps the opportunity had arisen. 
Although initially ignited by the immediate needs of driving out the Bonapartes, these 
juntas and the reforms behind them went on to produce a decisive break in Spanish 
political culture. Most Spaniards were horrified that there was a Bonaparte on the 
Spanish throne, and were united in their dislike of the French and their desire to be 
free of Napoleon’s influence. ‘You [French] still possess no laws, no liberty, nor any 
good; you have been compelled into enslaving Europe, spilling your blood and that of 
your children’ , wrote Juan Bautista Esteller and Juan Baustista Pardo, secretaries of 
the junta in Seville, in an open letter ‘to the franceses’.47 Although the public took 
against Napoleon, there would inevitably be collaborators, known as the 
afrancesados, many of whom became key figures in Joseph’s administration. As the 
previous chapters have noted, despite the unpopularity of the French, there were 
people who had been influenced by their culture. This was cemented with their 
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arrival, and some Spaniards had to decide where their loyalty lay. Almost 2,500 
administrators, on top of nearly 100 nobles, 252 clerics, and nearly 1,000 military 
members supported and ran the regime.48 A satirical letrilla poem of the time posited 
the question ‘¿Quién será pues el peor/ De Godoy y Bonaparte?’49 And with sad and 
ironic timing, Floridablanca, who had resurrected his political career by helping 
establish the juntas, died at the end of the very same year that the French he so 
distrusted finally took hold of Spain. His fears of France turned out to be not quite as 
unfounded as they seemed nearly twenty years earlier. 
 Indeed, the rupture produced by this turn of events gave rise to a much larger 
anxiety for the Spanish islands. As the first chapter showed, they felt their continued 
security and prosperity depended on the support of the crown. Without it, the whole 
economic project could collapse, and with Haiti lurking near by, the slaves could be 
incited to revolt as well. These years of uncertainty would lead to an unofficial 
renewal of the colonial pact between the Spanish islands and the crown, despite the 
circumstances and the fact that it caused rifts with the rest of the colonies. Fear and 
uncertainty were key in shaping this. The rest of this section will examine these 
tumultuous years in more detail, giving special attention on the loyalist rebellion in 
Santo Domingo, and the later constitutional debates in Spain, two events that show 
how the nature of Caribbean concerns set it on a different trajectory to its colonial 
counterparts. 
 The occupation and war in the peninsula sent shockwaves through the empire. 
Although it had been built on the Habsburg principles that all the colonies should 
view themselves as kingdoms of Spain (reinos), this had changed under the Bourbons 
into a more empire-colony relationship, with the many reforms taking away criollo 
power and serving as a reminder of where final authority lay. However, the 
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establishment of the junta central saw a return to the idea of all parts of the empire 
being integral kingdoms and, as such, many criollo elites in the Caribbean felt as if 
they too also being attacked by Napoleon, and likewise wanted to set up juntas, 
putting themselves on what they perceived to be equal footing with the peninsular 
juntas. As the failed Miranda expedition had indicated, Spain’s relationship with its 
colonies had been undergoing a transformation, and this crisis of sovereignty and 
legitimacy would only serve to further this process, though with the Caribbean 
islands, loyalty to the crown would be assured, as will be explained later in this 
chapter.
 In August, Governor Montes asked Puerto Rican planters to support the fight 
against Bonaparte, saying that although they lacked money, they should ‘take the 
decision to put at the disposition of the suprema junta part of the fruits produced in 
your haciendas. Coffee in good condition, sugar, dye-wood, cotton, skins, are 
donations that can be placed in Spain ...’50 Other territories with more resources began 
to set up their own juntas. Cuba toyed with the idea, with Arango and others calling 
for the creation of a junta, though eventually after much political wrangling – even 
Arango changed his mind – the measure failed by two votes.51 The Junta Suprema 
Central had, however, recognised by this point that the colonies’ help was needed for 
Spain’s survival, and so had to find a way to include them in the political process. It 
decided to call an assembly – the Cortes – and draw up a constitution, and 
representatives of the colonies would be allowed to participate. Thus each region was 
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permitted to send a certain number of elected delegates (diputados) to Cádiz, opening 
a small door leading towards colonial political participation.52 
 In Santo Domingo, reaction was even more dramatic. Upon hearing the news 
of Napoleon’s invasion, Spanish criollos went much further than Cuba’s political 
infighting and Puerto Rico’s humble offer of agricultural products, and launched a 
war against the French troops who were still nominally controlling the island, led by 
Juan Sánchez Ramírez. He was a wealthy Dominican who had fled to Puerto Rico in 
1803 but returned in 1807 to resume his exportation of wood. Sánchez Ramírez soon 
realised that other people on the island felt the same way as he did about French rule, 
and that he would have little problem rounding up men who were willing to fight for 
an end to the reign of Governor Ferrand. Life under French rule, while relatively 
peaceful with no further incursions from Haiti after Dessalines, was still poor, and the 
remaining criollos and Spaniards had never really accepted the change in power. 
Many wanted a return to Spanish rule. They had a clear enemy for both the 
humiliation of Spain and the poverty and suffering of the past few years: France. This 
arrival of Joseph Bonaparte was the spark that lit their fuse. In perhaps an attempt to 
forestall similar sentiments across the Hispanic world, as well as to officially lay 
claim to the crown, Joseph Bonaparte issued a proclamation to all the colonies, saying 
to unconvinced criollos: ‘I hasten to make this declaration of my paternal solicitude 
for your happiness, and to assure you, that it shall be exerted equally for the good of 
the remotest parts of my dominions ... Look up to me as your protector; I shall ever 
have your interest at heart...’53 He also unveiled the so-called Constitution of Bayonne 
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in 1808, in which he made clear his power over the colonies in addition that of the 
peninsula.54 
 These actions only served as further sources of irritation. Sánchez Ramírez 
used his contacts in Puerto Rico to obtain help from their better-off neighbour, which 
was host to other refugee Dominicans. Puerto Rico’s Governor Montes was willing to 
give arms and help the struggle, as he had been promised shipments of valuable wood 
from Santo Domingo to cover the costs. Preparations for battle were soon under way, 
and 300 troops from Puerto Rico were sent over.55 In addition, some of the men 
Montes had sent to Santo Domingo had been able to secure aid from Pétion in the 
South of Haiti, who gave supplies in exchange for cattle hides, but offered no 
troops.56 Montes, however, was not convinced of their good intentions. He later wrote 
that the Haitians had ‘good faith with the Spanish ... but in spite of this, I have ordered 
that these people are not trusted ...’57 Little came of the attempt, but it is worth noting 
that the Dominicans, at the time, seemed willing to ask for support from Haiti, and 
perhaps it is just as significant that Haitians did not want to get too involved.
 General Ferrand was well aware what was afoot. He began a speech in August 
1808 by pointing out that ‘the news I have just received from Puerto Rico announces 
that that colony finds itself in a political ferment, which can only result in sinister and 
regrettable effects’. He implored Dominicans to look at their similarities to the 
French, saying ‘you are already French, or, rather, French and Spanish together are 
one population of brothers and friends, whose only end is to defend the same 
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interests, and profess the same spirit and sentiments’.58 This idea did little to quell the 
sentiments of criollo elites such as Sánchez Ramírez, who wrote that the earlier news 
of Joseph Bonaparte now controlling the Indies – and especially his beloved Santo 
Domingo – had been the initial inspiration to take up arms: ‘From that moment I 
could not shake from my imagination the idea of war ... [it] produced in my spirit 
such rancour against [the French] ... I was not able to see them from then on without it 
irritating me in the extreme’.59 
 The fighting began, with Sánchez Ramírez and his 2,000 men invoking the 
deposed king in the battle cry of ‘Viva Fernando VII!’. Montes wrote to the junta in 
Cádiz to inform them of events, as well as to ask for support.60 After a couple of 
months of fighting, the loyalists managed a key victory in November, in the battle of 
Palo Hincado. General Ferrand’s pride was so wounded he shot himself after the 
defeat.61 One of the few surviving French soldiers later wrote in his memoirs that his 
general’s head was ‘presented on a spear to the English officials, who received with 
horror this bloody trophy of ingratitude and barbarity of those ferocious men’.62 This 
would not stop the French, however, and General Barquier took over the fight. He had 
to resort to enlisting Dominican slaves against Sánchez Ramírez, though the Spanish 
had also offered freedom to slaves if they fought alongside them.63 In addition, 
Sánchez Ramírez had received re-enforcements throughout the war of free people of 
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colour who wanted to join the fight, and there was even a moreno regiment.64 The war 
continued into 1809, by which point British military help had entered the picture. 
 Britain’s ships brought arms and some troops, and proved instrumental in the 
victory that was finally obtained in July of that year. Britain, for its efforts, was 
rewarded with a preferential commercial treaty.65 By this point, other Spanish 
territories had taken an interest in what was happening in Santo Domingo. When the 
news of the Dominican victory reached Santiago de Cuba, ‘immediately they 
prepared a music concert, and everyone without distinction of class or person went 
out into the main streets until ten in the evening, singing praises ...’66 Spain’s 
government in Cádiz was informed of these developments, and it declared its pleasure 
in the Regency publication Gazeta del Gobierno, saying: ‘The conquest of the 
Spanish part of Santo Domingo is the work of our glorious revolution. The same 
principles of national enthusiasm and of hatred of tyranny guided the brave conduct of 
those patriot soldiers.’67 On 29 April 1810 a real órden officially welcomed it back to 
the imperial fold. 
 This episode is worth relating in detail not only because of its contradictions, 
but also its timing. The rift that developed between the peninsula and the colonies 
during Napoleon’s occupation would for ever alter the colonial relationship, yet Santo 
Domingo was trying to re-establish the security of past times. For Santo Domingo, 
any Spain – even one where there was no king – was preferable to an uncertain future. 
This dramatic fight to return to the crown was undoubtably rare – rather than using 
the opportunity to reach for independence, Santo Domingo’s elites sought to defend 
and return under the protection, however faltering, of Spain, even after being under 
French rule for more than a decade. This persistence was born of tight cultural links of 
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language and religion, but also shaped by a perhaps misguided notion that Spain 
could not only protect the island, but help it prosper. It was a hope that had lived on in 
the island for some two hundred years, and one that could not yet be quashed by a 
treaty alone. The dogged loyalty of Santo Domingo would soon stand in very sharp 
contrast to other colonies. Santo Domingo’s sentiments were becoming less widely 
held in other places, and within months of that colony’s return, the newly formed 
juntas across the empire had become spaces for the articulation of autonomy and 
eventually independence from Spain, ideas which became manifest from 1810 
onwards. The eventual struggle for independence across the Spanish territories added 
another level of anxiety for the islands, which will be further examined in later 
chapters. But the years around 1810 were an important turning point, as a new 
language of representation and rights began to emerge within Spain as well as from its 
colonies.
 Although the territories on continental South and Central America would have 
loyalists who were willing to die for Spain and republicans who were ready to fight 
for the cause of independence, the Caribbean followed its own course. Some of this 
can be attributed to their geographical and demographic shortcomings in comparison 
with territories such as New Spain and Venezuela. Smaller and less populated, the 
events in Santo Domingo illustrated just how vulnerable they felt without the crown. 
At the same time, the ‘colonial pact’ between Cuba and Puerto Rico and the crown 
would begin to show its strength. Of the three islands, only Cuba felt in a position to 
even posit the possibility of its own junta. Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo equally 
feared themselves too weak to stand alone. Initially, however, the wider question was 
not independence in a straightforward sense, but the limits and power of colonial rule. 
The rupture Napoleon caused thrust the imperial world into a new place, as Spain’s 
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government was increasingly pushed to the sea.68 And although the Caribbean islands 
stood steadfast, once the idea of independence began to spread, for many on the 
islands it would never be suppressed – a new force had been released.
 As Santo Domingo was embroiled in fighting against France, Cuba was 
waging its own unrealised battles with it as well. Indeed, the neighbouring United 
States thought this peninsular crisis would end in the secession of Cuba. To US 
politicians, Napoleon seemed strong enough to take what he wanted, and with the fall 
of the Spanish crown a carve-up of its colonies loomed. The new pearl of the 
Caribbean was Cuba, and with Havana only being 90 miles from Spanish Florida, 
there was some hope that the United States could take both. To this end, the former 
US president, Thomas Jefferson, wrote to his recently installed successor, James 
Madison, saying: ‘I suppose the conquest of Spain will soon force a delicate question 
on you as to the Floridas and Cuba, which will offer themselves to you. Napoleon will 
certainly give his consent without difficulty to our receiving the Floridas, and with 
some difficulty Cuba.’69 Jefferson’s optimism would go unrealised, however, as Spain 
proved more resistant to Napoleon than the US leaders had expected, though the 
question of annexation to the United States would follow the island throughout the 
century. The US had long been interested in the island – not only had it received 
Cuban sugar, but more importantly, it was a ready market for US exports. At the same 
time, the US was well aware of the similarities between Cuba and its southern states. 
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Indeed, they were as keen as the Cubans to make sure the racial balance did not tip in 
favour of slaves. But in the end, the real attraction was the growing sugar industry. 
 In addition to these large political realignments, Cuba was contending with its 
own domestic problems, especially the question of what to do with all the people who 
had come to the island over the past decade from Saint-Domingue who were French, 
like the hated Napoleon. By 1808, the number of refugees had reached nearly 20,000 
in the East and more than 30,000 across the whole island.70 As they had been arriving 
since the 1790s, many families had re-settled and become important contributors to 
the Cuban economy, mainly in coffee growing – indeed output by this point had 
nearly quadrupled.71 But Someruelos’s outrage at events in Spain meant that the 
French refugees were going to take the brunt of his anger and that of loyalist Cubans. 
To deal with the problem, the governor decided to make some deportations. Initially, 
however, Someruelos only sent away those French people who were not naturalised, 
and he called for the surveillance of anyone deemed suspicious.72 In a December 
proclamation, he said: 
Spy on those ... who have or propagate seditious images or papers: report them 
to the authorities: allow to live in peace those French afflicted by the burden of 
their national name, that they are protected by our hospitality, and live 
peacefully, since the Tyrant is frightened by the lion’s roar, still they do not 
find a secure place where they can protect themselves.73
 
 On 12 March, however, the anger toward the French in Havana could no 
longer be contained. Many of the city’s residents – people of colour, sailors, slaves, 
and white criollos – banded together in the streets, shouting ‘Long live Fernando VII, 
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death to Napoleon and the French’.74 With the anger reaching a potentially more 
dangerous level, Someruelos now had a justifiable reason to expel the French.75 
Shortly after the riots, the authorities established juntas de vigilancia in the main 
towns throughout Cuba. These bodies were charged with deciding which ‘foreigners’ 
would be allowed to remain in Cuba. Those hauled in front of these juntas had to 
profess their religion, when they arrived in Cuba, what they were doing there, where 
they lived, and other personal information. Further justifying their cause to drive out 
French refugees, a decree from the junta in Cádiz arrived ordering all foreigners from 
Cuba.76 Following this, Someruelos issued a proclamation that all French people had 
to leave Havana in 17 days and the rest of Cuba in 25 days. A newspaper from 
Kingston reported that ‘Shortly afterwards [the order was decreed] a rabble, 
consisting principally of the lower order of Spaniards, sallied forth, and commenced 
the most desperate acts, by destroying the dwellings of those people, and committing 
every excess. Many houses were demolished, and several Frenchmen killed and 
wounded.’77 
 Records from a junta de vigilancia in Holguín gives some indication of the 
families involved, and the lives of these settlers. Many of the white refugees had been 
in Saint-Domingue for generations, and not all of them were planters. Thousands of 
people had provided Saint-Domingue with a variety of services, and their abilities to 
do a range of jobs was also brought over to the Spanish islands. Of course, at the same 
time there were many free people of colour who were in a similar situation. To give 
an example, the Holguín junta de vigilancia records had notes on the Peroden family, 
consisting of Juan Bautista (Jean-Baptiste – names were often hispanicised), aged 46, 
a baker. His family included his wife Tereza Origni, 31, sons Enrique (Henri), 6 and 
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Carlos Victor, 4, and daughters Ángela Josefa, 2, and Clara de Jesús, one month. Also 
included in the census were their slaves Guillermo, aged 24, Juan Bautista, 17, and 
Susana, 20. Other members of the household included a female relation of Tereza, 
Victoria Origni, aged 24, who is listed as a seamstress, and Juan and María Michaela 
Origni, aged 2 and 4 respectively. There were also the pardo members of the 
household, María Julia, 50, listed as a washerwoman, Maria del Rosario, 20, and 
María Magdalena, 22, both listed as seamstresses. On the margin of this information, 
it was noted that ‘The French Peroden, with his wife and the rest of his family here, in 
this city for five to six years have manifested conduct irreprehensible with the most 
distinguished of the city ...’78
 However good the behaviour of some, around 7,000 people were expelled via 
the Havana junta de vigilancia. These urban refugees performed crucial jobs – 
carpenters, tailors, butchers, blacksmiths.79 This was also the case in Santiago, which 
had seen the bulk of immigrants arrive into its ports before either staying or moving to 
other town, or being turned away. Many French had already had an idea of what 
might lie ahead after hearing the initial news of Joseph Bonaparte, and hurried to sell 
their goods and properties. This accelerated after the edicts, and allowed Cuban elites 
to expand their holdings of property, goods, and slaves. Even the administration took 
part – for instance, Santiago’s Governor Kindelán bought 14 slaves from the departing 
French planters, including ‘three negros bozales named Guillermo, Fulgencio, and 
Ambrosio’.80
 Kindelán, too, had to contend with social unrest from anti-French residents in 
Santiago, and he was forced to issue more ordinances. They included prohibiting 
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people from being in the street past 10pm, and ordering heads of households to not 
allow their children or slaves to leave the house after 9pm. In addition, no more than 
four people ‘be they Spanish or French’ were allowed to walk the streets together. 
Punishment could be up to eight days in jail, or, for slaves, jail and twenty-five 
lashes.81 Around the same time he published a bando – with one side in Spanish and 
one side in French so everyone could understand – outlining who was to leave, and 
when. It also ordered that all non-agricultural workers would have to make their case, 
but also that the region also would be establishing a junta de vigilancia to deal with 
this question. He asked Cubans to refrain from violence, remarking at the end of the 
document that, ‘A final warning for the Public who, imbued by the Christian and 
generous character that has always been our currency, far from bothering or extorting 
the French who have to leave, contribute to helping them embark, giving enlightened 
testimony of the prudence, moderation, and civility that constitutes the well-earned 
reputation of the Cuban People.’82 
 However, such an exodus was bound to be beset by some logistical problems. 
In many cases the refugees had trouble getting out of the country within their allotted 
time. Many could not find buyers for their goods, leaving them no way to pay their 
passage, and in any case there was often a lack of boats.83 Despite these difficulties,  
thousands streamed from Cuba throughout the summer of 1809. In a matter of months 
some 6,060 people left Baracoa and Santiago, of these 1,887 were white, 2,060 were 
free people of colour and 2,113 slaves, indicating that myriad means to keep people of 
colour out of the island perhaps had not been strictly observed. They mostly headed 
for New Orleans, as Louisiana had a strong French-speaking community, and it was a 
slave state as well. Initially, US president Jefferson tried in his final days in office to 
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stop them arriving in the US.84 Like many southern slaveholders, he did not want 
slaves or people of colour associated with Haiti entering the US. He had already 
caused trade chaos with his Embargo Act of 1807 – which initially prohibited 
American ships from going into foreign ports in order to steer clear of war between 
France and Britain – but it had proven to be unenforceable and was dropped in 1808. 
Likewise, the stream of settlers to North America could not be steered off their course. 
Boat records from Santiago in August 1809 give an idea of who some of the 
thousands were and where they were going. Boats left from Santiago and called at 
ports such as as Kingston, Curaçao, New Orleans, and Baltimore. New Orleans was 
the destination of the American ship Freeman, Captained by a Robert Sparrows, who 
took 50 white men, 26 white women, 35 white children, 20 men of colour, and 8 
women of colour to Louisiana.85 By the end of the year, most of the French people 
had left Cuba, though some families managed to stay through connections, 
naturalisation, or emigration before the 1790s.
 Puerto Rico did not have a comparable situation and was not as willing to 
force any former refugees out of the island, as they were seen to be especially vital to 
agriculture.86 Amid concerns about the French, in May island officials heard that 
mulattos and black slaves in the region of the north-western port Aguadilla – the same 
area where an uprising was stifled in 1795 – were saying that the government had 
kept secret the news that they had all been freed by the king, though it was unclear 
whether they meant the new or old king, and that this fact ‘had been hidden on the 
part of the government and the rest of the magistrates’.87 At the same time, there was 
also trouble with the staffing of the militia, as a letter from outgoing Governor 
Montes, who was also captain-general, had made clear, as some people were ‘trying 
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to enlist them [white soldiers] alongside people of colour, without consideration of 
their [the whites’] distinguished quality’ and recommended that whites and pardos 
should be listed separately, ‘whites as whites and pardos as pardos’.88 The 
administration also persisted in monitoring the movement of people deemed to be 
suspicious. An order from the new Captain-General, Salvador Meléndez, called for 
the drawing up of lists in San Juan, denoting who was ‘foreign’ and who was simply 
not from the city.89 Later in the year he wanted an ‘exact and precise knowledge of the 
foreigners existing in the Island’ and demanded that those who were not dedicated to 
agriculture be brought to the capital with their papers.90
 Meanwhile, Haiti had not faded from the view of the Spanish islands. 
Someruelos wrote to the secretary of state of the Regency in Spain over the issue. 
There had been a real órden the previous year requesting the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Henri Christophe, but Someruelos had come across reports 
in the gazettes of Port-au-Prince about the fighting between Christophe and Pétion, 
and suggested to the crown that it was best to keep the news away from people of 
colour in Cuba.91 But Haiti’s influence was still there. In Cuba, there was a call for the 
authorities to ‘redouble’ their vigilance, especially in keeping an eye on mulatto 
militia members, as rumours were circulating that Haitians were now planning to 
spread their revolution to Jamaica, despite the Cuban authorities’ knowledge of Haiti’s 
weakness and internal division.92 Santo Domingo, for its part, pleaded that its 
remaining militias were ‘badly organised, badly paid, and terribly clothed’ and unable 
165
88 Toribio Montes, 29 Abril 1809, AGPR, Fondo Gobernadores Españoles, Asuntos Políticos y Civiles, 
caja 18, No 178.
89 Salvador Meléndez, 8 November 1809, AGPR, Fondo Gobernadores Españoles, Asuntos Políticos y 
Civiles, caja 18, No 202.
90 Salvador Melédez, 29 October 1809, AGPR, Fondo Gobernadores Españoles, Asuntos Políticos y 
Civiles, caja 18, No 200.
91 Marqués de Someruelos to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1809, AGI, Estado, legajo 12, No 50.
92 Francisco Sánchez Griñón to the Governor, 9 April 1810, ANC, Fondo Asuntos Políticos, legajo 211, 
sig 80.
to provide much of their own defence.93 In addition, a conspiracy was uncovered that 
had the aim of aligning the Spanish part of the island to the junta of Caracas, which 
had already declared its independence. The named plotters included ‘the mulattos 
Santiago Foló, of French [Saint-Domingue] nationality, José Ricardo Castaños, of the 
city of Caracas, Juan José Ramires, of Puerto Rico, D[on] Emilio Perzi, of the 
kingdom of Sardinia, and Cristobal Huber, of Madrid’.94 For all the islands, there was 
no escaping the forces of change in the region. 
 By 1810, the situation in Spain was critical. A real órden was circulated from 
the Regency calling for the monitoring of anyone arriving in the ports across the 
Spanish territories, saying that ‘... Napoleon Bonaparte [is] to send emissaries and 
spies to these Dominions, and that it has been verified already by some their departure 
with the depraved design of introducing in them disorder and bitterness’.95  The 
Cortes had many pressing issues to cope with, as well as trying to contend with its 
internal divisions among liberals, traditionalists, and Americans. The range of 
problems was large, but only three issues will be examined here which pertain to the 
Caribbean: the free trade debates of 1810, the abolition debates of 1811, and the 
eventual constitution of 1812. All of these concerned the islands, and the participation 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico in these debates – and their particular interests – illustrates 
not only the nature of their anxieties about economic issues and slavery, but also the 
growing power of the planter class.
 Trade was one of the immediate concerns as revenue was badly needed, and 
there was some serious debate about the possibility of much freer trade, drawing from 
the ideas of Jovellanos and others. Indeed, the Regency considered granting a 
concession to other ports, but the Cádiz consulado put up too strong a fight, going as 
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far as burning 500 copies of the printed order ready for distribution.96 The merchants 
of Cádiz, still the most important port on the peninsula, had far too much to lose, 
especially in such difficult times. A few months later, the Regency called for Britain, 
now Spain’s ally against France, to have access to American markets as a politically 
expedient way to solve the issue of the peninsula’s inability to supply America as well 
as allowing Britain to accumulate money that would be spent on the defence of Spain. 
As the Cortes wrangled over the Regency’s proposals, Britain offered to mediate with 
the rebellious colonies. Yet the consulado again won the argument, with a propaganda 
campaign that claimed free trade would cause the Spanish economy to collapse, and 
so the measures were voted down by the Cortes, though the issue of free trade would 
reappear. Naturally, this defeat was a cause for concern for the Caribbean islands. A 
letter from Cuba’s commercial elites to Cádiz noted that:
The day will arrive in which, unburdened of business more urgent or 
 grandiose, the penetrating eyes of the Cortes will return to the important 
 matter of our overseas commerce, and in this day of justice, in this tremendous 
 day for the interest of the guilds and individuals, Havana will take great care to 
 expose the plotting and abuses of those [guilds and individuals], and the 
 incalculable wrongs that they have inflicted on the good economy and healthy 
 politics of the Spanish nation.97
 
 While these debates were taking place, the juntas that had been formed 
throughout the Americas were gaining strength at the expense of a weakened Spain. 
Yet because of the declaration that these territories were indeed a part of the kingdom 
of Spain – not just colonies – the question that had to be answered was that of 
representation, and how many seats Americans would have on the Cortes. Spanish 
members of the Cortes had a problem: while needing the assistance and economic 
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support of 16 million Americans, to give them the proportional representation they 
demanded would mean that the 10 million Spaniards on the peninsula would be 
politically outnumbered. The assembly in Spain could potentially be under the control 
of its imperial subjects. Maintaining the power balance to their favour became the 
Spanish politicians’ priority, though they were ignoring the fact that money from the 
Americas was keeping Cádiz afloat. Some 195 million reales were sent from the 
colonies to the metropole during the initial stage of the crisis, and from 1808-11 Cádiz 
received some 600 million reales, around 80 per cent of which were from New 
Spain.98 Initially, the number of elected deputies was kept low, with 30 Americans out 
of 99 in 1810, though this would rise to 51 out of 127 by 1812.99 In fact, many 
deputies did not attend some of the early sessions; representatives known as 
substitutes (suplentes) from whichever overseas region they were from and who were 
currently in Spain were voted in as representatives until locally elected ones could 
arrive, with the exception of Puerto Rico’s Ramón Power Giralt, who managed to 
arrive by 24 September 1810 and participated from the beginning. 
 Meanwhile, political agitation over what was perceived as an unjust situation 
was growing in certain regions, such as Caracas, from junta members fed up with 
Spain’s mismanagement. They began to take matters into their own hands, and were 
becoming an acute source of worry to members of the Regency. Attempts were made 
to limit their impact. Indeed, Power complained to the Cortes about the órden that 
Puerto Rico had received in early September 1810, which prohibited the arrival and 
entry on the island of people from Caracas and the surrounding region ‘without 
proceeding with the most rigorous examination of their conduct, opinions, patriotism 
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and loyalty to the legitimate government’.100 For Power, this was too unfair a step. 
Lashing out at the ‘barbaric’ order, he pointed out to the Cortes that it clearly did not 
understand the anxiety this caused to people from Venezuela – all of whom were, he 
claimed, loyal to the crown – who had come to Puerto Rico, as he told them that ‘each 
resident trembles and worries, all waiting to see the moments when their sacred 
asylum is assaulted’.101 The order was retracted, but the episode sparked a longer-
running debate in Puerto Rico between those that wanted stronger peninsular 
authority against those who wanted local autonomy.102
 Another aspect to the overall issue of representation in the Cortes was that of 
who constituted a citizen, a question which was really about race.103 There was wide 
agreement that indigenous people and mestizos (part indigenous, part white) deserved 
to have their own representatives and some political voice, and their citizenship was 
recognised, as there was a long legal history to their relationship with the Spaniards. 
The same could be said for slave and free blacks, mulattos and zambos, and yet they 
would find themselves excluded. Just as there were legal frameworks for relations 
between Indians and the Spanish, so too were there ones for slave and free, including 
those that allowed slaves to buy their freedom. José Mejía Lequerica, a deputy from 
New Granada, made an impassioned plea for the inclusion of Americans of African 
origin, arguing that, ‘As plants are improved by grafting, so too are the mixed castes 
of America ... Why should their blood be deemed impure? I find impure only that of 
men unsound of body, and eminently pure the blood of men who toil, who till the 
soil ...’104 This particular speech, however, was omitted in the Cortes session records 
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from 1 October 1810, though it did appear in the periodical El Observador, as noted 
by James King, in his influential work on the issue of colour and the Cortes.105 
Despite the impassioned debate – much of which would attempt to make citizens out 
of people with African blood as well as stress the supposed racial harmony of the 
Americas – the real issue for Spain was that if all people of African descent were 
included the number of Spanish representatives would be lower than Americans, 
something that American delegates realised as well.106 That being the case, black 
Americans in the end would be forced to forgo political representation, and so the 
issue of racial equality for people of colour would be one with which the new 
republics would have to contend, and one that the Caribbean islands would try to 
ignore.
 Enslaved Africans, present and future, would further lose out during the 
abolition debates, which saw attempts to end the slave trade fail. Liberal Spaniards 
wanted to push the country in new directions, and that included the suppression of the 
slave trade, as Britain had done. This gave rise to a debate in the Cortes, which roused 
the not inconsiderable anger of Cuba over this matter. The idea was initially offered in 
the Cortes in April 1811 by Agustín de Argüelles, a Spaniard and one of the Cádiz 
diputados, who petitioned ‘that the Congress declare this depraved traffic forever 
abolished’.107 The debate that followed had the spectre of Saint-Domingue hanging 
over it, as the abolition of the slave trade became muddled with the abolition of 
slavery. One of Peru’s representatives, José Mejía, cautioned Argüelles, arguing that 
‘the abolition of the slave business requires much meditation and a steady hand, 
because to liberate at once an immense multitude of slaves, more than the bankrupting 
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of their owners, would bring disgraceful consequences to the state ...’ but went on to 
agree that no more slaves should be introduced to the colonies.108 
 Argüelles re-entered the debate to clarify what he was proposing and said ‘the 
terms that have been conceded, manifest that they do not try to manumit the slaves of 
the American possessions, which is a matter that requires the greatest care, given the 
sad example of what befell Santo Domingo [Saint-Domingue] ...’109 The Cuban 
representative, Andrés Jáuregui, weighed into the debate by arguing that such an 
announcement would upset the ‘tranquility’ among races his island was enjoying, 
saying ‘Remember, Your Majesty, the imprudent conduct of the National Assembly of 
France, and the sad, fatal results it produced ...’110 
 Yet not all Americans – most of whom were from territories that had few 
African slaves – felt that an uprising was a real possibility. Antonio de Villavicencio, 
from New Granada, later remarked that ‘It is completely absurd to fear an outcome 
similar to that of Saint-Domingue, because of differences in circumstances and 
precedents’, referring to the smaller slave numbers, especially outside of Cuba.111  
This was an argument that was not without its supporters; yet the Cuban lobby would 
later weigh in very heavily with its representación in defence of slavery, penned by 
Arango, who once again put pressure on the Spanish government to leave Cuba alone, 
so that it could continue its course. Cuba’s economic space had opened up and its 
expansion into the sugar and coffee markets was too valuable to leave to the decision-
makers in Cádiz. Arango’s reply has three sections, all of which attempted to justify 
Cuba’s position. The first section put slavery in a historical context, harking back to 
the Portuguese slave traders and the arguments of Bartolomé de las Casas for the 
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introduction of Africans to the Spanish colonies. The second part made the bulk of the 
case. It asked, with the indignation almost rising off the page: 
Has Mr Argüelles proven that our traffic, our plantations, our morality in this 
 matter, our local laws, and the conditions of the slaves among us, is the same 
 as that of the English? Does he even touch these essential and indispensable 
 points for comparison? Well, how then can he ask that the assembly deny this? 
 How, in front of the world, can he determine as his only reason [for abolition] 
 that the Congress is dishonest about the improvement of America?112 
The chapter later brings up Haiti, noting ‘the terrible risks of the vicinity of King 
Henri Christophe’ going on to argue that any change from the current system would 
bring disaster: ‘This, if not liberty, is perhaps worse than absolute liberty; because, to 
say the least, we already know the effects that it had in Santo Domingo...’113 It 
concluded in the final section by discussing how the current system could best be 
enhanced. The Havana planters won the argument, and Spain did not abolish the slave 
trade for many more decades. Indeed, Cuba and to a lesser extent Puerto Rico, would 
see slave importation numbers continue to rise throughout the decade. The victory of 
the Havana planters, however, would rankle liberals in Spain and elsewhere. Joseph 
Blanco White, the noted Spanish intellectual who was based in Britain, wrote in 1814 
that the ‘plantation owners of Havana demonstrated such compassionate hearts; they 
are more fearsome than [the slaves’] African grandfathers’. He complained that the 
Spanish government at Cádiz only had commercial interests in mind when pleasing 
the Cuban landowners.114 The difference between Britain and Spain and why one 
abolished the slave trade and the other failed to was, for Blanco White, because 
‘between one and the other, it is that there they constituted an immense capital, and 
here a respectively small interest. For the rest, the other complaints can be reduced to 
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the fact that the government favoured the introduction of slaves, encouraging, in this 
way, various individuals to use their capital for speculation dependent on the work of 
Blacks...’115
 In addition to this fight against the Cortes, Cuba also had been contending 
with troublesome internal events. Román de la Luz Silveira and Joaquín Infante, who 
were alleged to be freemasons, in 1810 had begun organising an independence 
movement, whose supporters included not only whites but slaves and free people of 
colour.116 The plot was uncovered before any action was taken and brutally 
suppressed, though that would not stop others from trying to continue organising 
resistance outside the watchful eyes of the colonial administration. However, the 
incident, compounded with other complaints, proved disturbing enough for the the 
Cádiz delegates, in a secret session, to request that Someruelos, who had been 
captain-general of Cuba for twelve years when he was only meant for five, be taken 
out of office. His term came to an end in 1812 and he died the following year, and 
was replaced by Juan Ruíz de Apodaca.
 News of the failed plot and the ongoing abolition debates in Spain was not 
restricted to the elites, and soon slaves and free people of colour knew that changes 
could possibly be afoot. More rumours again began to circulate that the king had freed 
the slaves.117 But at the same time, over the course of the Cádiz debates, from 1810 to 
1814, the number of new slaves who disembarked in Cuba reached 22,291 and 
likewise the port of Havana was growing alongside the burgeoning sugar and slave 
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industries.118 By 1810, the total number of slaves was around 217,000, while there 
were 109,000 free people of colour and some 274,000 whites.119 
 A Scottish traveler to the island, JB Dunlop, arrived in Havana in 1811, where 
he observed that within a well-guarded city lay much diversion. Initially he had to get 
permission to come into the city, with a resident vouching for his good behaviour, 
though he noted that ‘These Precautions however appear to be a mere matter of Form, 
for permission to stay is never refused, even if the motive should be amusement’.120 
And indeed, according to Dunlop, the diversions were many. He observed: ‘Gambling 
seems to be a Vice to which all are passionately addicted, from the Government down 
to the most common individual...’ He notes other aspects of Cuban life, including a 
thriving theatre scene, and fashionable resorts where habaneros went to be seen and 
to promenade.121 Havana was becoming an increasingly important centre of not only 
commerce, but was culturally and socially changing as well, fueled by agricultural 
wealth and trade prosperity.
 Despite the economic growth, however, the constant flow of people from other 
islands – arriving or departing – was a drain on resources. The junta de emigración 
decided that the Dominican immigrants to whom they had initially paid a pension 
should be cut off, and, ideally, return to their island now that it was under Spanish 
control. Dominicans in Cuba were told to appeal to the Regency if they did not like 
this decision. Despite being described as ‘these miserable expatriates, poor and 
without the slightest succor’122  there was little sympathy, and in fact transport was 
being arranged to take them back to the island, to languish again in poverty. There 
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was little to go back to – the Lieutenant Governor of Santo Domingo, José Núñez de 
Cáceres, had written to the Regency begging for support. Echoing the often-repeated 
refrain, he explained that the island was still full of potential, but its suffering – and 
still loyal – inhabitants did not have any capital for development.123 The pleas fell on 
deaf ears, but for Núñez, who would continue in Dominican politics, this constant 
disregard would become unbearable, forcing him to change his views and eventually 
the island’s relationship with Spain.
 Santo Domingo’s neighbours were trying to re-group was well, and news 
reached Cuba that Andrés Rigaud, the Saint-Domingue mulatto who became an 
enemy of L’Ouverture, had returned to the island, and apparently had gained control 
of part of the South. He had been in contact with the governor of Baracoa in Cuba in 
order to find any French planters who had previously fled, as he wanted to repopulate 
his part of the island with them, though most would have left Cuba by that point.124 
His death in the autumn of 1811 cut short those plans. Pétion consolidated control of 
the South, and Christophe solidified his claim on the North.
 As news of events in Cádiz, and especially the debates about the slave trade, 
reached Cuban shores, vigilance was again a priority, as external agitators were a 
constant source of anxiety. One order calling for more monitoring of foreigners 
entering the ports drew special attention to four men with the French-sounding names, 
‘La Bastiste, Sicant, Póo y la Farie’.125 A real órden around the same time demanded 
that everyone – not just the French – show passports when they arrived in Spanish 
territories.126 The overall climate was again one of tension. Writing to the Governor of 
Santiago de Cuba, Someruelos relayed news of the debates in Cadiz and told the 
governor that they would need a junta de policía to ‘conserve order, [slaves’] 
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tranquility and fields where their movements can be observed’.127 Indeed, only a short 
time after that letter, Someruelos received a report from the lieutenant governor of 
Holguín saying that some more slaves had declared themselves free.128
Rebellion and restoration 
 Around the time of the abolition debates, Power wrote to his mother, Doña 
Josefa Giralt y Power in San Juan, telling her about events in Cádiz, which she 
received in January 1812. The letter sparked a series of events in Puerto Rico that 
nearly led to an uprising. Doña Josefa’s slaves, Jacinto and Fermín, found out the 
contents of the letter, in which – drawing from the events at the Cortes – Power told 
her that ‘if they [the Cortes] give liberty to the slaves, she would be the first in 
executing the law with hers’. On reading this, she began to cry and tore up the 
letter.129 It would not take long for her slaves to discover the source of her anguish, 
and relay the contents of her letter around the city. 
 Although the real slavery boom would not come until later, the numbers on the 
island were creeping up and had already reached 17,536.130 That, combined with a 
sizable population of free people of colour, meant the authorities were constantly 
concerned. Only a short time before the incident of the letter, an order had gone out 
across the island restricting the movement of people of colour. The regulations 
stipulated that no more than three people of colour could meet up without their 
motives being investigated; no slaves could leave their hacienda without signed 
permission from their owners; and owners themselves would be responsible for their 
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slaves and would notify the authorities of any troublesome ones.131 This vigilance, 
however, was of limited effectiveness, as the networks of communication made it 
easy for this news to spread. From San Juan news of Doña Josefa’s letter reached 
people further inland, and for a few days confusion reined over the legitimacy of the 
claims. But eventually the slaves, as well as the free people of colour who were 
helping to relay the news, were suppressed, with the supposed perpetrators being 
sentenced to 50 lashes of the whip, and others who took part to 30.132 A few weeks 
later, more orders were circulated by Governor Meléndez, who called for ‘all the 
means possible to instruct about slavery and its obligations, of obedience, respect and 
submission with those they should see and service as their owner ... they disillusioned 
themselves with the error of liberty ...’133 The slaves of Puerto Rico were not alone in 
their hopes. Some of the black and mulatto Dominicans who had participated in the 
War of Reconquest were now plotting to overthrow the white ruling class and forge an 
alliance with Haiti. The plan was discovered, and they were apparently dragged 
through the streets and their remains were fried in coal tar.134
 Cuba too would see turbulence in 1812. A series of revolts had taken place 
around the island over the course of the first couple of months of the year, in Havana, 
Puerto Príncipe, Bayamo, and Holguín. The authorities discovered that these 
uprisings, far from being local disturbances on plantations, were connected to each 
other. Their trail eventually led to a free black named José Antonio Aponte, an artisan 
who was also a sculptor and had been the captain of Havana’s free black militia. The 
authorities found a book with alleged plans and drawings; it apparently had sketches 
of military garrisons on the island, along with portraits of George Washington and, 
more significantly, Haitian leaders L’Ouverture, François and Dessalines, as well as 
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Christophe. This was enough for the authorities to pin the blame on Aponte. He was 
hanged a couple of weeks after the book of drawings was found in his house.135 
 Hopes of liberation or equality would be further dashed by the unveiling of the 
long-awaited Constitution of Cádiz on 19 March 1812.136 Not only was there no 
mention of abolition, but voting rights were not be granted to those of African origin. 
In other ways the constitution was a liberal document, empowering the Cortes and 
attempting to create a different political relationship between the monarch and the 
people. Its liberalism was considered only ‘idealistic and romantic’, but it was also 
misplaced and misrepresentative of wider and entrenched conservatism across the 
country.137 Its attempts to refashion the empire had come too late for some regions, 
and would be useless for others. And while Central and South Americans would find 
themselves divided between liberals and loyalists on the bloody road to independence, 
the Caribbean colonies – and the Philippines – managed to keep an even keel for the 
time being. 
 The upheaval and uncertainty across Spain’s imperial world proved an 
interesting juncture for Haiti. With some of its leaders having previously helped in the 
Miranda expedition, there seemed to now be even more opportunities to aid other 
revolutionaries and potentially to bring emancipation to new republics. In 1813, 
Mexican rebel leader Ignacio López Rayón sent one of his colonels to the North of 
Haiti to establish relations with and ask for help from Christophe, though apparently 
the mission failed. However, another Mexican revolutionary, Francisco Xavier Mina, 
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would be able to secure support from Pétion, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter.138
 In Spain, the Cortes met again in ordinary session from 1813-14, though its 
debates would have a limited impact, and the body as a whole and its struggle to enact 
reforms soon were laid to waste. Indeed, under the Treaty of Valençay in December 
1813, Fernando VII was to be restored to the throne, and Napoleon had to take his 
brother and his troops out of Spain. Fernando VII, also known as el deseado – the 
‘desired one’ – returned to Spain on 14 March 1814. By May he had ordered the 
abolition of the 1812 Constitution, and had some of the leaders involved with it 
arrested. In fact, in trying to reclaim his power, he had even entertained undertaking 
an expedition to Haiti, but the king was dissuaded by British abolitionists, including 
William Wilberforce.139 Troops were dispatched to take back rebel territories. Spain, 
tired and bankrupt, tried to return to life under its legitimate monarch, but it would not 
be so straightforward. Likewise, Santo Domingo had seemingly returned to its past 
life, but its days as a Spanish colony would again be numbered. For Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, local disturbances and disagreements were quelled through a combination of 
political will and commercial interest, a pairing that would stand the islands on much 
firmer footing than their rapidly dwindling fellow colonies.
 The decade after the Haitian Revolution had been no less eventful for the 
Spanish islands. In many ways they were far more dramatic, and full of ‘unthinkable’ 
events. In 1791 the overthrow of France and a whole plantation society by slaves 
seemed beyond the realm of possibility, just as in early 1808 did the idea of a 
Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. While the larger political world was shifting, Cuba 
had been experiencing its own social transformations. The nature of slavery on the 
island had changed – Cuba was developing large plantations and trying to populate 
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them with African slaves, not criollo ones, working them hard and replacing them 
when they died under the strain. Puerto Rico struggled with social control and 
runaway rumours. Santo Domingo, sitting alongside Haiti, was focused on its own  
return to Spain. The breaking away of the Spanish American territories had created 
another problem for colonial officials in the Caribbean, and one they would be forced 
to contend with for decades. In the years to come, slavery and republicanism would 
become more entangled, and colour and freedom would take on new meanings. As the 
rest of Spanish America severed its metropolitan ties and the spectre of Haiti still 
loomed large in the Caribbean, the idea of independence was something the Spanish 
islands felt they could ill afford. 
Conclusion 
The decade after the establishment of Haiti brought a new set of challenges and 
anxieties. France proved to be the bearer of more disruption, this time culminating in 
a political rupture in Spain – and its colonies were left scared and uncertain. With the 
unthinkable toppling of the king, colonial officials in the Caribbean were forced to 
believe that they could be next. Although some of the other Spanish colonies 
embraced this uncertainty and used it as a first foothold on independence, for the 
islands, the arrival of French rule, coupled with the development of Spanish 
liberalism, was seen as an existential threat. This was only tempered by the growing 
power of the Cuban sugar planters, whose intervention in the Cortes debates provided 
a sort of renewal of the colonial pact. But increasingly repressive measures were 
needed to combat internal insecurity – this period also brought the rise of local power. 
A proliferation of orders on behaviour, combined with the forced emigration of Saint-
Domingue refugees showed how local governors were trying to contain what they 
thought could be internal threats. In the space of just over ten years, the islands had 
gone from their relatively quiet existences on the imperial periphery to being caught 
up in not only a reconfiguration of the Caribbean world, but of the Spanish empire as 
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well. Lurking in the back of the official mind, however, was the ever-present 
possibility of slave rebellion, and years of uncovered conspiracies and suppressed 
plots attested to this. What the king and colonial officials in the Caribbean could not 
yet foresee was how this combination of disgruntled colonies, Haiti, and rebellion 
plots would be played out across their islands in the years to come.
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Chapter 4
‘A second edition of the horrors of St. Domingo’: Haiti and the Republicans, 
1815-1822
This chapter examines the convergence of a unified Haiti and South American 
republicanism. This combination led to a further entrenchment of loyalism among 
elites in Puerto Rico and Cuba, as Simón Bolívar was making headway against the 
Spanish in South America. The ideas of emancipation and abolition were anathema to 
the interests of the planters, yet by the end of this period, cracks in their wall of 
resistance were beginning to show as republicanism started to infiltrate Cuban society, 
and more prominent criollos began to speak out against slavery. In addition, the 
continued importation of enslaved Africans was not only fuelling expansion of the 
sugar industry but causing large shifts in Cuba’s racial balance. The latter part of this 
chapter is concerned with the failed independence bid by Santo Domingo and its 
takeover by Haiti, an event that was the realisation of unspoken planter and 
politicians’ fears. Although the takeover was bloodless, the fact that Haiti now 
controlled a Spanish territory marked a turning point for Cuba and Puerto Rico as 
much as it did for Dominicans. Yet what these criollos failed to appreciate was Haiti’s 
own fear of European invasion, and its worry that the East of the island would be an 
easy foothold for France to recapture its territory. In exploring these themes, this 
chapter will begin by looking at the economic and demographic issues, then move on 
to the issue of republicanism, and end on the events between Haiti and Santo 
Domingo in 1822.
Restoration and riches
Fernando VII’s return to the Spanish throne was beset with problems, not least of 
which was the desire of his increasingly agitated empire to be independent. From his 
vista, he was surrounded with chaos. Spain was poor, weary, and divided over its 
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loyalty to him. The crown’s empire looked increasingly fragile: the failures at the 
Cortes had opened up fissures that could not be covered. Venezuela, New Spain, Rio 
de la Plata – key colonial territories – wanted to peel away from the imperial fold, and 
the situation was beyond the point of negotiation. Fernando VII was forced to send 
more than 10,000 troops to aid the loyalists in New Granada and Venezuela to prevent 
this from happening. The Caribbean islands, however, would in these uncertain early 
years fail to be swept along in the revolutionary fervor, though that is not to say that 
there was no underlying sentiment for independence, as events in the previous chapter 
showed and later ones will further illustrate. Yet over the course of this period, 
independence for these islands became intertwined with questions about the colour of 
freedom. Could Cubans throw off what was increasingly being called the ‘slavery’ of 
despotic rule, yet permit real enslavement to continue? Could all people of colour be 
free without whites facing a racial war? These were not only questions for the 
Caribbean colonies, but all parts of the empire that had slave labour, such as Peru and 
New Granada.1 These issues, for Cuba and Puerto Rico, would weigh heavily on the 
minds of criollo elites. The years of upheaval that saw the slave rebellion in Haiti and 
the French occupation of the peninsula would during this period actually ensure a 
high degree of continuity and loyalty to the crown. For Santo Domingo, however, its 
fortunes in 1822 would take a turn that was at once foreseeable and yet unbelievable. 
 Initially, however, the three islands were eager to see if their loyalty had paid 
off and what the restored crown could do for them. Although Cuba was more 
important and Santo Domingo more in need, it was Puerto Rico which first received 
royal benevolence in the form of a cédula de gracias on 10 August 1815. The 
legislation granted a number of important concessions. At the heart of the measures 
was an emphasis on further agricultural expansion, spurring economic growth, the 
taxes on which could help fill a battle-weary Treasury in Spain, and pleasing the 
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merchants of Cádiz who were keen for a resumption of trade without disruption.2 In 
addition to the cost of war there also had been the interruption of trade due to fighting 
in the colonies, causing further chaos to the royal coffers. Puerto Rico’s own finances 
were affected as well, as there had been no remittances from Veracruz for years, 
owing to New Spain’s fight for independence. In attempting to outline measures 
aimed at economic improvement the legislation allowed for increased immigration, 
especially – and significantly – of non-Spaniards. Settlement was now extended to 
any Catholics, thus widening the possibility of new immigrants from beyond the 
rapidly shrinking Iberian world. Additionally, the provision would help in raising 
more capital for investment in agricultural technology, something that was needed on 
the island. For planters who wanted to set up an ingenio on the island, there were two 
pools of labour – slaves, or landless peasant labourers, the jíbaros. Although in 
previous years regulations varied over whether or not settlers and refugees could 
bring their own slaves, under this legislation it was encouraged.3 Or, if they wished to 
buy more slaves, they would find that the new regulations abolished taxes on the 
‘trade and introduction of Negroes in the island’.4 At the same time planters could 
draw from this pool of peasant labourers.
 In addition, the export of goods was encouraged by the scrapping of duties for 
three years, and placing none at all for products of sugar refineries. The legislation 
proved successful, and Spanish criollos began to arrive from Santo Domingo, 
loyalists from Venezuela, French planters from Louisiana, and even some Haitians 
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were apparently permitted; by 1816, some 1,319 people had arrived.5 They were 
given four and two-sevenths of a fanega of land for each person in the family and half 
as much for each slave.6 Five years, later 3,499 people had arrived on the island. It 
may not seem a large wave of immigrants – this made up less than two per cent of the 
population – but their significance should not be underrated. Although a good 
proportion of the new arrivals worked in the agricultural trade – labourers, overseers, 
hacendados – many were in related professions as well, such as carpentry.7 Most of 
the labour on the island, despite it being a slave society, was done by free people, and 
often to fill in employment gaps on plantations the jíbaros would be forced into work. 
As Sidney Mintz noted, the island ‘presented the curious picture of a Caribbean 
colony where slaves were treated little worse than landless free men’.8 
 The cédula also offered increased opportunity for people of colour. Article 11 
stated: ‘Negroes and people of colour, who in the capacity of Colonists and heads of 
family, come to establish themselves on the Island: they will be allowed one half the 
land which is allowed to the whites and if they bring Slaves and their property with 
them, the lands will be augmented in proportion to their Masters’.9 This change seems 
at odds to the legislation from less than a decade earlier that attempted to keep out 
people of colour, and certainly slaves from elsewhere. Yet the growth of this small 
island was becoming of increasing importance to Madrid. The new round of fighting 
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within Spanish America would demand funds to sustain it, and the island, now bereft 
of silver from Mexico, had to become more self-sufficient. On a more local level, the 
island had the capacity to absorb more people yet with the growing slave population 
and racialised fears during this time, it is hard to imagine that free people of colour 
received quite the same welcome as Europeans or white criollos. Governor Salvador 
Meléndez later had to issue instructions on how all these new settlers were to be 
integrated and clarification on what they would be allowed to do. While on the one 
hand, the immigrants were allowed rights of person and property under the eye of the 
law during their five-year period of residency, they would be limited in other ways, 
such as being prohibited to engage in personal maritime commerce, to own shops, or 
to be sea captains, but ‘they will be able to become involved, in association, in 
mercantile business conducted by Spaniards; and the contracts of interest that are 
agreed with them, either verbally or in writing will have the same validity and legal 
force as if they were between Spaniard and Spaniard’.10 
 Cuba, meanwhile, was improving economically but struggling socially. 
Around Havana, sugar was booming. To the East of the city, the region around 
Matanzas saw the number of ingenios rise from 37 in 1813 to 93 in 1817; likewise 
going West from Havana, around Guanajay, the number rose from 59 to 122 during 
the same years.11 To fuel this rapid expansion, and the rise of labour-intensive sugar 
production, slave importation had to keep up with demand. Slave imports were 
soaring, despite growing European demand for abolition, as discussed in the Congress 
of Vienna and treaty of Paris around the same time (1814-1815). Already Britain and 
other nations had banned the trade, yet this appeared to do little to stem the arrival of 
new slaves in Cuba. Just before the return of the king, in 1813, Cuba saw the arrival 
of 2,980 slaves and by 1817, the yearly number had reached 25,448 with the total 
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being almost nine times more had been brought in by 1813.12 The table below shows 
the annual number of slaves who disembarked in Cuba. The numbers between 1815 
and 1817 show the sharpest rise, with the totals dropping back by 1822, the fall likely 
due to not only Britain’s antislavery patrols, but the onset of 
Year Slaves disembarked in Cuba
1813 2,980
1814 2,196
1815 7,872
1816 18,384
1817 25,448
1818 20,762
1819 16,051
1820 11,096
1821 8,471
1822 10,729
more unrest in the peninsula during another struggle for liberal reforms (1820-23), 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. The total amount of slaves brought by 
Spanish, French, and Portuguese traders during this particular nine-year period was a 
staggering 123,989 – and despite the wishes of European anti-slavery activists, these 
numbers only got larger in the decades that followed.
 Spain showed little interest in stopping the trade, despite promising that it 
would – the king had agreed to end the practice by 1821 – and Britain continued to 
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lean on it diplomatically, as it was also doing with France.13 It was obvious the crown 
had no interest in the abolition of the slave trade, as the previous figures indicate. 
Sugar production was booming. Even coffee – despite the exodus of French planters 
in 1808 – in the East was growing at an impressive pace.14 However, with the 
constant influx of slaves also came an increasing amount of resistance and discontent. 
The East of the island, for instance, had long been home to groups of runaways, as 
previous chapters have explained. The communities persisted and during this period 
planters experienced renewed attacks by runaway slave communities and the 
palenques in which many lived once again became a focus for the authorities. These 
runaway slaves were accused of forming plots on a regular basis – sometimes with 
‘French’ agitators – and being a threat to order. In April 1815 Cuba’s asesor general 
wrote to the governor, Juan Ruíz de Apodaca, suggesting a tax of four reales for each 
slave over the age of 10, and two pesos on every barrel of wheat exported from the 
island in order to raise enough money to combat the problem of runaway slave 
colonies. Bands of men were formed to raid the communities, such Alfonso 
Martínez’s, which attacked the palenque El Frijol in the South-East of the island in an 
attempt to subjugate these long-standing troublesome communities.15
The asesor pointed out that: 
When the knowledge of the human heart does not instruct us of its natural 
 propensity for liberty and independence; when the character, inclination and 
 ignorance of the blacks does not make us fearful of their cruelty and rapacity, 
 the terrible example of the French colonies, so repeated in the last twenty-four 
 years would be enough to concern ourselves of the immediate and grave 
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 danger in which this island finds itself, in view of overtures of the blacks who 
 live in the palenques in the immediate vicinities of the city of [Santiago de] 
 Cuba.16
The next governor of Santiago de Cuba, Eusebio Escudero, issued a bando to try and 
gain control of the runaway slaves and limit their influence. The order reinforced 
existing practices, though the new laws attempted to prevent runaways from adding to 
their ranks. The orders demanded, for instance, that any slave found away from the 
plantation needed to have signed permission; and any slaves found with an out-of-
date pass and more than two leagues from a hacienda would be treated as a cimarrón 
and apprehended as such.17 Less than a month later he issued amended instructions 
that any slave found in the evening without papers would receive 25 lashes.18
Bolívar and Haiti
Although Cuba was preoccupied with internal concerns, and despite there being an 
interlude from the constant stream of rumours involving imminent plans from Haiti, 
the republic was still under constant surveillance. In May, news of an armistice 
between Christophe and Pétion reached Cuba, though little more than that was 
reported.19 But developments a few months later, in December, would have a long-
lasting effect for all of Spanish America. The eventual ‘liberator’ of much of South 
America, Simón Bolívar, arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 31 December 1815, 
seeking assistance from the southern leader. Pétion’s willingness to aid republican 
causes by giving rebels arms, troops, and refuge in Haiti to plan attacks had been 
well-known since the Miranda expedition almost 10 years earlier. Pétion officially 
welcomed the Venezuelan on 2 January 1816. Bolívar was also connected to two 
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British merchants who were based in the south of Haiti, Robert Sutherland and Jacob 
Lewis.20 
 Bolívar had been in Jamaica for the eight months previously, where he penned 
his famous Jamaica letter of 6 September 1815. In it he declared, ‘success will crown 
our efforts, because the destiny of America has been irrevocably decided; the tie that 
bound her to Spain has been severed’. He, however, was well aware of the apparent 
lack of similar sentiment in his Caribbean surroundings and was perplexed at the 
attitudes of the inhabitants, asking: ‘Puerto Rico and Cuba, with a combined 
population of perhaps 700,000 to 800,000 souls, are the most tranquil possessions of 
the Spaniards, because they are not within range of contact with the Independents. But 
are not the people of those islands Americans? Are they not maltreated? Do they not 
desire a better life?’21 His desire to see Cuba and Puerto Rico follow in the footsteps 
of Venezuela would continue for another decade, and will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. For the moment, his attention was focussed on his ongoing battle 
against Spain.
 Bolívar’s time in Haiti was productive – he managed to procure ships, men, 
and six thousand rifles for his next incursion.22 Also, while in Haiti, he met with 
Francisco Xavier Mina, who was fighting for the future of Mexico. The two 
revolutionaries spent some time together, though Bolívar did not join the Mina 
mission, as the latter had hoped.23 After one failed attack on Venezuela, Bolívar was 
forced to turn back to Haiti, writing that he was going to ‘return to the island of free 
men and place myself under the protection of the most generous republican leaders in 
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the New World’.24 He professed a great admiration for the Haitian president, declaring 
to him in a letter dated 9 October 1816 that: 
The pen is a loyal instrument for freely transmitting the sincere sentiments 
 that inspire my admiration! If flattery is a venal sin for the lower souls, the 
 due praise of merit feeds the sublime souls. I take the liberty to write to Your 
 Excellency because I do not dare to say all that I feel for you. Absence 
 animates me to manifest the depths of my heart. It is very sweet, without a 
 doubt, to fulfill the duties of recognition: but it is not a duty what encourages 
 the respectful homages that I want to fulfill.25
But Pétion’s involvement had a price: he wanted to see the end of slavery in the 
territories Bolívar was trying to liberate. When Bolívar left on a second mission in 
December of 1816 armed with supplies, before embarking he promised Pétion that he 
would free the slaves anywhere he was successful. The Haitian general made his 
wishes clear, saying: ‘You know, General, my sentiments in favour of that which you 
have pledged. you must be struck by how much I desire to see escape from the yoke 
of slavery those who still suffer from under it.’26 It was a promise that Bolívar would 
find difficult to keep, as he, like other criollo elites, was distrustful of both enslaved 
blacks and mixed-race free pardos. Eventually he would compromise and free slaves 
if they fought for independence, declaring that, ‘There will be no more slaves in 
Venezuela, except those who wish to remain so. All those who prefer liberty to repose 
will take up arms to defend their sacred rights and they will be citizens.’27 And 
although he freed his own slaves to help him in the struggle, other landowners were 
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less keen to do so, and thus his fiery words had rather less impact on the lives of 
slaves than Pétion would have hoped. Pro-slavery groups made sure that the issue was 
not done away with as quickly as Bolívar would have liked, and the issue of slavery 
continued to be a political battle in South America for the following decade. 
 Of course Pétion had more to contend with than helping republicans from 
Spanish America. He still faced internal and external threats, the most crucial of 
which were the constant rumours that France or French privateers, acting in the hopes 
of a large payment from the government, were attempting to reconquer Haiti as a 
colony and re-enslave its people.28 Christophe too, in the North, shared similar 
worries. British abolitionist Thomas Clarkson, who followed events in the islands, 
wrote in a letter, saying:
There is one circumstance which is an obstacle to his [Christophe’s] 
 improvement. This is the apprehension that France may wish some time or 
 other to recover Hayti by force of arms. On this account he is under the 
 necessity of keeping up a large standing army both of horse and foot, the 
 greater part of which he would disband and employ in agriculture, if this 
 apprehension were removed from his mind. I do not mean to imply by this, 
 that he is afraid of the French armies. He is well assured that France can never 
 conquer Hayti: but while he continues in this suspense, he seems to be 
 prevented from making the same improvements in agriculture as in literature 
 and the sciences.29 
However, their concerns were of little interest to the surrounding islands, as news of 
his involvement with criollo insurgents became more widely known. Not only was 
Haiti itself a threat in the example it had made of the slave system, now its 
involvement in republicanism added more potency to ideas about the island. The 
governor of Santiago de Cuba remarked that he was concerned with the ‘protection 
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that the Caudillo Pétion continues to dispense to the criminals ...’30 In addition to 
reports about Bolívar, news had arrived that a ‘criminal’ expedition from Cartagena 
had also entered the protection of southern Haiti.31 Yet for the Dominicans, at this 
particular moment, Pétion ‘lives with us in good correspondence and friendship of 
immediate neighbours’, winning this praise from Carlos Luis de Urrutia, the governor 
of Santo Domingo, after Pétion reported to him an incident involving pirates.32 
Indeed, Pétion had previously written to Urrutia, reminding him of the good relations 
between the two sides of the island, saying ‘when the Spaniards of Santo Domingo 
came together to shake off the yoke of France, then our common enemy, under the 
valiant command and patriotism of General Don Carlos [sic] Sánchez Ramírez I 
hastened to assure them that I would give all assistance and goodwill to a cause so 
just and sacred ...’33 Still, the combination of Haiti’s own internal disruptions and 
preoccupations, coupled with Pétion’s revolutionary activity and Christophe’s fort-
building was enough for Cuba to want to keep the island under close surveillance. The 
intendente of Havana, Alexandro Ramírez wrote to Madrid asking for permission to 
send a ‘secret agent’ to observe ‘the hostilities of the blacks and mulattos of the 
French part of Santo Domingo [Haiti]’. Ramírez complained that Pétion had not 
returned to its rightful owners a ship and cargo that had been captured by pirates in 
Haiti. 
By this [news] and other channels I am further convinced that it is absolutely 
necessary to not lose sight of the numerous tribes of people of colour of Santo 
Domingo … who have sufficient means and strength, and local tactics, to not 
only aspire to rise up against its former Metropolis, but for greater enterprises, 
among which they can count this island, barely separated by a channel of 
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thirteen leagues, attempting to get in contact, or already being in contact, with 
their slaves in the eastern part ...34
 
 Included in the classified correspondence was other testimony about the 
mounting number of problems that both sides of Haiti were involved with, and it was 
not limited to the South of Cuba, traditionally the area most concerned with its 
neighbour. Martín Folch, an honorary secretary from Matanzas, explained that ‘I have 
heard it said by trustworthy persons that the said Christophe, when demanding [the 
return] of a ship of his captured in the vicinity of Cuba, asked for it adding the 
political threat that if [his request] were rejected, he would land ... 2000 blacks with 
horns and whips [in retaliation] ...’ He went on to suggest that both sides of  Haiti 
should therefore be monitored: 
... [they] should sometimes in Guarico watch over King Christophe, and others 
in Puerto Principe [Port-au-Prince] observe Pétion ... This fact provides two 
clear insights: first, it shows that Cristophe is well aware of his superiority 
over us, founded as it is on his situation and resources; and second, it suggests 
that his [actual] hostility will not be as brutal as his diplomatic 
communications. If this system had been established [already] for a few years, 
we would have had timely and detailed news of the manoeuvers of Bolívar on 
those two occasions when he visited Santo Domingo to repair problems in his 
squadron, and regroup his forces to repeat his attack on the Mainland, as well 
as of the operations of Mina…’35 
Secretary of state Martín de Garay agreed, and said he had informed the king of the 
idea of sending over a spy who could speak both Spanish and French. Yet, reported 
Garay, the king was worried about the cost of the enterprise, though in the end he 
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capitulated, calculating that such a precaution would be worth the expense in the 
long-term.36
 Spain’s colonies were not the only islands contending with the lingering 
presence of the slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue, and the republican reality of the 
divided Haiti. The British sugar colony of Barbados found itself with a potentially 
explosive rebellion in 1816, adding to the general uncertainty and unease in the 
region. There had been no significant slave uprising in Barbados since 1702. The 
rebellion occurred on Easter Sunday April 1816, and it spread to 70 estates throughout 
the south-east of the island; it was quickly suppressed, and 144 people were executed 
and 170 deported, and many others were physically punished.37 Although the British 
had abolished the slave trade in 1807, they were still years away from granting total 
emancipation to existing slaves. A misunderstanding over a bill aimed at changing 
slave conditions, however, gave rise to the rebellion. The slaves involved in the 
uprising had been under the impression that they were to be emancipated by 
parliament under the Imperial Registry Bill of 1815, which William Wilberforce had 
been fighting to pass. Planters worried that the bill, which aimed to prevent smuggling 
by territorialising slaves so they could not be moved, might pave the way for 
emancipation. When details of the legislation reached Barbados, they were 
transformed by word of mouth into an emancipation rumour. But it would be another 
18 years before the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833 made the possibility of freedom 
a reality for slaves in British colonies. During the unrest in Barbados, some slaves 
even thought that soldiers from Haiti were due to arrive and defend them against the 
white planters. Yet according to later testimony, many slaves were vague about this 
idea, and others had even referred to the island as ‘Mingo’ (short for Santo Domingo), 
rather than the name of Haiti, which had been in use for more than a decade at this 
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point.38 News of this rebellion spread throughout the Caribbean, as did the 
punishments, and officials in Cuba were notified that some of the offenders were 
being sent to British Honduras – a territory surrounded by Spanish colonies – as 
retribution.39
 Matthew Lewis, who owned a plantation in Jamaica, had also been worried 
about the ramifications of political events in England a few months prior to the 
rebellion in Barbados. Like slave-owners across the region, Haiti was never far from 
his mind: ‘... the higher classes are all in the utmost alarm at rumours of Wilberforce’s 
intentions to set the negroes entirely free; the next step to which would be in all 
probability, a general massacre of the whites, and a second edition of the horrors of 
St. Domingo: while, on the other hand, the negroes are impatient at the delay; and 
such disturbances arose in St Thomas’s-in-the-East, last Christmas, as required the 
interposition of the magistrates’.40 
 Yet, for all this concern around the region, in Cuba Arango and the other 
planters put on a united and calm front. Arango argued that it would be, in fact, 
impossible for Cuba to undergo anything like what happened in Saint-Domingue. In 
his Voto particular de varios consejeros de Indias sobre la abolición del tráfico de 
negros in 1816, he remained steadfast in his anti-republican views, blaming what 
happened in the French colony on the revolution in the metropolis and the ‘foolish 
project of liberating all the blacks and making them equal to the whites’. Reiterating 
his earlier ideas, he pointed out that such a thing could not take place in Cuba 
because, 
In our possession the prospect is less frightening, because the number of 
slaves is less than the number of frees, and the total of blacks and mulattos is 
not disproportionate to whites... The vigilance of the magistrates and the 
interest of the owners have put out the fire with amazing alacrity and ease, 
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when the flame would have been scarcely discovered. This danger that so 
many fear can not be increased much with the small number of blacks entering 
the short space of five years [before the cessation of the slave trade].41
 
Yet his words were not born out by the demographic reality. The high number of slave 
imports alone during this period, as outlined earlier in this chapter, were enough to 
cause social unease. In addition, the number of free people of colour had been rising 
alongside that of the enslaved. Indeed, in the year after he wrote this report, 1817, a 
census showed that island had 114,058 free people of colour and 199,145 slaves, a 
total of 313,203 against a white population of 239,830. This was a dramatic rise for 
all groups – the year after the outbreak of fighting in Saint-Domingue, 1792, there 
were only 54,152 free people of colour and 84,590 slaves, for a total of 138,742 
people of colour compared with 133,550 whites.42 In twenty-five years the total 
population of Cuba had doubled, but for whites they had not managed to stretch quite 
so far, with their numbers being less than twice the population of 1792. However, the 
number of slaves had more than doubled and so too the population of free people of 
colour. Yet technically, the number of free people overall was more than that of 
enslaved, but Arango was perhaps willfully choosing to overlook the reality – whites 
were outnumbered, and that would only continue during Cuba’s sugar boom. The 
calm, confident face Arango had presented may have hid more conflicting thoughts 
from the planters he represented. 
 Madrid and the colonial officials on the island, however, were not so sanguine. 
The secretary of state in Madrid suggested that if possible slaves should be allowed to 
marry, ‘so in the end when [Cuba] has to terminate its [slave] traffic, it will have been 
very sensible to have made itself prepared with enough time to avoid a shortage of 
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workers for planting’.43 As the slave population steadily climbed, and the deadline for 
the abolition of the slave trade loomed, even Arango’s own views began to change, 
and moved towards supporting an end to the trade.44 He advocated buying more 
female slaves so that his slave population could become self-sufficient.45 This should 
not perhaps be interpreted as a change of heart by the architect of Cuba’s ‘free trade’ 
in slavery, but as a realisation that the landscape of Caribbean plantation society, as 
well as the global dimensions of the slave trade, had been transformed. If Cuba were 
to have the labour to fuel its sugar mills and coffee plantations, it would be necessary 
that it came from within its shores. Arango was so concerned about the impact of the 
changes in the slave trade, he even served as a judge on the Mixed Commission with 
England, which dealt with the suppression of the slave trade, though he had the aim of 
protecting the interest of planters like himself.46 The shifting racial picture in Cuba 
meant that more slaves could be a threat, statistically speaking, and so many planters 
like Arango thought perhaps it was time to stop importing them. For years it had been 
official policy to bring in bozales, a practice established around the time of the 
rebellion in Saint-Domingue, and one seen as a way to avoid unrest or problems with 
a large criollo slave population. Yet as in Saint-Domingue, having a large population 
of African slaves presented a different set of concerns for planters – especially fear 
over their tribal connections to each other, and ability to communicate in languages 
other than Spanish with one another.47 Despite what Arango thought, the conditions 
were not so far apart from Saint-Domingue as he would have liked to believe.
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 The growing gap between white and non-whites made Cuban officials also 
keen to see the arrival of more white settlers, like those which Puerto Rico had 
received. The island’s superintendente de Real Hacienda Alejandro Ramírez – who 
had been intendent in Puerto Rico in 1815 – set up a junta de población blanca after 
he arrived to take up his new post in Cuba that autumn. The main task of the junta, 
which was organised along with the captain-general, José Cienfuegos, was to petition 
the king to grant privileges to Cuba that were similar to those Puerto Rico received.48 
By the autumn of 1817, the crown had relented and a real cédula was issued. It was in 
many ways similar to the one released in Puerto Rico. It called for an increase of the 
white population, and Cuba became re-opened to the settlement of Catholics, with the 
edict saying ‘...that my command do propose all such further measures as may lead to 
the increase of the white population of this island of Cuba’.49 Likewise, these 
immigrants would receive full rights after five years on the island, though in the 
meantime they would not be allowed to open a shop or engage with trade against 
Spaniards. Additionally, they must be armed, join the militia, and ‘keep their slaves in 
due subjection’.50 And unlike Puerto Rico, the order was limited to whites. Indeed, in 
order to encourage reproduction among the slave population, officials put a tax of six 
pesos on each male slave introduced to Cuba during this time, but not on women.51 
With 27,752 slaves disembarking in Cuba in 1817, and 22,855 the following year,52 
the tax quickly began to fill the coffers of the junta de población blanca, though it 
was designed to end in 1820 when, in theory, the slave trade would cease, though 
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events took a very different course.53 Like the measures adopted in Puerto Rico, it was 
hoped that these incentives would help develop the sugar industry. In addition, in the 
same year, the crown abolished the royal monopoly on tobacco, which inspired some 
small landholders to plant that crop.54
 By the beginning of the 1820s, Cuba and Puerto Rico had experienced more 
than a decade of sugar and coffee growth, and a correspondingly large rise in slave 
numbers. Cuba was now producing some 13.64 per cent of the world’s sugar, and had 
more than 200,000 slaves.55 Every part of the island felt the impact – even Santiago 
saw its slave population rise from 8,836 in 1810 to 23,956 a decade later, alongside a 
general population rise from 25,727 to 48,665.56 The population of free people of 
colour had been rising as well, yet at the same time growing racialised fears meant 
that restrictions became increasingly oppressive in an attempt to assert white 
dominance, as well as the continual evolution of the sugar trade.
 The British observer Robert Francis Jameson spent 1820 in Cuba and saw the 
physical manifestations of this paranoia in Havana: ‘The mass of being is forcibly 
conjoined – their bond of union is a real chain. Fear, say the metaphysicians, first 
formed society, and it is undoubted that such is the elemental principle of West Indian 
society. Every house is a sort of garrison filled with domestic conscripts serving 
without pay and whom it is necessary to guard strictly.’57 His work, Letters from the 
[sic] Havana gives a useful impression of this period – when serious changes were 
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under way but well before the peak of sugar production later in the century. Even 
before he set foot on the island, Jameson was immediately struck by the extent of 
sugar planting: 
On approaching the shore of Cuba from the north, distance gives a clustered 
 effect to the trees, which, in reality, they do not possess. The country round the 
 Havana is rather of bare of them, as might be supposed from its soil being 
 more valuably employed. But the sugar ingenios (plantations) which formerly 
 surrounded the city have now disappeared: the soil has been exhausted, and 
 instead of laboring at its renovation, the planters have gradually receded into 
 the interior, successively occupying new lands, under which class more than 
 half the island may be comprised.58
 
 Like many travelogues of this type, Jameson comments on plants and the 
climate, the countryside outside of Havana, and on trade and commerce. But his 
observations about slave and free coloured life in the capital present some ideas about 
life in the city in 1820. On the one hand he speaks of slave owners who were so 
wealthy they had ‘no less than sixty household slaves’, though he points out that 
many free people of colour were in a condition not so different to slavery, being 
‘subject to most of the restrictions imposed on a slave, such as respect [to] carrying 
weapons, being out after dark without a lanthorn, &c’.59 Yet white and free people of 
colour came together in many areas of life, not least of all gambling, a vice the 
authorities, while indulging in, were forever trying to ban: 
This vice [gambling] and an immoderate love of dress are the bane of the 
labouring class. You would smile to see groups of black females with silk 
stocking, satten [sic] shoes, muslin gowns, French shawls, gold ear-rings and 
flowers in their woollen head-dress, gallented by black beaux, with white 
beaver hats, English coats and gold-headed canes, all smoking in concert like 
their superiors. These are your waterwomen and cobblers, festivalizing on a 
“dias de los cruces,” or a church holiday. The next day you will have them at 
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your door with some article of this finery, which they are seeking a sale for, to 
pay for the day's subsistence!60
Jameson was clearly disgusted by much of the slave society that he saw, and being an 
abolitionist, strongly advocated the need to end slavery in the island – though of 
course at the time, British colonies had yet to free their own slaves, despite having 
ended the trade. Still, his observations give some small glimpse into Havana life.
 Around the same time, however, there was also a growing discomfort with the 
slave regime from within Cuba as well, which was brought to light by the actions of 
one of Cuba’s representatives to the re-convened Cortes, Father Felix Varela. At a 
time of increasing racial unease, he flew in the face of the planter opposition and 
called for the abolition of slavery. He justified his actions with the idea that Cuba, 
with its racial balance, could soon turn into another Saint-Domingue, but this time 
aided by the revolutionaries of Spanish America.61 His proposals to preempt such an 
outcome included gradual measures such as liberty for slaves who had served their 
masters for 15 years and a lottery where freedom would be the prize, but abolition 
would not happen in his lifetime, and the hostility shown toward his views meant that 
he would never be able to return to Cuba.
 Despite its measures in the Caribbean, the crown’s financial situation remained 
precarious, as the costs of quelling independence movements across the Atlantic were 
high. Initially, in 1814, shortly after Fernando VII had returned to the throne, he had 
consulted advisors about the problem of raising more revenue, especially as trade had 
also been disrupted by the outbreak of fighting in the colonies, which had a severe 
economic impact as well. However, at no point in the early discussion that the king 
had with his advisers was the possibility of free trade discussed, a decision which 
would come back to haunt Fernando VII later. In an effort to stall what many saw as 
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inevitable, a junta de pacificación had been set up to deal with independence 
movements in the Americas. But with an empty Treasury at home by 1817 there was 
finally talk of trade reform but these would fail to materialise, and the colonies such 
reforms were meant to keep hold of, or at least temporarily placate, slipped further 
away.62 Although there was a ban on direct trade with foreign ships in most Spanish 
American ports, much ‘illegal’ trade took place anyway, and had done for years. The 
Caribbean islands, however, and especially Cuba, were in many ways outside this 
debate, having been allowed different trading concessions some 20 years earlier, and 
also having a long and steady tradition of illegal trade and contraband, two conditions 
that underpinned continued loyalty to the crown.63  
 During this period, Spain faced another loss further North, to the United 
States. The growing might of the US seemed unstoppable, and a dispute over the 
Florida territory arose between the two countries. General Andrew Jackson’s repeated 
incursions into Florida resulted in the Adams-Onís treaty of 22 February 1819, in 
which Spain sold Florida to the US for $5 million, though it did not come into effect 
until 1821. The Spanish had never managed to settle Florida to the same extent as 
their other territories – indeed, they had lost it to the British between 1763 and 1783, 
though later managed to claim it back. But it had a low population and little 
agricultural output. For the North Americans, however, there was growing momentum 
to push back European powers across the continent. Under the terms of the final sale 
to the United States, a boundary dispute in New Spain was also settled, though by the 
time the treaty was valid Spain had already been forced into recognising an 
independent Mexico. But while the empire was disintegrating around them, the crown 
– and the merchants of Cádiz – could take some consolation that Cuba’s sugar was 
turning into gold, with exports in the past four years alone averaging eleven million 
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pesos, an amount which put it on the same level as earlier silver exports of New 
Spain.64 
 Money, however, was not the only concern for the crown. The troubled early 
years of Fernando VII’s return only became more problematic. A military revolt in 
1820 forced him to bring back the Constitution of 1812, which he had 
unceremoniously discarded upon his return to the throne, and thus liberalism was 
restored to Spain. This marked the beginning of the trienio liberal though the years 
that followed (1820-23) would see much political unrest. Another session of the 
Cortes was called for September 1821, while at the same time loyalists and 
republicans were still battling in the majority of the colonies.65 This disruption 
restored the provincial municipalities (diputación provincial) that had been formed in 
1813-14 and governors also went about reinstating constitutional ayuntamientos.66 
British thinker Jeremy Bentham advised Spain to get rid of its colonies so as to not 
put its liberal experiment in peril, arguing that at the very least the crown would have 
to engage in free trade for the colonies to be remotely useful.67
 During the sitting of the Cortes, more stirrings for independence were rising as 
well, this time reaching the shores of Cuba. This unrest began to unfold throughout 
the 1820s. It first came to light in the following years during the uncovering of the 
Soles y Rayos de Bolívar conspiracy. In 1820, one of the organisers who had been 
fighting in Gran Colombia, José Franco Lemus, returned to Cuba and made contact 
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with the fledgling group, whose actions will be discussed in the next chapter.68 Now, 
in addition to fear about slaves and people of colour, the colonial authorities and 
planters had to worry about the criollos as well. Annexation to the United States was 
also increasingly seen as an option, or by some, as an inevitable way of staving off 
ruin. As the US Secretary of War, John C Calhoun put it, Cubans are afraid either: 
‘One that the island should fall into the hands of Great Britain; two that it should be 
revolutionised by the Negroes.’69 
Haiti takes charge, 1821-22
Santo Domingo, meanwhile, limped along its poor, isolated road. It did not receive a 
real cédula with the aim of developing the island, but rather a special real órden from 
the king commemorating the island’s loyalty in its fight against the French during the 
War of Reconquest (1808-09). The order outlined the awarding of various medals of 
distinction to key people involved in the fighting, which had taken place a decade 
ago, in order ‘to perpetuate the memory of the glorious reconquest of the plaza of 
Santo Domingo, and to reward the loyalty, valour and those who contributed to the 
happy success of such a memorable enterprise’.70 The following year, on 6 January  
1818 Sebastián Kindelán took up his latest post for the crown, this time as governor 
of Santo Domingo, after a spell as governor of Spanish Florida. As a previous 
governor of Santiago de Cuba, he was very familiar with Haiti and its relationship to 
the Spanish colonies, and over the course of his time in Cuba he had many dealings 
with its authorities – at first French generals and then Haitian ones. However, by the 
time Kindelán arrived in Santo Domingo, the divided Haiti was in a lamentable state. 
Pétion’s policy of distributing land, while politically popular, had been economically 
disastrous. Sugar production had dropped to two million pounds, down from the sixty 
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million pounds L’Ouverture had managed to get workers to produce amid the fighting 
and destruction of that period.71 To compound matters, Pétion died in March of 1818 
after an illness, and was succeeded by his popular minister Jean-Pierre Boyer. An 
eyewitness of the funeral on 1 April reported to the Times: 
Everyone who chose went to see [the body], and you would have been 
 surprised at the scenes which occurred every instant; they were such as are 
 seldom witnessed on the demise of men in power! In the different quarters of 
 the galleries of the palace, were men, women, and children, some on their 
 knees, other standing, who, after taking a last sight of the body, were 
 imploring Heaven for his soul.72 
 The following year, in 1819, Haitians were disturbed by a rumour which began 
to circulate claiming an accord now existed between France and Spain to yet again 
reconquer the island.73 The north was still under the rule of Christophe, and a reunion 
with the south did not look likely. Still, struggling American republicans continued to 
call on both sides of the country for help. For instance, the vice-president of the 
republic of Venezuela, Juan Bautista Arismendi, established contact with Christophe 
in 1818. The following year, an agent for Colombia, John B Elbers, managed to 
obtain 1,000 rifles and 6,000 pounds of lead.74 During this time Boyer finally realised 
his and Pétion’s dream of reuniting with the North. With the death of Pétion in 1818 
and the suicide of Christophe in 1819, Boyer was poised to consolidate power. Before 
his death, Christophe had made an attempt to buy the Spanish side of the island. A 
Briton who knew about the deal, John Irving, reported the attempted purchase to the 
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Spanish, but the deal came to nothing.75 A short while later, panicked rumours reached 
Santo Domingo that a Haitian named Dezir Dalmassi was sent on a mission by Boyer, 
though for what was unclear, and suspicion grew among the Dominicans. Dalmassi 
was supposedly going to lure back people who had left the West of the island. 
Kindelán wrote of how Dalmassi seemed to have ‘a supposed or real mission from 
president Boyer to invite and suggest to the citizens that they commit wholeheartedly 
to the government of their republic and offer them, with this view, promises ... of 
employment and improvements if they contribute with their influx to the achievement 
of these perfidious machinations’.76
 A few months later, Kindelán wrote to one of his generals in the large 
provincial town of Santiago, saying that ‘the rumours of invasion of our territory have 
had their great fermentation in the South of the French colony, and there they have 
sown and spread to the Spanish part’.77 The force behind these rumours, however, was 
less territorial ambition and more a question of security. Boyer had been forced into 
action due to what he saw as Dominican incompetence. He wanted to become 
stronger in the face of possible European incursions. News of French ships in 
Martinique rumoured to be heading to Haiti did nothing to reassure him. Boyer felt 
that the biggest problem was that the island was not in a position to be able to resist 
attack. He was especially perturbed that the whole of the East, under Spanish rule, 
was open and mostly unable to defend itself, and could provide an easy point of entry 
for any European power willing to attempt to re-colonise the republic. Thus, the 
Haitian leader sent agents trying to foster anti-Spanish sentiment among mulattos on 
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the Spanish side of the island and put forward the idea of a union with Haiti, as this 
would help to protect the whole island.78 
 Kindelán was in constant contact with the towns that Dalmassi had visited. 
The military commander in Las Matas wrote to Kindelán saying Dalmassi had 
‘offer[ed] me better employment and a thousand things’.79 To this Kindelán replied 
that
I understand that general Dalmassi and the other propagators of such seditious 
 problems will be among those malcontent with the change of regime that has 
 taken place in the Northern part as a consequence of the death of Cristophe, 
 and that being unable to implement there their designs of a new attempt [to 
 take over], they come to test the state of the mood of the Spaniards with the 
 perverse aim to alarm them or seduce them, forming between us a 
 coalition that they will baptise with the name government, and in its shade 
 [i.e. under its banner] will challenge the republic and its president Boyer ...”80
!
At the same time, Boyer was constantly looking over his shoulder, waiting for 
rumoured French invasions to materialise. As it turned out, he would have to watch  
for a few more years, as the former metropole still did not recognise the republic in 
1820, and would not do so until 1825, after millions of francs had been paid in 
compensation, which placed the island into a debt that ruined any possibility of 
prosperity.81 While accusations flew between Kindelán and Pétion, the Spanish 
neighbours of Cuba and Puerto Rico kept abreast of the news, fearful of the aims of a 
unified country, while Fernando VII in Madrid was also given updates of the 
situation.82
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 By the autumn, the diputación provincial was reinstated in Santo Domingo, in 
line with events on the peninsula. Kindelán proclaimed, with a dose of ironic 
optimism, in the inaugural session that ‘I promise myself, and indulge myself already 
with blind trust, that from your preoccupations and difficulties will undoubtedly be 
born the prosperity of the whole province...’83 A few days later Kindelán received a 
letter from Domingo Pérez Guerra, the commander general of the southern frontier, 
claiming that:
Yesterday, at six in the afternoon a lieutenant colonel of the Republic of Haiti 
came to me, named Dézir Dalmassi, saying that he came from San Juan after 
having stopped in Cahobas and Las Matas, in the commission of the president 
Jean Pierre Boyer, so that this Spanish part submits to said republic; and under 
the guarantee to keep everything in the same terms, he had an excuse to send 
troops, because disorder was inevitable ... The commander of Las Matas, and 
of San Juan gave news of this same official, after he spent two or three days 
telling them the same, and in reality Sir, confidentially, I believe that in each 
town of these there are very little that are not aware of the submission, fearful 
of their small moral force, and of the risk of losing their few possessions ...84
 
By the end of December, Kindelán had written to the Constitutional ayuntamiento of 
San Juan for help, with no result. By the end the year, the situation had become 
increasingly fraught. Rumours were abounding that Dalmassi had gone to the south-
eastern towns of Las Matas, Neiba, and Azua to try to incorporate them into Haiti.85 
In addition, the crown had ordered the mobilisation of troops in preparation for action 
against corsairs who were working with Bolívar. They were sailing in the waters, 
surrounding the Hispanic Caribbean islands, plundering ships, and hampering trade. 
But with no money to back up the demands, Kindelán was hard-pressed to prepare 
troops while at the same time worrying that once he uncovered the truth of Haiti’s 
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intentions, he may well need his militia to perform more urgent undertakings.86 
Kindelán had cause for concern – reports arrived of plans of some regions on the 
island to make alliances with Haiti. Letters were dispatched from regional leaders to 
the republic, declaring their intention to ‘hoist the Haitian flag’, though this was soon 
followed with pleas for munitions to ready the Spanish side for its own independence 
struggle, showing the real motivation for their enthusiasm.87
 Fed up with such information, Kindelán also took it upon himself to seek 
reassurances directly from Boyer. The two leaders had an exchange of correspondence 
which Kindelán would later publish and distribute. Kindelán began by asking Boyer 
to clarify his position on what Dalmassi had been sent to do, and to find out if there 
was any truth to the continual rumours of invasion. Boyer replied that: 
The Lieutenant Col Dezir Dalmassi has for many years been involved in 
commerce with the Spanish part of the island, where for his own business he 
resides more frequently than in the Republic: it is true that he always travels 
with the permission of the Government, which is required by good 
government and common usage, and he is not the only one who does this; but 
he has never been entrusted with any mission, and I have always known him 
to be a man of too great prudence to act in such a reckless manner, and so I 
think Sir that there is no reason for describing him [in this way]… If I had 
wanted to listen to the unfounded insinuations, to complaints, and I’ll say it 
now, to disturb the Spanish part, I would have done it a long time ago, because 
Your Excellency has enough experience to know that there are those who 
benefit from the liberty and innovations everywhere. In conclusion, I assure 
Your Excellency that I desire no other titles than those of consoler and pacifier 
of the oppressed, and that my sword will never lead armies to bloody 
conquests.88
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Kindelán added a postscript at the bottom, dated 10 January 1821, addressed to his 
Dominican readers: ‘Now, Dominicans, having more than enough judgement and 
discernment, you have [evidence] to comprehend where the origin of those insidious 
rumors is, what the objective of the plotters could have been, and that it is not our 
neighbours who have perturbed this time our repose and tranquility’.89 Later that 
month, Kindelán wrote a confidential letter to the secretary of state in Spain, warning 
that an attack from Boyer was imminent. He explained that some information had 
fallen into his hands via troops in the north of the island. The plan, he was that ‘they 
spread the news that the French would arrive in February or March to take possession 
of the Spanish part and acclimatise the troops before marching against the colony’.90 
In his letter, however, he could not pretend that his troops would be able in any way to 
withstand an attack, being understaffed and lacking in weapons, and he begged the 
secretary of state in Madrid to send what he could, realising with a sinking feeling 
that these pleas would go unmet.
 Santo Domingo, however, was not alone in dealing with internal problems. 
Puerto Rico was contending with a serious slave conspiracy which had taken place 
around Bayamón, an area to the south of San Juan. It had become one of the main 
sugar-producing regions over the past twenty years, and the number of slaves had 
doubled from 1815 to 1820 to just over 1,000.91 While this was not a high number in 
comparison with plantations in Cuba, it was sizable for Puerto Rico. This particular 
plot was to see slaves in Bayamón, as well as other nearby districts, rise up and come 
together for an attack on the town. As so often was the case, the officials had heard 
that something was afoot, tipped off by an informer. They local officials gathered men 
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together. The governor sent a force of 350 militia soldiers, including thirty-three 
cavalry, and nearly one hundred mulatto infantry members to suppress it.92 Even after 
it was stopped, local authorities remained on guard. A later report on events in 
Bayamón by Puerto Rico’s Governor, Gonzalo de Arostegui, said: ‘I continue to 
practice the same standard of security, and I dare to affirm to Your Sovereignty that in 
what concerns this jurisdiction, it is not necessary to be careful because the only black 
who seems to be guilty, according to the investigations conducted in Bayamón, is the 
foreman of the hacienda of Don José Canales, who was sent to that mayor [of 
Bayamón] when he was captured.’93
 In Cuba, tensions were also rising. Santiago’s governor was so fed up with 
maroon communities that he reorganised the compañía de cazadores de la costa in 
1821 in order to patrol and stifle anything that threatened the region’s ‘tranquility’.94 
Meanwhile, officials in Havana were also being kept abreast with developments 
between Santo Domingo and Haiti. Kindelán had written about his fears over the 
menacing rumours he had heard, noting that ‘I do not need to explain myself any 
further so that Your Sovereignty is convinced vividly of the certain and fundamental 
principle that the defence, security, and conservation of the Spanish part of this island 
is a common cause of all the rest of the Spanish possessions that have slavery’.95 
However, in May Kindelán was forced to watch events unfold in Santo Domingo 
from the vista in Cuba, where he was sent as interim governor, and was replaced by 
Pascual Real. The new governor stepped into the role and soon discovered the extent 
of the conspiracy that engulfed the island. Indeed, it was not just Haiti causing 
problems, but the whole spectre of republicanism; now many Dominicans were 
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seriously considering making a bid for independence, with some even looking to win 
the support of Haiti. The plot was led by the lieutenant governor, José Núñez de 
Cáceres. 
 Like many members of the Dominican elite, Núñez de Cáceres had been 
forced to spend part of his life away from the island. In his case, his family moved to 
Camagüey in central Cuba when the French took control of Santo Domingo. He 
returned in 1808, became involved with Juan Sanchéz Ramírez’s War of Reconquest, 
and even wrote a well-known poem about the victory in Palo Hicado. Re-established 
in Santo Domingo, Núñez de Cáceres continued in his literary life, editing a 
newspaper, El Duende, and taking on numerous roles within the administration.96 As 
such, he was well-placed to organise this conspiracy. Like many Dominicans, he was 
also fueled by a deep anger at the economic neglect that caused the island to stagnate 
since its reunification with the peninsula, a period known as España boba, or foolish 
Spain. Indeed, the return of the 1812 constitution had initially inspired hopes of the 
island’s financial rescue, or at the very least the possibility of receiving some sort of 
investment. An article from the newly established newspaper El telégrafo 
constitucional de Santo Domingo declared:
Thanks to our wise Constitution, which has laid the main foundations of the 
happiness of the people, depositing in them and their ayuntamientos the 
political and economic governance, declaring their right to extend their 
municipal ordinances, to promote agriculture, industry and commerce ... Santo 
Domingo is going to be an agricultural people, and raise the building of its 
happiness, of its strength and greatness, on agriculture ...97
However, one aspect Núñez de Cáceres had not fully considered was that of slavery. 
Re-instituted by the French, its continued presence was a source of irritation to 
Haitian officials, and something they were ready to take action over in addition to 
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concerns about Dominican weakness. This was especially the case as the possibility 
of Spanish retaliation grew more unlikely – there was not the force to withstand an 
invasion of Haitian troops. There were many reasons for this, not least that Spain had 
finally signed a treaty with Britain to end the slave trade in 1821, but also a lack of 
investment and overall interest. José de la Cruz Limardo, a young Venezuelan doctor 
who was living in Santo Domingo and who eventually travelled to Haiti, tried to 
explain the situation to the discontent Dominicans. He had Haitian acquaintances who 
had pushed the point that ‘they oppose the great difficulty of establishing a Republic 
under slavery adjoining a Republic of free men’.98 Yet the matter was ignored, 
overshadowed by the plot to renounce Spanish control.
 By November, this group – composed of Dominican elites, but also some free 
people of colour – orchestrated a coup calling for the end to Spain’s rule. On 1 
December 1821 they unveiled the ‘Estado independiente de la parte española de 
Haití’. Despite the somewhat misleading name, the idea was to join forces with 
Colombia, not Haiti, and be taken under the Bolivarian wing. This episode was later 
remembered as not only independencia efímera but also independencia boba. For a 
variety of reasons this experiment was doomed to failure, not least because of Núñez 
de Cáceres’s inability to secure a concrete pledge from Bolívar, who was too busy 
fighting his own military and political battles. This, however, did not stop Núñez de 
Cáceres from issuing a ‘declaration of independence’, which began: ‘No more 
dependence, no more humiliation, no more provoking the caprice and whim of the 
Madrid Cabinet’ before going on to outline more than 300 years of complains, and 
concluding with ‘¡Viva la Patria, viva la Independencia, viva la Unión de 
Colombia!’.99
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 This move, however inspired it was by events on the mainland, failed to gain 
support from its island neighbours. Núñez de Cáceres invited Governor Arostegui to 
join him. Arostegui wrote soon thereafter that,
This government has just received, with other official letters ... one in which 
there is an invitation to take part and cooperate in a plan that had been adopted 
by some dissatisfied and unwelcome people in Santo Domingo ... Only 
obstinacy, ignorance, or the most stupid frenzy could have encouraged the 
author of this paper to address me and reveal in his territory the confidence 
and ease that [he] had and would find in his favour.100 
Not only had he failed to secure support from Puerto Rico, another factor that would 
fuel his eventual failure was the fact that Núñez de Cáceres had not really organised a 
new government, but rather little more than an anti-Spanish junta and thus there was 
confusion over what would happen next.101 Regional commanders reported to Núñez 
de Cáceres that there were ‘innumerable displays of happiness’ over the political 
change and their alliance with Boyer.102 In an attempt to seem coherent, the group had 
issued an Acta constitutiva del gobierno provisional del estado independiente de la 
parte español de Hayti. In the document, the group declared that Spanish Haiti was 
‘free, and independent ... that the form of its government is, and ought to be 
Republican’. It went on to say, in the fourth article, that it would enter an alliance with 
Colombia, but offered a message to its neighbours that ‘it will send [another message] 
immediately to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Haiti in the French 
part of our island, proposing a treaty of friendship, commerce and alliance for 
common defence and security in both territories in case of an enemy invasion, or of 
215
100 Quoted in Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Santo Domingo y la Gran Colombia (Santo Domingo, 
1971), p.128.
101 Carlos Sánchez i Sánchez, La ‘Independencia Boba’ de Nuñez De Cáceres, ante la historia i el 
derecho público (Santo Domingo, 1937), p.35.
102 Manuel Machado to José Núñez de Cáceres, 6 February 1822 quoted in Jean Price Mars, La 
República de Haití, p.131.
internal machinations against its liberty and independence’.103 However, it skirted 
around the issue of slavery, only going so far as to outline the rights of liberty, 
equality, security and property, as well as declaring citizens those of ‘whatever colour 
and race’, but not specifically spelling out the manumission of the few slaves on its 
part of the island.104
 It was not enough for Haiti. With more troops, Boyer could overpower the 
Spanish side. He initially tried to convince Núñez de Cáceres of the need to unite. In 
an exchange of correspondence, Boyer said to Núñez de Cáceres: ‘I do not expect to 
encounter in all parts but brothers, friends, sons to embrace. There is no obstacle that 
is capable of stopping me ... open your heart to enjoyment, to trust, because the 
independence of Haiti will be indestructible, due to the fusion of all hearts into one 
whole.’105  The new nation of Spanish Haiti was stuck – Spain was unwilling or 
unable to intervene, and with a very limited militia compared with Boyer’s 12,000 
troops, there was little choice. And so Boyer entered the city of Santo Domingo on 9 
February 1822, and, following in the footsteps of L’Ouverture, once again 
consolidated power. Likewise, for the second time, slavery was abolished. In writing 
to Francisco González de Linares, a later governor of Puerto Rico, the former 
secretary of the diputación provincial, Juan Francisco Brenes, said ‘... Boyer took 
possession of the Spanish part of the Island of Santo Domingo, as a consequence of 
its disgraceful political change to a Republican system, his first steps were to bring 
together [public] opinion by means of popularity and [granting] equality to all classes 
of people of the island, by declaring the absolute liberty from slavery’.106 Once again, 
the other islands became extra vigilant. Kindelán, now in Cuba, issued a notice about 
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capturing free people of colour who had plans to go to Santo Domingo, saying ‘it 
could have been a danger to the public tranquility, and singularly the superior order 
and discipline of our slaves’.107
 Boyer’s second task was to defeat a badly organised expedition from France, 
which also involved French planters who had been growing coffee near the eastern 
bay of Samaná.108 Once that had been taken care of, like L’Ouverture before him, he 
set about attempting to reform the land use system in Santo Domingo in an effort to 
make agricultural land more profitable, though this time he went a step further and 
took control of church land as well. The system of terrenos comuneros had lapsed 
back into confusion, at least where the Haitians were concerned, as the land was not 
surveyed.109 A couple of years later he invited black Protestants from the Northern 
United States to settle in the East of the island, which some 5,000 did, in Samaná, 
Puerto Plata, and the capital.110 
 Haitian rule did not suit many Dominicans, for a variety of cultural, linguistic, 
and, not least, racial, problems. Brenes said in his letter to Linares:
This policy, apparently necessary in these circumstances, far from producing 
 the effect that Boyer has proposed, did little else than encourage discontent 
 of the people in general, because of the insults with which the freed slaves 
 injured their masters, the recklessness that the Haitian troops began to use 
 among a Religious people, the difference in customs, in language, and the 
 monumental transition from one legislation to another, occasioned such 
 manifest disgust in the resident whites, blacks, and mulattos of the Island ...111
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It does not take a leap of the imagination to realise the disquiet with which elite 
Dominicans were forced to accept the consequences of their decision, especially those 
involving land reform, an issue which had been a problem in the past as well. After 
Núñez de Cáceres’ failed experiment at independence, some Dominicans left the 
island for other Spanish-speaking points, though if they were loyalists there were only  
a few ports of call remaining. Those who stayed had to face a new, and previously 
unfathomable, regime. For free and enslaved people of colour in Santo Domingo, it is 
more difficult to know their thoughts. Did they see the Haitians as liberators, or, due 
to land reforms, oppressors? And once liberated, where did these people of colour fit 
into the expanded republic? The archival sources trickle down to a very small stream 
during this period, and many documents have been lost to the ravages of the 
Caribbean climate amid decades of political uncertainty, so it is nearly impossible to 
piece together any sort of complete picture of many aspects of these years under 
Haitian rule, especially in matters such as administration, local politics, and 
Dominican-Haitian relations.112 This may sound insignificant, but it bears pointing 
out that Haitian rule lasted until 1844 – 22 years, and ones in which many factors, 
both cultural and political, would have been mediated. And while there were 
constantly simmering Haitian-Dominican tensions, an independence movement only 
began to form at the end of the 1830s, and it took years to come to fruition.113 Núñez 
de Cáceres would not, however, take any part in this later struggle, having fled first to 
Venezuela in 1822, where he lived for some years, and then to Mexico, where he died 
25 years later. 
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 The wider impact of Haiti’s control of Santo Domingo, and indeed the story at 
all, is still largely silenced, outside the internal debates of Dominican history.114 While 
much scholarly work is being produced about the earlier part of Haiti’s initial fight 
under L’Ouverture, this intriguing moment remains little mentioned. Stepping 
momentarily into the discourses of the 21st century, it is a postcolonial rarity – a 
former colony taking control of another ex-colony which had not only a different 
imperial power but different languages and culture, and making that relationship last. 
Boyer and his deputies displayed their clear savvy and cunning, turning on its head 
the notion that the republic was not functioning, and certainly putting to rest any idea 
that it was not watching its back for foreign invasion. Indeed, it seems clear that 
Boyer did what he had to do in order to protect his people, as well as free the 
remaining slaves on the island, an issue that had been a concern since L’Ouverture’s 
time. By intervening, Haiti showed what it could accomplish well beyond the events 
of 1791-1804, and at the same time throw in to contrast the woeful and chaotic state 
of Spain’s most neglected colony. But more than that, it proved correct about the fears 
of captains-general and governors throughout the region – that the former slave 
republic was a force to be reckoned with. Perhaps if Haiti had continued to be divided 
it would have slipped further from public consciousness. But this resurgence – in 
reality, it was only political, as the country was suffering from poor output and a lack 
of trade – kept it in the mind of planters, and slaves for decades to come. Certainly for 
the Spanish islands, they were becoming increasingly closed in by republics. Once 
Cuba and Puerto Rico were surrounded by other Spanish colonies. Now, at every turn 
lay independent nations. As the engines of Spain’s remaining Caribbean colonies kept 
churning out at a faster speed and higher price sugar and blood, the knowledge of 
Haiti’s potential would increasingly haunt them. Add to that republicanism, a 
possibility that became a firm reality for most of Spanish America in just over a 
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decade, and the choices were perceived by criollo elites to be limited: loyalty, or 
destruction.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate the entrenchment of patterns born out of the 
previous 20 years of change. The implementation of the Enlightenment ideas about 
land use discussed in the first chapter were indeed beginning to pay dividends for 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, though this was in large part due to not only the wide gap in 
the sugar and coffee market left by a weak and divided Haiti, but also the large 
enslaved labour force brought over from Africa. Yet for all the growing wealth, the 
crown could not pay for stability. The restored Fernando VII was spending his riches 
trying to keep hold of his empire while also battling the liberal reformers on the 
peninsula. As Simón Bolívar and others cut the ties between Spain and its colonies, 
Cuba and Puerto Rico watched with concern. Bolívar’s links with Haiti and Santo 
Domingo’s later attempt to join Colombia pointed to possibilities that many felt 
would be the undoing of the racial and economic order on the two sugar colonies. 
This chapter has also shown how slave owners like Arango dismissed the threat of 
another Saint-Domingue, while the reality was that whites were outnumbered by 
people of colour. As for Haiti, its leaders were willing to do what they felt was needed 
to stave off any more European incursions even if that meant taking control of the 
Spanish side of the island. Haiti had now shown was it was capable of. The two 
threats of republicanism and Haiti would not fade, and the 1820s saw the emergence 
of a increasingly repressive order that would continue to bind Cuba and Puerto Rico 
to Spain in their colonial pact amid the proliferation of other possibilities.
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Chapter 5
The struggle at the new centre of empire, 1823-30
This chapter considers the final years of the transformation in the Spanish world and 
examines three main themes: republicanism and Cuban efforts to bring about political 
change on the island; the growing wealth and the scale of slavery on the islands; and 
the larger geopolitical consequences of Cuba and Puerto Rico remaining Spanish 
colonies. As the 1820s closed, Spain was reeling from the loss of most of its colonies, 
bar the two remaining sugar islands and the Philippines. The king had managed to 
suppress another liberal uprising on the peninsula, but that and the battles against 
republicans in the Americas had left Spain broke and exhausted. The financial 
responsibility was beginning to shift to Cuba and Puerto Rico, both still enjoying the 
benefits of sugar and coffee, while ignoring British pressure to stop buying slaves. 
The US, its power now firmly established, took a very close interest in Cuba, and it 
became a pawn in larger nineteenth-century power struggles between the old and new 
worlds. On the islands, the decades of political uncertainty and years of rumoured 
invasions and annexations had left planters and colonial officials wary and vigilant. In 
addition to this was the growing problem of republican conspiracies in Cuba. The 
image of Haiti had not faded either, with rumours arriving with regularity that the 
freed slaves were going to liberate the islands, as was Simón Bolívar, whose threat 
came with more credibility. In the new republics, Haiti raised its head as the 
frightening face of racial equality – a question that many former Spanish territories 
had yet to resolve. Fear of Haiti by the 1820s became in many ways an emotional 
canvas upon which anxieties about the racial and colonial order in the Spanish 
Caribbean were drawn. The combination of these economic and geopolitical factors 
gave rise to a more entrenched anxiety. Colonial officials now would not only 
suppress rebel slaves, but rebel criollos, and at this point they were far more well-
practiced at it. This chapter, then, aims to show how the events of the previous twenty 
years came to certain endpoints in this decade, and how this laid the foundation for 
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the finalisation of the colonial deal between Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Spain which was 
to last until the end of the century.
‘That most valuable of all of the West India islands’
The remainder of the 1820s were crucial years in the formation not only of the new 
Latin American republics, but in also further cementing the relationship of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico with Spain, a process that was being observed with solemn interest by 
other nations, especially the island’s northern neighbour, the United States. At the 
same time, it was watching as the former Spanish colonies fought for their 
independence, knowing that Cuba and Puerto Rico were less likely to follow the same 
course. In 1822, the US Congress recommended that Spain recognise independence of 
South American republics, something the Cuban captain-general only found out 
about, much to his alarm, when he read it in a copy of the Federal Gazette and 
Baltimore Daily Advertiser.1 The following year, in December 1823, the US threw 
down a geopolitical gauntlet to Europe in a speech that outlined what became known 
as the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that any efforts of European nations to colonise 
territories in the Americas would been seen as an act of aggression by the US. 
President James Monroe told Congress that,
... the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which 
 the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American 
 continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed 
 and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
 colonisation by any European powers...2
This dislike of European encroachment, however, did not stop the US from becoming 
further intertwined with the fortunes of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Cuba especially was of 
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interest of a variety of reasons. First of all, it was now the nearest Spanish colony – 
Spain no longer controlled Florida or Louisiana, and Mexico was independent. And of 
course, the US, like other rival powers, was well aware of Spain’s fall from power. 
The second factor was the value of trade. Cuba and the US had long been trading 
partners – in legal and contraband goods sailing throughout the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean worth millions a year, and the US had become Cuba’s main partner in trade 
during this decade. Vying with this interest was that of Cuba’s own ‘peculiar 
institution’ – like the southern states, it too was now a large slave society, though 
unlike the US it was actively engaged in the slave trade, despite the British attempt to 
abolish it. 
 Cuba had a high turnover of Africans, losing many to death through overwork 
and disease, whereas losses were smaller in the US, as southern planters attempted to 
impose a system of social control over their slaves that included encouraging births 
and, to a degree, family life on plantations, the result of which was a slave population 
that was able to reproduce itself, limiting the need for more importations.3 From 1807, 
when the US abolished the slave trade, until 1865 at the end of the US civil war the 
number of slaves that disembarked in the South was around 43,423 – mostly from the 
time around the ending of the trade – while in Cuba and Puerto Rico for the same 
period it was a staggering 777,941. However, the opposite had held true for the period 
up to 1807. For instance, 1750-1807 saw some 270,322 slaves imported to the US, 
while Cuba and Puerto Rico only had about half as many at 138,612.4 With so few 
imported slaves after 1807, the US was forced to rely on self-reproducing slave 
populations. Despite efforts of Arango and others to increase the number of female 
slaves and encourage reproduction, life was often short and brutal on an ingenio, and 
Cubans were dependent on the continued importation of slaves. The boom of ingenios 
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across the island, responding to higher demand for sugar, also meant that there was an 
ever-growing need for more labour. From 1820 to 1824, the amount of sugar exported 
rose from 215,593 boxes, as measured by the German naturalist and observer of 
Cuba, Alexander von Humboldt, to 245,324. A decade previously, in 1810, output was 
186,672 boxes.5 In addition there was coffee production and smallholders who were 
growing tobacco. There was also a growing need for labour in the cities and ports of 
the island. This demand for more workers meant that the black African population 
quickly increased throughout the decade, and the racial balance of Cuba underwent 
changes that worried the white planters and the Spanish administration, augmenting 
those outlined in the previous chapter. Additionally, the right of coartación meant that 
the population of free people of colour grew steadily as well. The situation in Puerto 
Rico was similar but on a smaller scale, and with one crucial difference: that island 
had a large workforce of landless free peasants, jíbaros, who could undertake much of 
the agricultural work which meant the island did not employ the same volume of 
slaves as Cuba. 
 Humboldt’s observations about Cuba had finally been published in 1826 
despite his first journey to the island having taken place a quarter of a century earlier. 
He returned again in 1804, and after he went back to Europe, he stayed in contact 
with Cubans and kept up to date on the statistical information of the island. His work 
includes a thorough discussion of the island, its physical life and economic workings. 
But Humboldt had abolitionist leanings, and, like many Europeans, wanted to see the 
end of slavery, though of course his actual visit was well before the ending of the 
slave trade. He was far was more optimistic than many on the island about Cuba’s 
potential for prosperity without forced labour. He considered peaceful abolition was 
possible, or at the very least, thinkable, claiming that it was, 
not yet too late, for the horrible catastrophe of St. Domingo happened because 
of the inefficiency of the government. Such are the illusions which prevail 
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with the great mass of the colonists of the Antilles, and form an obstacle to 
improvement in the state of the negroes in Georgia and the Carolinas. The 
island of Cuba may free herself better than the other islands from the common 
shipwreck, for she has 455,000 freemen, while the slaves number only 
260,000; she may prepare gradually for the abolition of slavery, availing 
herself for this person, of humane and prudent measures. Do not let us forget 
that since Haiti became emancipated, there are already in the Antilles more 
free negroes and mulattoes than slaves. The whites, and more particularly the 
free blacks, who may easily make common cause with the slaves increase 
rapidly in Cuba.6
Of course, his friend Arango would have disagreed. But that did not stop Arango from 
taking a very detailed interest in the wider debates about the issue of slavery. Indeed 
when the book was translated into Spanish in 1827, Humboldt’s work was considered 
controversial in Cuba. Arango decided to write commentaries in the margins, mostly 
about his role in the development of the island’s economy. These comments were later 
be published in a different edition, after Arango’s death. In addition, a chapter about 
slavery on the island was not published, though it later surfaced in a 1856 edition in 
English.7 
 As Humboldt acknowledged, the threat of another Saint-Domingue was still 
present in the mind of the public. Yet by the 1820s, Haiti was falling further behind 
economically, shut out and ignored by trading partners, as well as suffering low 
production from both sides of the island. Boyer struggled to assert his authority over 
the Dominicans with respect to his land reforms, as well as other aspects of life in the 
united island. Compounding this problem was hostility from the new republics in 
South America. They were often confused and divided, as the struggle for Bolívar to 
establish his Gran Colombia attests. In addition, the question of abolition in the new 
republics was one that was not straightforward – despite various attempts, many 
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landowners persisted with slavery. At the same time free pardos – many of whom had 
helped in the fight for independence – struggled to find their place in their new, yet 
racially divided, nations. With all these new anxieties, different types of rumours 
circulated, and chief among these was that Haiti was to be a racial war agitator 
throughout the region. No longer a source of nightmares only for slave owners and 
colonial officials, the free republics feared race riots among their own people, agitated 
by Haitians, angry at the failure to enact true abolition in places like Gran Colombia. 
The United States leadership observed this with interest. 
 Around this time, new types of rumours began to emerge – that Colombia or 
Mexico were going to ‘liberate’ Cuba and Puerto Rico – and residents there too feared 
such an event would unleash a Haitian-style uprising. If there were unrest in places 
like Cartagena, which had few slaves left, the chaos and bloodshed that would be 
released in Cuba, where whites were a minority, would be unimaginable, or at least it 
would be on the same par as that of Saint-Domingue. Spain and Cuba had seemingly 
ignored the lessons of that former colony, and the growing racial imbalance now 
forced the colonial authorities into further perpetuating a regime of surveillance and 
oppression on people of colour, while at the same time being forced to watch for 
incursions from their neighbours, and dissent from within. The United States, too, 
joined the growing list of potential dangers.
 The US secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, was in no doubt about Cuba’s 
value, writing in 1823 that:
Such indeed are, between the interests of that island [Cuba] and of this 
country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed 
by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, 
that in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of 
half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the 
annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the 
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continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious however that for 
this event we are not yet prepared.8
As European nations, the US, and even Russia began to pile pressure on Spain into 
recognising the new Latin American republics, they were all well aware that the 
situation was very different in Cuba. And while they admired the island’s impressive 
wealth, none was so bold as the US to declare their desire to control it, as Adams had 
spelt out with his remarks about annexation – though there had been rumours that 
Britain too had its eye on Cuba. To Adams, the immediate threat in the minds of 
Cubans seemed not so much colonial rule, but that liberty in any form would spark a 
race war. He wrote that ‘were the population of the island of one blood and colour, 
there could be no doubt of hesitation with regard to the course which they would 
pursue’.9 By this he meant joining with the other new republics, yet he was aware, as 
were Cubans, that to be free might mean the end of not just their prosperity but also 
their livelihood and social order. Although Haiti had now existed for 16 years, the 
story of its birth continued stalking the planter imagination. The consolidation, or 
occupation, with Santo Domingo in 1822 was a reminder that no matter how much 
other islands or the US tried to prohibit the entry of Haitians, avoid trade with the 
island, or refuse diplomatic relations, Haitians would neither go away, nor be re-
colonised.
 By the mid-1820s, Haiti’s population was pushing towards 800,000, the 
majority of whom were Haitians, as the population of the former Spanish side was so 
low – somewhere around 65,000 – that their inclusion did not have a significant 
impact on the island’s numbers.10 This combined anxiety about the repercussions of 
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independence and emancipation was not limited to planters alone. Spanish officials, 
who already felt their burden increased by agitation for independence, had the island 
within the colonial orbit of enemies. Indeed, archival documents from this time still 
refer to Haitians as ‘franceses’, implying that in the official mind the free blacks and 
mulattos of Haiti were still in some way ‘French’. But with the inclusion of Santo 
Domingo and criollos like themselves in 1822, Haiti took on an even darker 
dimension in their imaginations.11 
 For Cuba, population boom was little comfort, as it was mostly black people, 
although like in Puerto Rico, there had been an official push for more white 
immigration. But the shifting racial demographic, and its significance, was obvious to 
all on both islands. In Puerto Rico, according to 1820 figures (see fig 1) there were 
102,432 whites, 86,269 free mulattoes, 20,191 free blacks, and 21,730 slaves, for a 
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total of 128,190 people of colour out of a total population of 230,622, so whites 
comprised just under half of the population.12 
Later in the decade, the Cuban census of 1827 (see fig 2) showed a white population 
consisting of 311,051 people, with 106,494 free people of colour, and 286,942 slaves, 
making whites, as in Puerto Rico, slightly less than half (44.2%) of the population.13 
What US secretary of state Adams was referring to in his letter was clear: a Haitian-
style uprising was a real possibility, and if it occurred, Cuba – much less Spain – 
would be able to do much about it. This went directly against the earlier claims by 
Arango – that the balance of slaves to free people made such an uprising impossible – 
and public anxiety drowned out his views. As Humboldt observed, quoting at length a 
passage of the Representación del ayuntamiento, consulado y sociedad patriótica of 
Havana on 20 July 1820 to illustrate attitudes among the elite: ‘In all matters 
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concerning changes in the situation of the servant class, the important issue is not so 
much our fear of a decrease in agricultural prosperity as it is the safety of white 
people, who could so easily be harmed by an incautious measure.’14 What really was 
at risk was not only the safety of white people, but also the prosperity of the island.
 By the end of the decade, there was a significant alteration in the Spanish 
economic landscape. Not only did the metropole lose the wealth of its colonies, the 
onus was on Cuba and Puerto Rico to adjust to covering their own costs without the 
situado from Mexico, which by this point had stopped for more than a decade. In 
addition, Spain had even lost its status as the colonies’ main trading partner. In 1792 
the South American colonies accounted for 16.6% of Spain’s export market and it had 
provided some 20% of its imports. By 1827, however, the situation had changed 
dramatically and Cuba and Puerto Rico, which had absorbed some 4.3% of imports in 
1792, were now, along with the Philippines, taking 16.6%. Likewise, imports in Spain 
from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines rose from 6.8% to 20.3%, and from the 
former colonies fell to 0.1%. Throughout the 1820s Cuba became a valuable market 
for Spanish exported goods. In 1826 the value of imports from Spain was 2,858,792 
pesos and rose to 4,739,776 pesos by 1830. The real trading partner for Cuba, 
however, was the United States. US imports were worth nearly double the Spanish 
ones, averaging around six million pesos a year from 1826-1830.15 Additionally, the 
value of exports to Spain by 1827 were 2,284,249 pesos but to the US they were again 
nearly twice as much – 4,107,449 pesos.16 In the same year, the value of the island’s 
exported sugar was 5,878,924 pesos, with coffee following behind at 3,443,476 
pesos.17 Spain’s exports included products such as wine and wheat, worth some 
230
14 Von Humboldt, Cuba, p.263.
15 Pablo Tornero Tinajero,  Crecimiento económico y transformaciones sociales: esclavos, hacendados 
y comerciantes en la Cuba colonial (1760-1840), (Madrid, 1996) p.390.
16 Ibid, p.385.
17 Ibid, p.387.
2,541,322 pesos per annum though again the US well outstripped Spain, with exports 
to Cuba worth 7,162,695 pesos.18 So not only had there been a wider political shift in 
Spain’s colonial world, but an important economic one as well, which would go a 
long way to giving the crown a vested interest in keeping hold of its remaining 
colonies. By this point, Cuba’s value was clear.
 While Cuba’s wealth was growing with each passing year, Haiti fell further 
behind. Crippled by the debt owed to France – some payments were even in made in 
coffee rather than currency – Boyer attempted to make land more productive. He 
enacted the Rural Code in 1826, with the aim of stopping people from squatting on 
vacant land and instead attach workers to certain plantations, allowing for more 
productivity. Large landowners were eager to raise their output, but labour was hard 
to find. Despite the island being populous, there was much resistance to enforced 
labour. One fundamental problem was the previous awarding of land to loyal soldiers. 
This practice had created a situation in which the state was at odds for encouraging 
anyone to work land other than their own. Because so many smallholders were in the 
military, it was difficult for Boyer to chastise them.19 Boyer could not get output to 
reach the levels he and the handful of powerful mulatto landowners would have liked, 
and sugar production tailed off. Indeed at one point there was talk of bringing in 
indentured Chinese or Indian labourers, though these plans came to nothing.20 All the 
while, the Dominicans were attempting to keep alive the long-held practice of obezco 
pero no cumplo with regards to changes in land use, and they carried on with their 
wood and cattle trading. 
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 In Puerto Rico, George Flinter painted an exhaustive and dramatic picture of 
economic growth. He noted that in 1828 there were 85,076 acres of land under 
cultivation for a variety of crops, with the main ones being 11,103 acres for sugar, 
9,135 growing coffee, 11,855 for rice, and, largest of all, 21,761 acres for plantains.21 
These and other crops had over the past decade led to higher wealth levels, and 
subsequently higher export customs revenues. He said that in 1823 all the island’s 
produce was worth $6,883,371, with $3,411,845.50 going to the customs house.22 
While this was not on the scale of Cuba, it was useful to the crown. The sugar 
industry, like that in Cuba, had been transformed, and by the end of the 1820s there 
were more than 200 large sugar plantations and numerous smaller enterprises, with 
exports rising from 37,969 quintales in 1810 to 277,154 quintales in 1829.23 Many 
planters who had started out with very little had prospered. Flinter cited the case of  
‘A French gentleman from St. Domingo, who had only 3000 dollars capital, 
established himself on the very inferior land on the north side of the island, near the 
capital, and commenced planting cane. In less than eight years he had thirty slaves, 
and his property was valued, in 1832, at 40,000 dollars’.24
 Indeed, as much as Cuba and Puerto Rico’s prosperity was obvious, so much 
more so was Spain’s weakness. Monroe remarked to Congress in the same December 
1823 speech: ‘If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those 
new governments [in Latin America], and their distance from each other, it must be 
obvious that she [Spain] can never subdue them.’25 It was clear that Spain’s imperial 
might had come to a close. This loss was compounded by further unrest on the 
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peninsula, as Spanish liberals fought to keep their constitution alive. Monroe, making 
his remarks in December, had seen how unkind the year had been to Spain. Tensions 
in the peninsula by 1823 had become exacerbated as military campaigns in the 
colonies failed, there was violence as well in the metropole, and the Treasury was 
running low and beginning to rely on money from Cuba.26 Adding to this was the 
spectre of the return of the French, which had been discussed among other European 
powers at the Congress of Verona in 1822, led this time in the form of restored 
Bourbon monarch Louis XVIII, and with the aim of returning complete power to 
Fernando VII. Some 60,000 troops marched into Spain in April 1823. Despite the 
aims of the invasion, old prejudices were resurrected, and their aggression was met 
with disapproval, and concern. 
 In echos of 1808, the captain-general of Cuba, Francisco Dionisio Vives, 
issued an order in 1823 warning the public to look out for anyone suspicious, but in a 
change from the previous period, he spoke of his general trust for the French on the 
island, saying ‘[T]he French established here or who come to establish themselves 
here, [are] for the most part pacifist proprietors and farmers, but I know also, that 
everywhere on the side of good there are always [some] disobedient men’.27 France’s 
troops proved the deciding factor. From Napoleon providing the trigger for the onset 
of liberalism, once again France’s army shaped the contours of Spanish political life. 
This time rather than allowing for the birth of liberalism, it presided over the burial of 
the constitutional trienio, though this would not be the last of the Spanish liberals. 
 The combination of Spain’s weakness and the growing confidence of the Latin 
American republics, however, became a cause of concern for the United States. It, 
like the islands themselves, had heard rumours around this time that they were to be 
‘liberated’ by Colombia or Mexico, a matter that for a few years became of great 
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importance for all the nations who had an interest in Cuba. On one side there were the 
trading partners, the US, Britain, and France, all of whom were eager to see the 
current situation continue. On the other were the new nations, who wanted to drive 
the final nail in the coffin of Spanish rule. Spain, of course, had every interest in 
retaining its most valuable colony. And there was the island itself, with its growing 
racial imbalance, independence agitators, and powerful planters. The situation was 
very delicate, and was not aided by the constant swirl of rumours about a European or 
Colombian or Mexican takeover. US ministers shared this anxiety as it was keen to 
maintain the status quo on the islands for the moment. President Adams gave 
instructions to the US special agent to Cuba and told him to keep an eye on the British 
and French on the island, the size of their fleets in the region, and to ‘be mindful of 
any apparent popular agitation; particularly of such as may have reference either to a 
transfer of the Island from Spain to any other Power; or the assumption by the 
Inhabitants of a Independent Government’.28 Yet the previous year Bolívar, who was 
contemplating Cuba and Puerto Rico’s independence and finding it impossible, wrote 
that in the panorama of the free Latin America ‘we have in front of us the rich and 
beautiful Spanish islands which will never be more than enemies’.29 As the decade 
wore on, his opinion about the fate of those islands would change. 
Conspiracy and masonic connections
 Fernando VII once again set about re-establishing his absolute power and sent 
to death many of the liberals who had brought about the return to the constitution, he 
also stamped out their reforms, such as freedom of the press. This had ramifications in 
the Caribbean as well for those who sought to use the diputaciones provinciales to 
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push a more liberal agenda on the islands. However, like Fernando VII’s killing of his 
enemies in Spain, officials in Cuba and Puerto Rico were given permission to do what 
they needed to consolidate their hold on public order. They had more than the 
disruption in Spain to concern them, however. There was the example, and threat, of 
the new American republics and the possibility of agitators from within leading the 
way towards republicanism, if not abolition. Haiti represented both – its involvement 
with Bolívar and other revolutionaries in the previous decade had shown that it 
wanted to go beyond abolition, and in the minds of Cubans encourage republicanism 
as well. 
 Yet Haiti was not embraced by the new American republics, and instead was 
treated as the possible agitator of racial warfare. This was especially the case on the 
Caribbean coast of South America, as it had more slaves than Andean regions. The 
abolition of slavery was under way, but it was less rapid and dynamic than Petión 
would have hoped when first extracting his promise from Bolívar a decade earlier. 
Changes in the law allowed for a graduated emancipation, slowly giving rise to more 
free people of colour. Laws enacted in 1821 had banned the importation of slaves and 
decreed that children would be born free, though they would have to work for their 
mothers’ masters until they were 18 – without pay. While technically emancipation, it 
was hardly an unlimited freedom. However, the number of slaves along the Caribbean 
coast had dropped from around 14,000 in 1770 to 6,827 by 1835.30 Throughout this 
period, many had bought their freedom, and Caribbean port cities such as Cartagena 
had large numbers of free people of colour who, like their counterparts elsewhere on 
the islands, took up employment in a variety of important trades. After the wars of 
independence, this group, labelled generally as pardos, began to claim a stake in the 
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societies that were taking shape.31 But there was much resistance from whites, and 
this spilled over into the political arena. While this resistance took myriad forms, the 
ones of greatest interest are those that invoked Haiti. For instance, in the town of 
Mompox, near Cartagena, anonymous threats emerged in 1823, amid much political 
uncertainty, that whites would be chopped up with machetes, as had happened in 
Saint-Domingue. Other rumours emerged around the same time that Haitian agents 
were sent to Venezuela to destablise the regime, and two plots to murder whites were 
uncovered. On one hand these could be the racialised fears of a white class struggling 
to establish its authority in territories where were they often outnumbered by free 
people of colour and there were also indigenous populations to contend with; on the 
other, Haiti was used as a potent symbol of not only a bloody path to racial equality, 
but also of perhaps a more true meaning of the word equality itself. For some 
historians of Colombia, the emergence and use of Saint-Domingue in these contexts is 
arguably not about race so much as a way for people to articulate anxieties about 
social structure and the quest for equality in the burgeoning republics. Marixa Lasso 
has argued that in many ways what happened in Colombia was a class struggle, and 
by invoking Haiti, people of colour were imagining a political possibility that did not 
see the lower classes, who were usually not white, being oppressed.32  
 So it would seem that Cuba and Puerto Rico were surrounded – to the North, a 
US that was not ruling out a forced annexation; to the South and West, new republics 
which supposedly wanted to ‘free’ the islanders from the last vestiges of Spanish rule; 
and to the East, Haiti. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, other islands were experiencing 
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similar turbulence. For instance, 12,000 slaves staged a large rebellion in Demerara – 
today’s Guyana – which managed to spread until it was stopped.33 A report had 
arrived in Cuba a month earlier of Jamaican authorities offering a £100 reward for a 
‘negro man named Baptiste, a native of St. Domingo ... and well known in this city 
[Kingston] for drumming and singing [who] stands charged with being concerned in a 
rebellious conspiracy’.34 The Lieutenant Governor of Holguín, in the South-East of 
Cuba, circulated an order to not allow the entry of illicit slaves, such as the ones that 
had supposedly been involved in a conspiracy in Jamaica.35 The fear that both Cubans 
and Puerto Ricans would be ‘contaminated’ by these external forces was ever-present, 
and the liberalism that had marked much of the last two decades was replaced with 
the return of a Floridablanca-style censorship. Cuban ports were not supposed to 
accept any commerce or communication from ships that had come from Haiti.36 
Perhaps not without reason, as this period was marked by suppressed rebellions and 
uncovered plots, and attention still turned to Haiti when tensions were high. The 
military garrison had also been built up in Cuba, to some 15,000-20,000 troops, in 
anticipation of these many threats, both internal and external.37 
 Despite the many outside factors, Cuba was arguably most shaken in 1823 by 
an internal conspiracy, organised by freemasons. Freemasonry, like sociedades 
económicas and other organisations which had started in the peninsula, crossed the 
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Atlantic and was established by Spanish immigrants in Cuba and other territories.38 
Lodges spread throughout the island, and were generally occupied during this period 
with plans for independence and burgeoning liberalism. Masonic lodges provided the 
perfect cover for organising an independence movement, as they were secret societies. 
They had names such as ‘Soles de Bolívar’, invoking the image of independence. In 
this particular case, known as the conspiracy of the Soles y rayos de Bolívar, the main 
organisers were a Colombian, José Fernández Madrid; a Cuban who was in the 
service of the Colombian army, José Francisco Lemus; and a Haitian, Servre Courtois, 
who had previously ended up an officer in the Colombian navy.39 But it was Lemus 
who would call himself the general of the ‘Republic of Cubanacan’.40
 Colombian connections convinced Lemus that the time was right to return to 
Cuba and try to stir up an independence movement.41 He established himself in these 
masonic circles and began organising his allies, which also included people of colour. 
For instance, one testimony mentions conspirator José Nicomedes Valmaseda, ‘Who 
in addition to Spanish possesses French, and understands some of the English 
language, [and who] has a brother named José Nicomedes Valmaseda ... officially an 
indigo farmer, currently absent in the island of Santo Domingo ... That said brother is 
in the French Port-au-Prince, which has become dominated by pardos and blacks with 
their republican government ...’42 The plan also included the support of liberal elites, 
238
38 For more on freemasonry in the context of liberalism and revolution, see Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, 
Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, 2009); and on its history in Cuba, see Eduardo Torres-
Cuevas,  Historia de la masonería cubana: seis ensayos, (Havana 2004).
39 Eleazar Córdova-Bello, La independencia de Haití y su influencia en hispanoamérica, (Caracas, 
1967), p.151.
40 Francisco Morales Padrón, ‘Conspiraciones y masonería en Cuba (1810-1826)’, Anuario de Estudios 
Americanos XXIX (1972), p.368.
41 Roque E. Garrigó, Historia documentada de la conspiración de los Soles y rayos de Bolívar, 
(Havana, 1927), p.153.
42 ANC, Primera pieza de la causa por la Conspiración de los Soles de Bolívar, quoted in Garrigó, 
Historia documentada, pp.156-7.
such as judges, mayors, and militia captains fed up with Spanish rule.43 And women 
were also involved. Despite not being eligible for masonic membership, many knew 
what was going on in these circles. Another testimony, given by a Doña Socorro 
Mancebo, spoke of a woman from Costa Firme, who ‘from the times she had come in 
contact with her, she [Mancebo] knew to be a bad woman, hearing also that Bolívar, 
with whom she [the woman] corresponded by letter, professed fondness and affection 
for her’.44 Mancebo also had news that a ‘a significant sum of promissory notes by 
Bolívar’ were to be used to ‘rouse this island to revolt, and establish in it a 
Republic’.45
 The plan spread through lodges up and down the island, east into Matanzas, 
Camagüey, Villaclara, and west into Pinar del Rio. Lemus heightened the tension by 
starting a rumour that Spain had sold the island to the British.46 Thus when Dionisio 
Vives arrived to take his post as captain-general in April 1823 the island was in a state 
of agitation, further disturbed by the publication and spread of propaganda calling for 
the establishment of Cubanacan. In addition to this, Vives had found out that they 
were offering liberty to slaves in order to gain their support.47 A report to Havana 
from the governor of Puerto Príncipe, Francisco Sedano, noted that ‘the conspirators 
with false promises had managed to seduce many blacks and mulattos, who forced on 
them not only an oath of secrecy, but at the same time for the most bloody 
cooperation’.48 
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 But the conspiracy began to unravel, and Lemus and others were betrayed. 
The authorities across the island were on alert, even calling for martial law ‘in order 
to contain the horrors with which this rebellion threatens’.49 Lemus was arrested in 
August 1823, apprehended near Guanabacoa, and provincial officials throughout the 
island searched for any conspiracy in their region. Vives mounted an investigation 
into the causes. In a report to Spain from the captain-general, he noted that ‘the entire 
island would have been a theatre of arson ... in any other country the dangers are 
smaller and do not compare to the dangers that the conspiracy brings with it, because 
there are no slaves, but in Havana where the number of blacks is equal to that of 
whites there would be no end ... ’50 Sedano, like other provincial officials, felt the 
conspirators ‘ought be punished with all the severity that the laws mandate, and 
require a public punishment ...’51 In the end, they jailed more than 600 people.52 After 
the incident Vives went on to form a military commission with the aim of suppressing 
any possible future conspiracy.53 This would not be the end to the dream of 
independence, however, though it would be long-deferred. Later that year, the 
governor of Holguín noted the discovery of Colombian propaganda that had been 
distributed which said: 
Habaneros, Brothers of the island of Cuba. Colombia has known your glorious 
efforts, she soon will help with all her power: the reign of tyrants has ended in 
America, she is called to the independent rank that it must to occupy among 
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the nations of the universe. The Liberator of Colombia, and her soldiers give 
you a friendly and fraternal salute.54
 This island-wide plot was the convergence of not only republicanism, but a 
multi-racial alliance. However, the involvement of people of colour in the plot was 
not the only internal concern – that summer saw slave unrest and small-scale 
rebellions, such as the one in Guanabacoa, in the plantation-heavy region around 
Havana.55 There were also outbreaks in the East on both sugar and coffee plantations, 
in Tiguabos and Yagua, where properties were set on fire.56 And the continued 
survival of palenques continued to irk the authorities. In Santiago, another slave-
hunting militia was formed to track down runaways and ‘evildoers’.57 At the same 
time, Cuban authorities had to contend with rising numbers of free people of colour, 
whose involvement with the Soles conspiracy, among other unrest, had shown some  
were ready to fight alongside white criollos against the Spanish. 
 Cuba faced another rebellion in June 1825, as some 200 slaves rose up in 
Matanzas, near Havana. What marked this disturbance out was that it was apparently 
organised only by African-born slaves.58 It spread to 24 estates, and some 15 whites 
and 43 blacks were killed, and 170 slaves injured.59 Normally, such conspiracies 
involved a range of people, for instance not only black slaves but also free mulattos, 
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as previous examples have shown. Yet what happened in Matanzas shows that bozales 
were willing to take action as well. Such unrest was not limited to sugar plantations 
either. Earlier that year, in the East of the island, there had been a rebellion organised 
by a zambo named Félix de Rosario, in which the French proprietors of a coffee 
plantation were whipped, and the property destroyed and set ablaze, before the 
plotters moved on to destroying another cafetal.60 There was also the case of a 1827 
rebellion on a coffee estate on the island, which saw 57 mostly African-born slaves 
run away and kill some of their overseers, and go on to commit collective suicide 
rather than return to slavery.61 In addition to this, the British had taken seriously their 
role as abolitionists, and were still patrolling the waters around Cuba. When a slave 
ship was seized, its captives were given certificates of emancipation and set free on 
the island. The question of what to do with the growing number of emancipados was 
also the subject of public concern and debate.62 
 So throughout these years economic capacity rose, along with governmental 
power, especially after 1823. Yet despite this, there was nothing slave owners or 
colonial officials could do to stifle slave rebellions, unrest among free people of 
colour, and criollo conspiracies. Throughout the 1820s, militias and bands of slave-
hunters crawled the island, assisting planters to catch runaways and officials to punish 
ringleaders. Likewise in Puerto Rico, similar practices persisted in the treatment of 
rebels and runaways. One report noted the capture of eight slaves who had fled in a 
canoe, but the currents had delivered them back into the hands of their masters.63 The 
governor of Puerto Rico, Miguel de la Torre, who had fought for Spain in Venezuela 
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and Colombia, was very concerned with re-establishing ‘order’ on the island. Initially 
appointed as captain-general in 1822 he was given the role of governor in 1823. As in 
1810-14, power had been given to local constitutionally approved committees, while 
the posts of governor and captain-general continued. And like the captain-general of 
Cuba, with the return of absolute monarchy, Torre had been given full powers to 
restore order on the island, and to suppress not only slave unrest, but liberal or other 
any sort of reformist agitation. 
 Flinter, an Irish-born British soldier who worked as an interpreter in Caracas 
between the British and Spanish Americans in 1816, spent years traveling around the 
West Indies. In his observations on Puerto Rico, An account of the present state of the 
island of Puerto Rico, he gave Torre’s reforms glowing praise. He said the island from 
1820-23 was on the course for ‘inevitable shipwreck’, citing the ‘confused state of the 
public accounts; the unbridled licence of the press; the anarchy inseparable from 
popular tumults; the want of capital and of confidence; the depressed state of 
agriculture; and, finally, the impotency of a government divided in power and 
opinion’.64 Flinter praised Torre, who took up the post in 1822, because he ‘executed 
[reforms] with ... the comprehensive foresight of a political economist’.65 Torre’s first 
priorities were to untangle the financial mess the island had got itself into, and to 
quickly find a way to cover the island’s costs, while simultaneously reasserting royal 
authority on the island. 
 However such reforms did not stifle the will to conspire. A rebellion broke out 
in Ponce, in the South of the island, and in a place of rapid sugar growth, in July 
1825. This attack was supposed to take place during a dance (bailar una bomba), but 
it was discovered before then. The organisers were accused of wanting  to take arms, 
claim property, and assassinate the whites. Not surprisingly, officials thought the 
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conspiracy had been planned by Haitian agents.66 And the threat of intellectual 
subordination had not quite gone away either. In Puerto Rico the threat of ‘contagion’ 
also lingered, and part of Torres’s suppression included texts. There had been a ship 
from Nantes, France, the Carlos, which had been found carrying works by Bentham, 
Voltaire, and Rousseau. Some 90 volumes were confiscated  on the grounds that they 
‘promoted revolution, corrupted customs, ridiculed our laws and sowed 
demoralisation, seeking to spread the ideas that tend towards disorder and 
anarchy ...’67
 Torre, like other captains-general before him, was uneasy with Haiti, and 
correspondingly suspicious of the relationships between whites and people of colour 
on the island, as well as between free people of colour and slaves. A bando de policía 
y buen gobierno in 1824 outlawed the hiding of runaway or ‘delinquent’ slaves.68 
Around this time, Puerto Rico was struck with another conspiracy, this time 
emanating from Bayamón, and Torre took further action, enacting his Reglamento de 
esclavos in 1826. This ordinance called for slave owners to make sure that their slaves 
celebrated feast days in their own plantations and within open view of their owners 
and overseers.69 His aim was to stifle the potential for further conspiracies, as well as 
to limit the overall movement of slaves and ensure their close supervision.70
 A classified report from the diputación provincial in 1823, which would 
become defunct by the end of the year due to termination of the trienio, presented a 
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complicated picture of the islands during the first years of the decade. The report 
focused on keeping stability on the island. One of the authors wrote:
I have said and [I] repeat, that unfortunately the enemies that threaten us are 
 many, they are of different qualities, and those are their aims and purpose, and 
 varied [are] the means of which they serve themselves to disturb our peace. 
 The first and most terrible is the mulatto Boyer, president of the republic 
 established in Santo Domingo. His ambition, his actions, his interest, his aims, 
 which are glimpsed in his latest decrees relating to the Antilles, his close 
 proximity, and the support of the people of colour of this island, are terrible 
 elements for an invasion.71
Yet later in the report, the writer implies that Boyer, while being a threat, might lack 
the means to take action, and perhaps such rumours were stronger than realities, 
saying,
Where many are lacking, he [Boyer] proceeds intently; how is it possible to 
undertake expenses that although necessary, cannot be in any way preferable 
to those sad [people], and it is unpleasant for the government to [be aware of] 
the probability that there is a conspiracy against the status quo, and be unable, 
for lack of means, to acquire the …  securities and information necessary to 
give vigour and action to their providences. Such, however, is our situation.72  
 
But for Torre, such intimations were largely ignored. Only a few days later he wrote 
to the outgoing governor, Francisco González de Linares, of his worry over the threats 
of Haiti, free people of colour, and republicanism, saying: ‘There is much vagrancy, 
many demoralised youths, too many will turn among the people of colour, and in 
excess speak publicly of independence’. Yet later in the letter he expressed his 
concern about the influence of events in South America, with news of recent events 
and rumoured rebellions making their way to the island. However, in his mind, the 
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enemy was clear, as he wrote, ‘There is no doubt that we are under threat by the 
negroes of Santo Domingo.’73 
 Linares had previously received a copy of a memoria from a member of the 
dipuatación provincial, Juan Francisco Brenes, who had visited Haiti in August 1822, 
only a few months after the Spanish side fell under Boyer’s control. In the report he 
criticised Núñez de Cáceres’s political failures which left the colony at the mercy of 
Haiti. He outlined the island’s problems, saying: 
Having described in this way the character of the Dominicans, I believe that I 
 should also speak to Your Excellency about the Haitians: they well know that 
 in their own territory they cannot support themselves with just the 20 reales of 
 salary that soldiers receive, 50 for colonels, and the respective proportion of 
 this for the intermediary ranks, and it is for this reason that their government, 
 through a particular ordinance, grants them all a property to cultivate and a 
 house. In the Spanish part they lack this second contribution: they [Haitians] 
 earn double the salary, and so they [Dominicans] see themselves as little more 
 than troops of bandits, or stealing bread, or begging for alms, and so they 
 become discontented and disgraced, and desertion and abandonment is seen 
 daily, of entire guards [companies]…74 
Indeed, the payment of land to soldiers was an important part in maintaining the 
heavy militarisation of Haiti, something that was felt to be necessary for defence. By 
the 1820s, Haiti had some 32,000 regular troops.75 Brenes noted that Haiti also had 
the potential to draw from the Spanish territory 6,000 to 8,000 armed men, with the 
possibility of getting more ‘black Spaniards’ from parts of the north. 76
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 However, the republic only saw further isolation. Although initially there were 
some slaves and free blacks in Santo Domingo who had welcomed Haitian rule, the 
land reforms which saw crown, church, and private lands taken over by the state was 
the source of a great deal of friction. Small and large land owners alike were proving 
resistant to orders for increased quantities of sugar cane, cotton, and cacao, and 
wanted to continue their cattle ranching and tobacco-growing.77 Pleas filtered to 
Madrid via Puerto Rico of Dominicans who wanted Spain to bring it back in its 
somewhat diminished imperial fold.78 It was a fight it could not afford. Some people 
in Gran Colombia were also uneasy, remembering the alliance between Pétion and 
Bolívar, and the unkept promise of total emancipation. There was concern that Haiti, 
with its heavy militarisation, had the troops to attempt to retaliate this unfulfilled 
pledge in some way.79 With the power of Boyer and the unified island, rumours also 
circulated combining the many fears of authorities and slave owners in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico – that Boyer was going to invade Cuba, a plan which had the support of 
Colombia and Mexico, and Bolívar.
Recognition and refusal at the Congress of Panama
After the defeat of the Spaniards at Ayacucho at the end of 1824, more or less 
marking the end of the battles for independence, the new and finally recognised 
republics were looking for a means of expressing their political identities. At the same 
time, the US was watching events with caution, while continuing its overtures of 
goodwill to the new republics, though this would eventually cause a complicated 
domestic political row. In late November 1825, Adams, who at this point was US 
president, received three invitations to a congress of plenipotentiaries from Latin 
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America, which would convene in Panama, organised by Bolívar. Mexico, Colombia, 
and the United Provinces of Central America requested the presence of their powerful 
neighbour.80 Their plan was to discuss numerous political and diplomatic matters to 
do with regional cooperation. The secretary of state, Henry Clay, replied to the 
invitations later that month, with the intention of sending a representatives, though 
they would be little more than observers so as to allow the US to continue in its 
neutral stance. A few days later, Adams made a speech to Congress in which he told 
legislators about the forthcoming event in Panama.81 What Adams perhaps did not 
realise is the great debate this move would generate in the House of Representatives, 
lasting throughout the first few months of 1826. The Senate was even moved to meet 
in secret sessions to discuss the matter.82 
 Around the same time, in early 1826, two Cuban conspirators, Francisco 
Agüero and Manuel Andrés Sánchez, who had been in exile in Mexico, returned to 
Cuba to ignite another bid at independence. They thought the timing was opportune, 
with the Congress meeting later that year, as well as the rumours circulating that 
Bolívar was going to liberate the island. They were unsuccessful, and imprisoned for 
their efforts. The authorities claimed to find papers that implicated them, as well as 
revealing them to be freemasons.83 Such events only added to the anxiety on the 
island, and abroad. Indeed, there were still international concerns about a European 
invasion of the island. And then there was the question of Cuba’s French-speaking 
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neighbour. In relating the Congress’s agenda to Clay, a Colombian minister, José 
María Salazar wrote:
The descendants of this portion of the globe [Africa], have succeeded in 
founding an independent Republic, whose government is now recognised by 
its ancient Metropolis. On what basis the relations of Hayti, and of other parts 
of our Hemisphere that shall hereafter be in like circumstances, are to be 
placed, is a question simple at first view, but attended with serious difficulties 
when closely examined.84
 
Elsewhere in the letter, Salazar had brought up the issue of slavery, with the delegates 
to consider means of ending the slave trade.85 A sensitive issue to southern politicians, 
political ears pricked up at its mention. And while there were many questions that 
concerned the congressmen and senators – that this meeting was a guise for war, 
among others – the slave issue was lurking in the background.86 But concern about 
Cuba and Puerto Rico were well in the forefront of minds, over both commerce and 
slavery. To defenders of slavery, the issue was clear. Haiti must not be recognised, and 
there was also the uncomfortable fact that most of the republics had begun the process 
of manumission, which should not be encouraged in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The issue 
of the Congress resulted in months of political fighting. The Senate’s foreign relations 
committee was against the mission to send representatives to the Congress of Panama, 
though in the final vote on 15 March it won the vote 24 to 19, and the following 
month the House agreed to give the necessary appropriation with a vote of 134 to 
60.87  
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 The Congress convened on 22 June and met until 15 July, with delegates from 
Gran Colombia, Mexico, and the United Provinces, which are now Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Representatives from Peru also 
attended, while Chile, and Argentina did not. The US delegates, in the end, did not 
attend; one of the two representatives, Richard Anderson, had died on his way there, 
and the other, John Sergeant, finally arrived on 24 July, well after it had finished.88 
Haiti – desperate to receive more external recognition of its statehood – never 
received an invitation. Despite agreeing to pay reparations of 150 million francs in 
1825 in order to secure its France’s official recognition of independence, it became 
clear that Haiti’s immediate neighbours had no intention of acknowledging this 
gesture. Indeed, the instructions that Henry Clay had sent Anderson and Sergeant 
warned that,
It will probably be proposed, as a fit subject of consideration for the powers 
represented at Panama, whether Hayti ought to be recognised by them as an 
independent State ... The President is not prepared now to say that Hayti ought 
to be recognised as an independent sovereign power. Considering the nature 
and the manner of the establishment of the governing power in that island, and 
the little respect which is there shown to other races, than the African, the 
question of acknowledging its independence was far from being unattended 
with difficulty, prior to the late arrangement, which, it is understood has been 
made between France and Hayti. According to that arrangement, if we possess 
correct information of its terms, the parent country acknowledges a nominal 
independence in the colony, and, as part of the price of this acknowledgement, 
Hayti agrees to receive for ever the produce of France at a rate of duty one 
half below that which is exacted, in the ports of Hayti, from all other nations. 
This is a restriction upon the freedom of its action, to which no sovereign 
power, really independent, would ever susbscribe.89
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Meanwhile, the issue of an invasion into Cuba still had not been resolved. The British 
foreign minister, George Canning, had proposed the signing of ministerial notes 
between the US, France, and Britain that none of them would invade the island.90 The 
Spanish ambassador to Paris, the Duque de Villahermosa, wrote to the crown in 1825 
warning that its ‘most precious jewel’ was under threat.91 Villahermosa reported 
rumours he had heard via New York, that Bolívar was planning to arm the blacks and 
start an uprising. To the ambassador, the elites stood firm on the side of Spain, and he 
reported that ‘In this city [Paris] there are some landowners and natives of the island 
[Cuba] whose fortunes and political existence are identified with the interests of Spain 
and would be ruined by emancipation’.92 Though where Bolívar stood amid the 
rumours was unclear. Juan Diego Jaramillo has argued that Bolívar was using the 
concern of Britain, France, Russia, and the US about the balance of power in the 
Caribbean as a bargaining chip, and with the threat of ‘liberating’ Cuba as ante, he 
was playing diplomatic poker in order to secure his own interests with regard to Latin 
America.93 Indeed, Bolívar wrote to Francisco Santander saying: 
Never forget the three political warnings that I have dared to give you: first, 
that it is not in our interest to admit in the league the Rio de la Plata; second, 
the United States of America; and third, not liberating Havana. These three 
points seem to me to be of the greatest importance, because I believe that our 
league can be maintained perfectly without touching the extremes of South 
and North; and without the establishment of a new Republic of Haiti... With 
regard to Havana, we should say to Spain, if you do not make peace, you will 
soon deprived of your two great islands.94
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 In addition to all the outsiders who were interested in the fate of Cuba, Cubans 
themselves who lived away from the island also were a source of concern. The one-
time representative to the Cortes, Father Varela, had exiled himself in New York, 
where he wrote articles in a periodical called El Habanero that asked ‘is it necessary, 
for a political change in the island of Cuba, to wait for the troops of Colombia or 
Mexico?’, answering ‘in my opinion, in that of many, yes’.95 In 1827, Cuban officials 
had heard yet again that Bolívar would be arriving from Venezuela to liberate Cuba or 
Puerto Rico.96 But the instability that was plaguing South America during this time 
would have attracted all his attention. Not only were there regional divisions in Gran 
Colombia, but increasingly racial divides as well. For instance in 1828, in the 
Cartagena region, a pardo named José Padilla had become the focus of a political 
controversy. Padilla, whose father was originally from Saint-Domingue, was an 
important commander who had come to prominence defending Cartagena from Spain. 
However, as fears and uncertainty prevailed about the possible roles for people of 
colour during the early years of nation-building, Padilla was passed over for 
promotion. He was an advocate of absolute equality, suffering, as all pardos did, from 
racial discrimination throughout his life.97 His view won him local loyalty, and the 
public in the region made him the general commander. Shortly thereafter, a rumour 
spread through the region that someone overheard a person in the area saying ‘this 
would be a good night to finish off the whites’.98 Padilla got tangled up in political 
machinations and the spectre of inciting an alleged race war, and was unable to defeat 
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his rivals, or explain himself to Bolívar. He was executed that October.99 Pardocracia 
was still evident among nervous generals. 
  A Mexican agent, meanwhile, had been in touch with Boyer, looking to work 
together to ‘assure the independence of the United States of Mexico’ by launching an 
attack against Cuba, the bastion of Spanish imperialism. The Mexican president at the 
time, José María Bocanegra, justified the involvement, proposing that 
The best way to prepare ourselves to defend our territory, in the case of an 
invasion, is in effect, to combine our forces with the co-operation of Colombia 
and Santo Domingo... Santo Domingo is the terror of Cuba: let us take 
advantage [of this], since the alliance that can be formed with Boyer in order 
to assume a threatening attitude, and to make all the Spaniards in Havana 
understand that if they invade us, they will be invaded; if they come to Mexico 
to end the anarchy, as they say, will go to Cuba to end the slavery of 
negroes.100
The news travelled quickly. The governor of Puerto Rico received a letter from St 
Thomas, an important stopping point for ships all over the Caribbean, saying that 
Haiti was getting ready to bring revolution to the two islands, information that was 
passed along to Cuba.101 The US, fearing its interests might be threatened, waded into 
the dispute, writing to Colombia and Mexico to stop them from taking any action. US 
Secretary of State Clay said in a letter to Colombia that such an action would 
undermine European pressure on the Spanish crown to end any lingering wars in 
South America, and that, ‘under these conditions, the President believes that a 
suspension, for a limited time, of the sailing of the expedition against Cuba or Porto 
Rico, which is understood to be fitting out at Carthagena, or of any other expedition 
which may be contemplated against either of those islands, by Colombia or Mexico 
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would have a salutary influence on the great work of peace’.102 Such involvement 
would become a hallmark of US policy towards Cuba, and one that would last well 
beyond the period of rumours in the late 1820s. Martin Van Buren, future president 
but the then secretary of state (1829-1831), wrote to the US minister to Spain in 1830, 
saying: 
The Government of the United States has always looked with the deepest 
interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its 
geographical position which places it almost in sight of our southern shores ... 
Other considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it 
the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be 
made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first 
effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave 
population whose result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent 
shores of the United States.103
But the Spanish crown was out of step with public sentiment and issued a real órden 
saying the islands should stop worrying about Haiti now, and that if troops were 
needed for extra support they would be sent out.104 But of course, they anxiety did not 
go away. The rumour mill was fed even more grist when the Spanish ambassador in 
London reported that an attack on Manilla which Mexico was apparently plotting was 
actually meant to be a cover for an attempt to free Cuba.105
 However, despite the decades of paranoia, Haiti did not invade Cuba or Puerto 
Rico, it had not spread abolition anywhere except next door, and it was not the igniter 
of race wars in the new Latin American states. Instead, it had to contend with constant 
threat of invasion itself until 1825; poverty; political fighting and fragile peaces; as 
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well as being ignored or pushed away by most of the international community. If the 
fear of Haiti was in any way real in the 1820s, it was only in the fevered imaginations 
of those whose worst nightmare was to lose life and livelihood in a race war. That 
these groups included Cuban and Puerto Rican planters is not surprising, nor that the 
US felt a relationship was too much of a risk for stability in the southern states, but it 
was a revelation for Haitians that the type of equality and independence espoused by 
Latin American leaders did not only not include them, but it apparently failed to 
encompass anyone of African origin. How this was met by free people of colour 
around the region is hard to know, though incidents like the Padilla episode in 
Colombia, and the continued presence of free people of colour in conspiracies and 
plots in Cuba and Puerto Rico attests to the almost certain anger and disappointment.
 At the same time, the continued success of Haiti – inasmuch as it remained a 
republic – meant that its potential could be used by Spanish officials in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico to suppress people as well as create new powers, as demonstrated by both 
Vives and Torre. They had a lot of interests at stake. Not only did they feel that had to 
ward off possible incursions by the US, they had to make sure rebel influences from 
the American republics did not overturn their social order. At the same time, they 
watched Spain’s liberal experiment fail, and the high cost of those battles, which saw 
the country go deeper into debt and spend much of the nineteenth century in civil war. 
Even for the planters, whose wealth perhaps proved some comfort when it became 
clear that they would get little say in their own governance. With the two periods of 
reform over, and the return of a more determined crown and officials, the relations 
between Spain and Cuba’s elites would begin to take a very different form, with a 
small fissure growing into a giant split. The pulse for independence would still 
continue to beat, and over the course of the next eighty years, many Cubans became 
engaged in that struggle. Likewise for Puerto Rico, the question of independence 
would return many times, while social control and attempts to suppress would-be 
republicans would mount.
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 Within the span of fifty years, the colonial outposts of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
saw their fortunes change dramatically. Alongside this was larger shifts in the Latin 
American and Atlantic worlds. The 1820s were a critical juncture in this. Staying 
loyal where others had left, these two islands were rewarded with the protection of the 
crown, something they increasingly felt was needed to contend with the racial 
imbalance internally and the external threat of invasion from republicans or Haiti, lest 
they suffer the same fate as Santo Domingo, taken under Haitian control, as their 
slave populations began to rise. 
 The 1820s was in many ways a decade where many uncertain aspects of the 
previous 20 years fell into place, if only temporarily. The lines were re-drawn, and 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines stood behind theirs. Fear had a large part to 
play in this, as it often does in times of uncertainty, but what makes this period 
significant is that many strands came together: racial fears, republicanism, economic 
growth, the rise of US power. It is also useful to see how this fear of Haiti manifested 
itself in the new republics as well, showing how Haiti had become a symbol of a type 
of liberation that even the new republics found threatening. The rumours of race war 
prompted by Haitian involvement in Gran Colombia meant that anyone considering 
independence in Cuba or Puerto Rico had to factor in the possibility that despite all 
their efforts, a Saint-Domingue-style uprising could very well happen. This did not 
stop the slaves arriving, just as the lack of any such race war did not extinguish this 
ongoing fear of Haiti, or quell the spirit of independence. But the result of the decade 
was the entrenching of attitudes around the region.
Conclusion
This chapter illustrated how this decade was a critical juncture between the many 
strands of the other chapters – racial fears, republicanism, the fall of Spain and the 
return of peninsular liberalism, the spectre of repression in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and 
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how they coalesced during this time, firming up relationships that would continue for 
decades. The idea of Haiti, too, became more entrenched, its reputation renewed by 
fears in the new republics that black rule was a possibility. Within Cuba and Puerto 
Rico the concern was also very present – despite the assurances of Arango that a 
Saint-Domingue uprising could not happen in Cuba, the racial balance offered a 
potentially different version of events. More widely, this chapter has illustrated the 
growing influence of US power, and the changing nature of international diplomacy 
and geopolitics, with Spain falling behind in Europe and the world. The revolutionary 
earthquakes that had struck the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Atlantic 
world – resulting in US independence, Haiti’s slave rebellion, and Bolívar’s Gran 
Colombia – had stopped by this point, with new alignments in the political fault lines. 
For Cuba and Puerto Rico, little more would shift for decades, as they left this period 
of transition in the same place they had started, though now they were not only richer, 
but also the centre of Spain’s diminished imperial world.
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Conclusion
The ‘fear’ of Haiti in the Spanish Caribbean – of its people, of its potential – was far 
broader and more complex than it might seem at first sight. It was not just about slave 
rebellions but about the larger social order; there was no static fear, but anxiety was 
constantly in flux, relative to changing circumstances. The very nature of Spain’s 
colonial project in itself was inevitably laden with threats. From the earliest days of 
the empire the dangers were everywhere: the sea passage between Iberia and the New 
World; the establishment of colonies in tropical climates; the possibility of plunder on 
the ocean; the relations with the indigenous people. But by the eighteenth century, 
these perils had largely disappeared, though plunder and disease remained constant 
fixtures of criollo life. In addition there were social concerns that arose as generations 
of Spaniards were born in the colonies, giving rise to complicated identities and 
relationships to people in the peninsula. And with presence of slave labour, and the 
rising numbers of free people of colour, there was a racial aspect to these changes as 
well, and a growing need to implement a racialised social order, one that could put 
slaves at the bottom and keep them there.
 However, with the advent of the the Haitian Revolution, a new kind of fear 
was brought not only to the neighbouring Spanish islands, but to the entire region, as 
the French Revolution that had preceded it brought to Spain. Although this thesis 
focused on the Spanish Caribbean, the British and remaining French islands were also 
in similar states of alert and panic between 1791 and 1804. At once the slave rebellion 
in Saint-Domingue represented a threat to the social racial order in a broad sense, but 
also, as this thesis has shown, it created a serious predicament for the Spanish 
economic project that had come to life under the Bourbons. Convinced of the value of 
agricultural goods, Carlos III listened to his advisors and granted concessions, giving 
planters the incentive they needed to expand their operations. This received an 
unexpected boost when Saint-Domingue descended into chaos by allowing Cuba to 
pick up much of the sugar business, but also through the French planters who fled to 
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the island and were able to bring their capital and advanced technologies with them. 
This not only helped the sugar trade, but also stimulated coffee production in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. The rise of the sugar plantations on those two islands coincided with 
the advent of the republican age in the Americas, as embodied by the US and then the 
former slaves of Haiti and later Spanish America. This combination provoked not 
only racialised fears about slave uprisings, but the potential loss of the islands further 
bound Spain to them in their pacto colonial.1 
 Santo Domingo, however, fell outside the boundaries of this arrangement, and 
in many ways suffered an ‘unspoken’ fate – rule by former slaves. Santo Domingo 
showed the mirror image of the colonial pact: lingering, isolated, and poor. From a 
perspective that encompasses all three Spanish islands, this particular case illustrates a 
different side to this story of Haiti in the Caribbean. The example of Santo Domingo 
shows two things. First of all, that its experience could not be to the other territories 
anything other than a frightening example of what might happen to them. Yet the 
other side of this was the reality and longevity – 22 years – of the Haitian-Dominican 
relationship. The botched attempt at independence in 1821, coming little more than a 
decade after a successful fight to become once again a Spanish colony, illustrates the 
contradiction that was very much part of the Caribbean world. Amid all this, however, 
the real Haiti was in no way capable of doing what was expected of it, yet Spanish 
colonial officials were constantly braced for attack. Indeed, Haiti was more concerned 
with protecting itself – hence the high number of men in its military and its perpetual 
concern about European invasion. The idea of Haiti was an emotional canvas on 
which nervous officials and elites drew out their ideas, expressing their anxieties, not 
only about race but also the changing economic fortunes of the colonial sphere, and 
larger realignments of Europe and the Atlantic world. The threats had changed – the 
Arawaks and Taínos that the first Spaniards had encountered on the island had now 
been replaced by free people of colour; unquestionable royalism had given way to 
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passionate republicanism. One of the ways anxiety about these changes could be 
articulated was by placing them on Haiti. It follows, then, that at moments of great 
tension – for instance around the time of the 1812 abolition debates, or of the end of 
the republican wars some 20 years later – Cuba and Puerto Rico received constant 
notice of Haitian attack, of slave revolts, of looming chaos. 
 A sense of security for the elites in Cuba and Puerto Rico meant they had to 
live among a climate of oppression; and inevitably it was the people of colour who 
suffered this the most under these regimes. Beaten, imprisoned, and made scapegoats 
for unrest – slaves and free people of colour bore the brunt of colonial anxiety. But 
that is not to say that whites were excluded. For instance, the treatment of French 
refugees in Cuba provides an example of the extent of anxiety. Initially wary of their 
republican ideals, as well as the thoughts and possible actions of the slaves they 
brought with them, they were given a wary welcome – one that by 1808 had run out. 
In Cuba, the mechanics of the state even set up a junta to find and regulate these 
immigrants, and ultimately to drive most of them elsewhere into the Caribbean world 
when Napoleon invaded Spain. And with the advent of independence movements, 
whites became further implicated in usurping stability, and punished for it. 
 On the other hand, the constant proliferation of orders, proclamations, 
testimonies, and arrests which fill up archival legajos indicate that the ‘order’ that 
Spanish officials tried to maintain was fragile. Perhaps Miguel de la Torre would not 
have felt the need to confiscate copies of Voltaire’s writings in 1823 if this had not 
been the case. The tools of maintaining public order were well-honed by the 1820s, 
and officials well-practiced in suppressing slave plots could now turn to uncovering 
republican plans. And while the question of whether or not leaving the Spanish fold 
would have tipped the islands into a race war is unknowable, at the time it was not 
even a question but a certainty, hence the wider interest in Cuba’s future, as expressed 
by the US presidents. For the new republics of Latin America, the spectre of Haiti 
loomed, as Simón Bolívar and other generals articulated their ideas about how to 
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build a nation and what role pardos should play, citing the island as dangerous 
example.
 What this thesis has sought to show is how fear endured in the Caribbean: the 
planters fearing the French in 1791 were very different to those who did not want a 
Bolivarian intervention in Cuba. Likewise, for colonial authorities, anxiety about 
peninsular events gradually diminished as juntas across Latin America asserted their 
own authority. Moreover, it is not surprising that these ideas became conflated in the 
official mind, and often tagged to Haiti. Criollos felt that they had no option but to 
remain loyal to the crown. In many ways Floridablanca’s initial concerns were well-
founded – liberty needed to be avoided at any cost. Not only had it caused decades of 
upheaval in France, but it had also cost the French their most valuable colony. He was 
aware of the danger of the ‘contagion’ of liberty and lived long enough to see its first 
manifestations in Spain in 1808. He died before he could witness the extent to which 
these forces, combined with the frustrations of criollo elites, would bring about the 
end of Spanish rule. 
 Colonial control lasted in Puerto Rico and Cuba until 1898. The predictions of 
physiocratic thinkers had come true, and agriculture flourished. On the back of this so 
had other aspects of the economy, and Cuba even began to bring in Chinese 
indentured labour in 1847.2 Yet abolition did not come until later – 1873 for Puerto 
Rico and 1886 for Cuba. Spain had finally abolished the slave trade in 1867, some 46 
years after its initial pledge to Great Britain. Though, of course, there was a nearly 30-
year gap in the British colonies between the end of the slave trade and the ending of 
slavery. But after the practice of enslaved labour had ended in Jamaica, Barbados, and 
Trinidad, Cuba in the period from 1830 to 1860 saw an enormous influx of African 
slaves. More than 350,000 people were imported into Cuba from 1830 to 1860, while 
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in Puerto Rico there were 10,250. After 1860 the numbers dropped significantly, with 
the years 1860 to 1866 seeing around 55,000 slaves imported to Cuba.3 
 The themes explored in this work would come up repeatedly in the years that 
followed. An outbreak of rebellions in Cuba in 1843 had prompted the colonial 
authorities to react with previously unseen levels of repression in what became known 
as the ‘year of the lash’ in 1844. More broadly, the series of events known as ‘La 
Escalera’ saw the island’s officials mount a brutal attack on people of colour or any 
whites accused of being part of a ‘conspiracy’. In the crackdown, thousands were 
killed or beaten.4 The well-honed techniques of repression were once again displayed 
in full force. These events were followed a few years later by the twin threats of 
‘Africanisation’ and annexation to the US.5 The United States once again entered the 
picture, as southern landowners were also feeling under threat. Plans were drawn up 
for a filibustering expedition to Cuba with the aim of putting the island under US 
control after Spain refused President Franklin Pierce’s offer to buy it.6 In the end, 
Cuba remained under Spain’s control. In Puerto Rico, similar fears saw the 
introduction in 1848 of a bando contra la raza africana which was aimed at the 
policing of all people of colour, as the threat of slave insurrection persisted.7
 Eventually, it became clear there was no other option than to introduce some 
form of gradual emancipation once Spain had finally agreed to end the slave trade. 
The Moret law, which was approved by the Cortes in 1870, stipulated that children of 
slaves were to be free, and attempted to limit corporal punishment of slaves, as well 
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as freeing anyone who managed to reach the age of 60. Unsurprisingly, slave owners 
sought to delay its implementation for a couple of years. These changes had coincided 
with the most valuable sugar crops to date – from 1856-65 the mean annual value of 
sugar output was nearly $70 million.8
 The issue of independence, of course, did not go away either. In 1868, a 
criollo conspiracy in Puerto Rico turned into a small, though unsuccessful, struggle 
known at the Grito de Lares. In Cuba, too, anger at the colonial regime was growing, 
and later that year a battle in the East began that would turn into the Ten Years War, 
which, like events in Puerto Rico, would be unsuccessful in securing independence, 
but it would open the way to later struggles. Some 20 years after the end of that war, 
Spain’s imperial chapter came to its conclusion, when its defeat in the Spanish-
American war meant the loss of its remaining colonies, and US control. 
 Santo Domingo, meanwhile, also experienced its fair share of drama. It 
lingered under Haitian rule until 1844, when power struggles caused Boyer to lose 
control of the island. Dominicans used the opportunity to organise an independence 
struggle via a secret society known as la trinitaria, which was successful and resulted 
in the establishment of the República Dominicana. The experiment was initially 
somewhat short-lived, as there was another attempt to deliver the island into Spain’s 
protection in the 1860s. Pedro Santana struck a deal to restore the island to Spain in 
1861, but this time there was little appetite for a return to 1809. Resistance mounted, 
and resulted in a war that lasted until 1865, but one in which the supporters of 
independence were victorious. 
 As for Haiti, it continued to linger. A British missionary, John Candler, visited 
the island in 1841, touring many of its port cities. He noted that in 1838-39 the value 
of coffee on the island was £834,055, tobacco £51,222, but sugar was not even listed 
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in the records he had seen.9 Indeed, output had dropped from 2.5 million pounds in 
1820 to around 6,000 pounds in 1842.10 He was struck by the potential of the island in 
its trade with Britain and the US but noted,
It is greatly to be lamented, that the commerce of Hayti, large as it is by 
 comparison with that of many other nations, should remain so limited and 
 stationary as it has done. Were the industry of the people brought properly to 
 bear upon the soil, and were the juice of the sugar-cane manufactured into 
 sugar for exportation, instead of being converted into a deleterious spirit which 
 injures and degrades the consumers, the exchangeable products of the country 
 might in a few years be multiplied five-fold.11 
 In the white mind, Haiti still had power, even in the age of abolition, except 
now it was a symbol of racial war. A striking example is the case of the Morant Bay 
rebellion in Jamaica in 1865 – well after the end of slavery on the island. A rebellion 
broke out in the East of the island, over long-held grievances which came to a head 
over the unfair jailing of a black man who had been squatting on land. It was brutally 
suppressed – nearly 500 people were killed, even more flogged, and houses burnt 
down. Such retaliation prompted calls in Britain for an inquiry into Governor Eyre’s 
actions. Eyre maintained that he was keeping order and had taken necessary actions to 
prevent a race riot. The events also prompted intense public debate began between 
intellectuals John Stuart Mill and Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle backed Eyre, which was 
not surprising, as he was opposed to black resistance. In his infamous article, The 
Nigger Question, he mentioned Haiti, saying: 
‘Or alas, let him [a free black] look across to Haiti, and trace a far sterner 
 prophecy! Let him, by his ugliness, idleness, rebellion, banish all White men 
 from the West Indies, and make it all one Haiti, – with little or no sugar 
 growing, black Peter exterminating black Paul, and where a garden of the 
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 Hesperides might be, nothing but a tropical dog-kennel and pestiferous 
 jungle ...’12
 
As for Eyre, his defence of the suppression was that indeed he was saving the colony 
from a race war. He told the committee how the rioters were ‘determined to make 
Jamaica a second Haiti’.13 
 The idea of Haiti ran far and wide, and took on myriad meanings.  The impact 
of the Haiti Revolution turned out to be more dynamic and long-lasting than has been 
recognised. As Gwendolyn Midlo Hall pointed out, ‘Colonial officials were fairly 
competent comparative historians, and avidly sought to learn the lessons of the 
Haitian Revolution to prevent a repetition of similar scenes on their own soil. The 
archives are full of admonitions and suggestions about how to prevent another Santo 
Domingo’.14 But it in many ways was also a success. As well as inspiring fear, it also 
brought hope to the oppressed and enslaved, and for ever altered the Caribbean. 
Although the republic was plagued with internal divisions and much poverty, it 
persisted in its freedom. It is perhaps an irony however, that the liberty of Haiti 
allowed for the continuation of colonial rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico. The spectre of 
slave revolts, coupled with the onset of ‘second slavery’, ultimately resulted in a 
successful Caribbean reconfiguration for the Spanish crown and criollo elites, 
bringing wealth to the islands, as well as to the Spain – though much of that would be 
spent on fighting during Spain’s turbulent nineteenth century in the Carlist Wars that 
broke out between 1833 and 1872. The impact of the Haitian Revolution on the 
Hispanic Caribbean was profound, shaping the historical trajectories of all three 
265
12 Thomas Carlyle, Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question, (London, 1853), p.22.
13 Anti-Slavery Reporter, London, 1865; see also Gad Heuman, The Killing Time: The Morant Bay 
Rebellion in Jamaica, (London, 1994); B. A. Knox, ‘The British Government and the Governor Eyre 
Controversy, 1865-1875’, The Historical Journal 19, No 4 (1976), pp. 877-900.; Gillian Workman, 
“Thomas Carlyle and the Governor Eyre Controversy: An Account With Some New Material,” 
Victorian Studies XVIII (1974), pp. 77-102.
14 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies: A Comparison of St. Domingue 
and Cuba, (Baton Rouge, 1996), p.125.
islands, as well as the metropole. Examining it, moreover, has provided an insight into 
the role and power of fear in the nineteenth-century colonial world, and how 
racialised anxieties were about far more than race. Slavery, abolition, republicanism, 
and colonialism were all factors in the emotional mix, giving rise to repression and 
resistance. 
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